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AT PREFECTURE AND COUNTY LEVEL
BY MARIA CSAN`DI, HAIRONG LAI
Abstract
The study describes the acceleration of the disintegration and withdrawal
of the party-state network and transformation of the system on national
level, and empirically surveys the impact of the hardening reproduction
constraints of the party-state network since 1994 in three Chinese pre-
fectures and six counties. We track the reactions to the hardening repro-
duction constraints at these levels and the consequences of these reactions
on the transformation of the party-state network at those levels. We make
an effort to demonstrate the differences in impact, reactions and conse-
quences among the given administrative levels and between them. We
also try to detect how does this process change the relationship among
the actors within the net (party-state and economic decision-makers) and
between those within and outside the net. The survey is based on the im-
plementation of the Interactive Party-State model (CsanÆdi, 1997, 2003)
that serves as a device and approach for comparative empirical analysis.
The surveyed prefectures and counties provided a test-field for the postu-
lates of the model.
More than 70 interviews with provincial, prefecture and county level
party- and state officials, different level statistics, national and local
level documents and secondary sources forged the raw material for the
study.2
A KÍNAI PÁRTÁLLAM ÁTALAKULÁSA,
A PREFEKTÚRÁK ÉS MEGYÉK TÜKRÉBEN
CSAN`DI M`RIA ￿ HAIRONG LAI
Összefoglaló
A tanulmÆnyban a pÆrtÆllami hÆl￿ bomlÆsÆnak Øs visszahœz￿dÆsÆnak, va-
lamint a rendszer ÆtalakulÆsÆnak felgyorsulÆsÆt ￿rtuk le makro szinten.
Emellett empirikus kutatÆs seg￿tsØgØvel feltÆrtuk a hÆl￿ roml￿ œjratermelő-
dØsi feltØteleit K￿na hÆrom prefektœrÆjÆban Øs hat megyØjØben.
Nyomonk￿vett￿k azt, hogy e szinteken milyen m￿don reagÆlnak a roml￿
feltØtelekre Øs azt, hogy e reakci￿k hogyan hatnak a pÆrtÆllami hÆl￿ Ætala-
kulÆsÆra a vizsgÆlt szinteken. Igyeksz￿nk bemutatni a hatÆsok, reagÆlÆsok
Øs k￿vetkezmØnyek k￿z￿tti eltØrØseket az egyes adminisztrativ szinteken be-
l￿l Øs azok k￿z￿tt. Azt is megpr￿bÆljuk nyomonk￿vetni, hogy ez a folyamat
hogyan vÆltoztatja meg a pÆrt-Ællami hÆl￿n bel￿li szereplők (pÆrt- Ællami-
Øs gazdasÆgi d￿ntØshoz￿k) egymÆshoz val￿ viszonyÆt Øs a hÆl￿n bel￿liek Øs
az azon k￿v￿liek k￿z￿tti viszonyt. A kutatÆs az Interakt￿v PÆrtÆllami Modell
(CsanÆdi, 1997, 2003) alkalmazÆsÆval kØsz￿lt, amely az ￿sszehasonl￿t￿ em-
pirikus elemzØs eszk￿zØ￿l Øs szempontjÆul szolgÆlt. A vizsgÆlt prefekturÆk
Øs megyØk egyben a modell műk￿dőkØpessØgØnek k￿sØrleti terepØt jelentet-
tØk.
T￿bb mint hetven ￿ tartomÆnyi, prefektura Øs megyei ￿ szintű pÆrt Øs Ællami
vezetővel kØsz￿lt interjœ, k￿l￿nb￿ző szintű statisztika, orszÆgos Øs helyi do-
kumentumok Øs mÆsodlagos forrÆsok szolgÆltattÆk a tanulmÆny alapanya-
gÆt.3
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PART I
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: INTRODUCTION
This joint research was aimed at tracing the process and main characteris-
tics of the transformation of the Chinese party-state at county level between
1994 and 2002. We view transformation as a reaction of decision-makers to
the different impacts attaining them and the behavioral and institutional
consequences of these reactions on the party-state. The starting point of the
research is 1994. At this period, according to different data, a major impact
may be detected in the Chinese economy as a whole and at different ad-
ministrative levels. This major impact was caused by the coincidence of the
implementation of some impressive economic policy decisions and the ex-
piration of others with great prior importance. The two major factors of this
impact were the introduction of a comprehensive tax reform and the expi-
ration of the dual-track system that allowed enterprises to profit from mar-
ket factors while enjoying advantages of being nested in the party-state
network. Expiration was due to the decline of advantages provided by the
net (CsanÆdi, 2003).
For empirically studying behavioral and institutional consequences of eco-
nomic policy impacts on party-state a new analytical framework is intro-
duced: the Interactive Party-State Model (CsanÆdi, 1997, 2003). On the one
hand, the Interactive Party-state Model (IPS) serves to empirically analyze
and compare structure and dynamics of party-states and that of their differ-
ent administrative levels. In turn, the research serves to empirically test the
theoretical postulates of the model.
1. THE IPS MODEL AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL FOR THE SURVEY:
THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF PARTY-STATES
The IPS model is an inductively built dynamic construct that postulates a self-
similar
1 character for the structure and operation of party-states along
different dimensions (time, space, different aggregation and condition of the
                    
1  Self-similarity (fractal character, see Mandelbrot, 1987) of and within party-states
was first defined in CsanÆdi, M. and A. Lőrincz (1992), "Neural Network Formaliza-
tion of the Hungarian Party-state System", Behavioral Science, Vol. 37, 1992, pp. 81￿
108.8
structure). It also identifies the structural reasons behind the differences
among party-states
2. Here is a brief description on some of the most
important arguments and conclusions of the model. Figure 1 schematically
shows the structural properties of a party-state network besides the usual
rules of hierarchies within the party and the state. The distinctiveness of a
party-state structure evolves through the direct connection between party and
state, politics and state-owned economy.
                    
2 CsanÆdi, Maria, Party-states and their Legacies in Post-communist Transformation.
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK,  Northampton, Ma, US, 1997, p. 26 in Chinese,
Zhuanxing: Toushi Xiongyali Zhengdang-guojia Tizhi, Jilin People￿s Publishing
House, 2002, p.44.9
Figure 1 Power structure of the party-state system and the perspective
of decision makers (actors, An  ) on various levels on the
possible paths of interest promotion (from 'a' to 'i'.)
Key:
S State (non-party) hierarchy
P Party hierarchy
An Decision-makers (actors) at the n
th level of the structure
D1 Direction of intra-hierarchy dependence
D2 Direction of cross-hierarchy dependence
I1 Path of intra-hierarchy interest promotion
I2 Path of cross-hierarchy interest promotion
I3 Direction of feedbacks
Direct connections arise via the power instruments of the party
3. We call these
instruments as interlinking dependency lines
4 (D2). These interlinking lines
penetrate non-party institutions and directly influence decisions by
overlapping positional-, organizational-, activity structure and individual
behavior. These specifics render the political nature of dependencies and
interest promotion possibility (I2) for those connected to these lines.
Interlinking lines produce structurally built-in inequalities among those
connected and those lacking connection. Inequalities further increase through
the deeper political integration of strategic actors that ￿ by meeting priority
criteria of politically rational concerns are able to short cut the decision-
making process within and across party and state hierarchies at any level.
With short cuts (I3) another structurally built in inequality will emerge.
Through shortcuts actors are able to directly promote their interest and resist
to disadvantageous decisions by encountering decision-makers whom
                    
3 Not only state owned economy is directly connected to the party. The same direct
connection is true for other sub-spheres and levels of the society: culture, politics,
education, healthcare, civil society, social movements, mass movements, executive
legal and judicial decisions, procurator, police apparatus, etc. These sub-spheres for
the sake of simplicity, are "condensed" in the concept of the non-party ￿ state ￿
hierarchy.
4 The interlinking lines infiltrating institutional framework of non-party institutions are
the following: nomenklatura system overlapping decisions through position structure
in non-party organizations, the subject-matter responsibility system overlapping
decisions through activity structure, the instructor system, overlapping decisions
through the organization structure, the party membership, overlapping individuals
through party discipline  (CsanÆdi, 1997, 2002).10
otherwise, considering their formal position in the hierarchy would never
meet
5. Shortcuts are in short, a form of structural feedback
6.
The result of unequal interest promotion and resistance possibilities is that
bargaining capacities and formal positions differ. These characteristics furnish
the unique institutional interactivity of politics and other spheres at the level
of individual decision-making. They comprise the structural background of
operating principles of party-states: the politically monopolized
dependencies, politically monopolized interest promotion, as well as
politically monopolized resource extraction and redistribution. They also
contribute to the politically rational motivation and subsequent behavior of
actors that are being simultaneously exposed to and holding dependency
links within the structure concerning intervention, selection and interest
promotion.
This double-sided position (might and exposure) and the inequalities within it
result in selective bargaining capacities, defining the distribution of power
within the system. These inequalities allow the different resource attracting,
extracting, distribution and resisting capacities of the actors within the net.
The balance of these capacities will result in selectively hard or soft
reproduction constraints that forge the dynamics of the structure, motivating
actors’ behaviour.
Elements, principles of connection of these elements, and principles of
operation and the subsequent motivations and behaviour have a self-similar
pattern.  Self-similarity of structure and dynamics will prevail in time, as well
as in space in different aggregations and conditions of the structure.
Differences emerge within the self-similar properties due to the different
distribution of the origin, extent and depth of interlinking threads, locus of
origin, arrival and density of feedbacks acquired and the different distribution
of resource extraction and allocation capacities (CsanÆdi, 2003)
7. The
                    
5 For example it may occur within the hierarchies: if an enterprise manager is invited to
a ministerial session, or a local party secretary becomes member of the Central
Committee of the Party (CC), or across hierarchies: if an enterprise manager or local
government leader becomes member of the CC.
6 See about feedbacks in detail CsanÆdi, 1997, pp. 28￿37, in Chinese version on pp. 46￿56.
7 Variation of structural elements: interlinking lines may vary in density, extension and
depth, shortcuts may vary in density, level of accumulation, the place of those in the
respective hierarchy who are privileged by short-cuts and the place (within his/her
own or party hierarchy) where the privileged actor reaches in consequence of the11
combination of these differences will define the different distribution of
power and accordingly the differences in the distribution of soft or hard
reproduction constraints. Selectively soft/hard reproduction constraints are
therefore structure-specific.
Placed in the dynamics of the model, these arguments call for the re-
evaluation and modification of the widespread view on soft budget constraints
in party-states:
a) the term should refer to the result of the balance of attracting, resisting,
extracting and allocating capacity of decision-makers, instead of being a
mere concept of distribution. In more detail, incomes evolve in conse-
quence of the unit’s extracting and attracting capacity. Expenses evolve
in consequence of the unit’s revenue sharing pressures both from below
￿ allocation ￿ and from above ￿ and in consequence of the resisting ca-
pacity to this pressure.
b) Therefore, budget constraints in party-states do not evolve in economic
conditions but instead, are nested in power relations. From this point of
view, the dynamics of the system transforms budget constraints into a
wider concept: the reproduction of the status quo within the power net-
work. We shall call this in short: reproduction constraints.
c) Therefore, budget constraints in party-states is a systemic instead of eco-
nomic concept that evolves in the context of interrelated party-state-
economic decision-making and interaction of self-similar units during
self-reproduction
d) in consequence of the structural and dynamic self-similarity, the idea of
reproduction constraint is extended structurally, in space and aggrega-
tion. It concerns any self-similar unit nested in power relations: from the
lowest to the highest aggregation levels: from enterprise shop-floor and
village to national level rather than concerning only enterprises; it also
concerns any unit of one level;
e) Within the net, softness of the reproduction constraint is selective rather
than being a general rule. Selectivity within the net is based on political
and not economic rationality. Selectivity evolves according to the
interaction of self-similar units with specific distribution of power and
bargaining capacity. Consequently, within the net not only soft, but also
hard reproduction constraints prevail, according to actual bargaining
capacities of the unit, and distribution of power within it.
                                                                                                                                              
short-cut, and extracting and allocating capacity may vary according to which level
they are delegated or concentrated in the structure.12
f) Reproduction constraint is not only structural but also a dynamic con-
cept. Reproduction constraint is not only extended in space and aggre-
gation level, but in time as well. Soft reproduction constraints may turn
to hard from time, to time and prevail for different periods and than may
turn to soft again.  Persistence and frequency of this shifts depends on
the capacity of changing bargaining position within the higher aggrega-
tion, redistributing power relations within the unit, and/or acquisition of
resources from outside the net.
g) Reproduction constraints and budget constraints outside the net are
strictly connected. When reproduction constraints are soft, budget con-
straints do not play a role. If reproduction constraints are hard, budget
constraints may still be soft, softening reproduction constraints and sus-
taining status quo within the net. If reproduction constraints are hard and
budget constraints become hard, adaptation pressure increases, repro-
duction of status quo meets barriers and cohesion within the net de-
creases, and the net disintegrates.
Based on the above arguments, we shall use reproduction constraints as an
extended version of budget constraints in time, space and aggregation of
different patterns of power distribution.
Motivations, subsequent behavior and instruments of resource acquisition
due to the selectively soft or hard reproduction constraints provide the self-
reproduction mechanisms of the whole system.
THE MAIN PATTERNS OF REPRODUCTION AND TRANSFORMATION
8:
Development and transformations of party-states may be grouped from the
point of view of reproduction of the system, according to the specifics of
the distribution of power and its adequate dynamics (Table 1). Distribution
of power includes three major structural factors: (1) the distribution of
interlinking threads, (2) the existence of structural feedbacks (shortcuts)
from economic field and (3) the levels of extraction and allocation of
resources.
                    
8 CsanÆdi: A critical analysis of comparative reform literature. 2003, manuscript13
Table 1: Basic patterns of power distribution in party-states

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Three major patterns are given upon the variation of the above elements: (i)
Self-exploiting, (ii) Self-disintegrating and (iii) Self-withdrawing. These
structural patterns will determine the different ways of self-reproduction
with pattern-conforming instruments of resource extraction and
distribution, the capacity within the pattern to resource attraction and
resistance to intervention and extraction. These factors will determine the
different frequency of hardening reproduction constraint within the pattern.
Patterns will also contribute to the differences of the paths to trans-
formation of the given systems. The impact of the specific way of
reproduction on the structure results in characteristic disintegration,
collapse and transformation. Disintegration, collapse and transformation will
occur in different sequence and pace according to the specifics of the pattern
of power distribution.
In consequence of the self-similar character, within a complex aggregation,
according to bargaining capacity and structural specifics, different patterns of
self-reproduction may exist simultaneously nested in different power rela-
tions. Accordingly, different extent of reproduction constraints may evolve
simultaneously and enhance pattern conforming instruments of resource ac-
quisition (forceful resource redeployments, resource mobilizing- and resource
creating reforms). Moreover, due to the different patterns in one aggregation,
also different transformations may take place concurrently. They may coin-
cide in time and space, on the same level aggregations, in different level ag-
gregations, and in different conditions of the given power structure. In turn,
according to the variations within one pattern one may find the variations of
the same transformation.
The national level as a final aggregation has also reproduction constraints
that may be also soft and hard and hardening. In the case of final aggrega-
tion, attracting capacity evolves in relationship of resources from outside
the net (either within or out of the national framework) that may be still dif-
ferent. Within the net the center has extracting and allocating capacities to-
ward lower level self-similar units (be these industrial, agricultural or re-
gional). The softness of the reproduction constraint of the center within the
net depends on the bargaining, attracting and resisting capacities of lower
levels in relationship to the center and its attracting capacity from outside
the net.
Let us turn to our research subject: the Chinese way of self-reproduction. First
let us see which of the transformation patterns China is seemingly following
and second what role reproduction constraint plays in this transformation,
third, what stage is China in this transformation, according to the model.15
PART II
CHINA AS INTEGRAND PART OF THE IPS MODEL
9
2. WHICH OF THE TRANSFORMATION PATTERNS IS CHINA SUPPOSEDLY
FOLLOWING?
As a complex aggregated structure, China seems to follow the third ￿ Self-
withdrawing pattern. All the above factors are pointing to the hardening re-
production constraints and the relative and absolute shrinking of the net and
supposedly, in consequence of the decreasing distribution capacity within
the net, to the emptying and disintegration of this latter at different levels.
The process reflects the dynamics of the self-withdrawing pattern: disinte-
gration parallel to transformation. Our supposition is supported by the fol-
lowing: (a) the fast growing share in employment, and production contri-
bution of non-state enterprises (the field partially or completely out of the
net) see Table 2; (b) the large amount of infiltrating foreign and domestic
private capital into the net (forming joint-ventures and purchasing shares of
transformed SOEs, or whole SOEs, or green-field) and increasing the mar-
ket field outside the net see Table 3; (c) the growing budgetary deficits see
Table 4; (d) the decline in the number of economic units attached to the net
Table 2; behind the numbers, the expansion of TVE (Township and Village
Enterprises) and SOE privatization both in number and enterprise size to
get rid of burdens (World Bank interview and Table 2); second, the in-
creasing number of village, township and county level free-and semi-free
elections (Lai Hairong, 2000
10) for redistribution of responsibilities and
enhancing willingness for collaboration and resource contribution.
As to the privatization, the process within the net is already reaching the
larger state owned enterprises on province and central level as well: bad
loans are exchanged to debt equity shares, compensated from privatization
incomes, through liquidations or FDI inflow. Large enterprises are being
transformed into companies and also listed at stock exchange for attracting
                    
9 The following section is part of CsanÆdi’s book manuscript that besides describing the
model demonstrates its applicability as an analytical tool in the case of the
Romanian, Hungarian and Chinese party-state systems.
10 Lai, Hairong, and Rong, Jingben, ￿A Comparative Study on Reform of the Political
System at County and Township Levels in China,￿ prefaced by Andrew Watson,
representative of Ford Foundation for China, Comparative Economic and Social
Systems, No.4, 2000.16
additional capital. Shares of the largest SOEs are being "diversified", that
is, also domestic and foreign capital may purchase them.
Table 2 Number of employment in each sector and their contribution to
industrial production on national level in 1994 and 2000
1994 2000 Difference Rate %
SOEs 112140000 81020000 -31120000 72.25
Collective 153020000 143190000 -9830000 93.58
Employ-
ment
PEs 48300000 81190000 32890000 168.10
SOEs 37 28         /99 -9 ￿
TVEs
Collective E
38 35         /99 -3 ￿





Others* 15 19         /99 +4 ￿
*  Including FDI, share-holdings with majority shares not controlled by the state, and
those with ownership not clearly defined.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1995, compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of
China, Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1995, p. 84-85, 375. China Statistical
Yearbook, 2001, compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of China, Beijing:
China Statistics Press, 2001, p. 247.
Table 3 Total investments in fixed assets by ownership on national level
in 1994 and 2000  (Billion RMB)
1994 2000 Difference Rate %
SOEs 932.3 1650.4 718.1 177
Collective 266.5 480.1 213.6 180
Pes 197.1 470.9 273.8 239
Jointly owned* 10.0 9.5 -0.5 95
Share-holding 56.9 406.2 349.3 714





43.0 129.3 86.3 301
Others** 3.3 14.0 10.7 430
sTotal FDI 281.8 337.9 56.1 120
*  Jointly owned by more than two SOEs, or by some SOEs and TVEs, or by SOEs and
PEs. ** Those with ownership not clearly defined.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1995, compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of
China, Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1995, p. 398, 558. China Statistical17
Yearbook, 2001, compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of China, Beijing:
China Statistics Press, 2001, p. 428, 607.
Table 4 Revenue, expenditure, and balance of governments at all levels
as an aggregation in China in 1994 and 2000 (billion RMB)
1994 2000 Difference Rate %
Revenue 521.8 1339.5 817.7 257
Expenditure 579.3 1588.7 1009.4 274
Balance -57.5 -249.2 -191.7 434 def.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1995, compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of
China, Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1995, p. 375, 379. China Statistical
Yearbook, 2001, compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of China, Beijing:
China Statistics Press, 2001, p. 112-113.
3. ACCELERATION OF THE SELF-WITHDRAWAL OF THE PARTY-STATE IN
CHINA:  ESCALATION OF RESOURCE-CREATING REFORMS COMBINED
WITH ABSOLUTE SHRINKAGE OF THE NET
Reproduction constraints within the net are hardening from two
dimensions. First, hardening begun from township level and is spreading
towards the center. Second, hardening reproduction constraints are
spreading at each aggregation level, thereby narrowing the circle of those
economic units (be they enterprise or administrative territory) who can
persist with soft reproduction constraints. In turn, the circle of those with
hardening reproduction constraint expands. The process paves the way for
further absolute shrinkage of the net through increased asset stripping, close-
downs, bankruptcies and privatization spreading upwards the net.
The spreading of hardening reproduction constraints within the net
contributes to the increasing efforts and simultaneous difficulties of
resource extraction on central level, and with that, the acceleration of
absolute and relative shrinking of the net on national level. This process, in
turn, further accelerates the spread of hardening reproduction constraints
within the net on lower levels. Reactions to the hardening of reproduction
constraints within the net are very different, due to the bargaining
(attracting, resisting) capacities and internal distribution of power
(extracting and allocating) of the given unit and thus, the pressures and
capacities to attract resources from outside the net.
Acceleration in China will leave more and more interlinking (D2) threads in
limbo in consequence of the disappearing targets in the economy, or turn
them less important in consequence of the infiltration of alternative (private)18
capital in the net, or by voluntary withdrawing them while market is taking
over. Hardening reproduction constraints within the net in China from the
1990s.
Reproduction constraints hardened by the end of 1980s. Central government
introduced an overall retrenchment that contracted economy. Growth was
again incited through the usual instruments: TVEs, so far strictly suppressed,
were again politically legitimized. In December 1991, Deng declared that "the
more I watch TVEs the more I like them". Similar legitimization with radical
consequences was Deng’s roundtrip in 1992 that made private enterprises to
boom. Motivations and possibility to openly acknowledge market activities
came from the decreased extracting capacity of the center from within the net
and from outside the net (Table 5).
Table 5: Revenues and Expenditures at Central and Local Levels
before 1994 (Billion RMB)
Revenues Expenditures Years
Total Central Local Total Central Local
1981 117.58 31.11 86.47 113.84 62.57 51.28
1982 121.23 34.68 86.55 123.00 65.18 57.82
1983 136.70 49.00 87.69 140.95 75.96 64.99
1984 164.29 66.55 97.74 170.10 89.33 80.77
1985 200.48 76.96 123.52 200.43 79.53 120.90
1986 212.20 77.84 134.36 220.49 83.64 136.86
1987 219.94 73.63 146.30 226.22 84.56 141.66
1988 235.72 77.48 158.24 249.12 84.50 164.62
1989 266.49 82.25 184.24 282.38 88.88 193.50
1990 293.71 99.24 194.47 308.36 100.45 207.91
1991 314.95 93.83 221.12 338.66 109.08 229.58
1992 348.34 97.95 250.39 374.22 117.04 257.18
1993 434.90 95.75 339.14 464.23 131.21 333.02
Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/
Foreign investments, compared to the low growth along the 1980s begun their
sharp increase from 1990 on. The number of foreign investment projects
between 1990 and 1992 quadrupled, contractual value raised seven fold, and
realized value raised about three fold respectively (Xiaojuan, 2001a, p. 1,
Table 1). FDI did not spread evenly in China. Most of the export oriented FDI
was concentrated in the open coastal regions due to preferential policies, lack
of competition for the scarcity of SOEs and for ancestral roots. In the 1980,19
90 percent of such investment was made in these areas and only somewhat
decreased in the 1990s. Opposite to the tendencies of the 1980s, when FDI
overwhelmingly preferred joint ventures with collective enterprises, in the
1990s, the wholly owned foreign firms begun to grow impressively. From
services preferred in the 1980s, FDI shifted to industrial activity in the 1990s
(Xiaojuan, 2001a, pp. 4-6).
Meanwhile, SOEs’ tax contributions steadily decreased. This was partly due
to SOEs’ declining profit rates and partly to the boom of other enterprises
and that of their tax contribution. This process drastically declined the
market share of SOEs in all branches except gas industry between 1988 and
1995 (Jefferson and Rawski, 1998, pp. 28￿29). In consequence of the rapid
influx of TVEs, foreign invested enterprises and domestic private firms,
SOE profit rate declined for they had difficulty to sustain higher prices
(Jefferson et al., 1998, p. 147) than their non-state counterparts. SOEs’
profitability also relatively declined in consequence of their slower pace of
profitability increase
11. Also capital productivity of SOEs declined between
1988 and 1992 in consequence of over-investment (Jefferson et al., 1998, p.
147;  Jefferson and Rawski, 1998, p. 31). Moreover, profit rates have
declined overall, in consequence of the decline of monopoly rents due to
entries and import competition (Jefferson and Rawski, 1998, pp. 34, 36;
(Jefferson et al., 1998, p. 145). This latter lead gradually to the decline of
the advantages of the dual-track system.
Despite of the decrease in profitability, SOEs still gave overwhelming part
of industrial taxes (65 percent in 1994)
12, that meant 30 percent of total
government revenues (Jefferson and Rawsky, 1998, p. 38). However, losses
were widespread among independent accounting units, while bailouts since
1986 were partial and radically declining (Jefferson and Rawski, 1998, pp.
80￿81). This fact suggest stricter selection, hardening reproduction constraints
of widening number of SOEs in consequence of hardening reproduction
constraints of central and local governments to which they were subordinated.
In respect of the center, less allocating capacity and stricter selection is also
suggested by the decline of the share of state budget (state budgetary
                    
11 Capital intensity, pensions, social services, housing that are most extensive in state
sector depress reported profit rates Jefferson et al., 1998, p. 149)
12 Revenue tax-rates until 1994 were differentiated to the detriment of the SOEs: in
1995 it was 72 percent for SOEs, 60 percent paid by collectives and 39 percent by
foreign-invested firms (Jefferson and Rawski, 1998, p. 38).20
appropriations) as a source for investment financing in SOEs. The share
precipitated from 40.6 percent in 1983 to 4.9 percent in 1995 (Jefferson et
al., 1998, p. 221). Hardening reproduction constraints within the net as a
reaction accelerated the implementation of structure-conform instruments.
FIRST SIGNS OF ACCELERATION:
Letting the net shrink officially:
From 1992 on we can experience the acceleration of the absolute and
relative shrinkage of the net.
Deng’s roundtrip was formalized on the 14
th Party Congress in 1992 that
declared the existence of the socialist market economy. The legitimacy of
private ownership was included in party statute. The next year, legitimacy of
private ownership was also legislatively recognized as Peoples’ Congress
included private ownership in the constitution. Moreover, the 14
Th Fourteenth
Party Congress had formally jettisoned the central plan as a mechanism for
resource allocation. By that time, the proportion of planned production in
total industrial output value was reduced from over 90% in 1978 to 5 percent
in 1993. (Woo, 1998 p.158).
1) The same year, Contract Responsibility System was enhanced by the
Regulations on Transforming the Management Mechanism of State-
Owned Industrial Enterprises and delegating SOEs more autonomy in
several fields. The law defined three major forms of companies: joint-
stock, limited liability company, state wholly-owned company. By that
move, the law legalized the absolute shrinkage of the net in economic
realms. It is not by chance, that FDI inflow in fixed assets doubled from
1992 to 1993 and so did FDI’s share in total investment in fixed assets
(Xiaojuan, 2001b, p. 4, Table 5)
2) The perspective on the infiltration of foreign and domestic capital
into SOEs was given by the resolution of 3
rd plenum of the 14
th. Party
Congress in 1993. According to the resolution, every SOE must turn into
company. Around 10,000 enterprises were to be transformed into
corporations, restructured or merged (Sun, 1997, p. 22￿23). The shares in
centrally controlled SOEs were to be held by the state in the first instance.
However, the intention was to distribute the shares gradually to provincial
and local governments and banks. Operations were delegated to the
management, who in turn bore responsibility for profits and losses. At a
plenum in 1993, the CPC had identified "ambiguous property rights" as a
key reason for the inefficiency of SOEs (Woo, 1998 p. 155). According to21
the Congress, the virtually bankrupt enterprises will be allowed to go
bankrupt.
3) The Plenary Session of the 14
th. Party Congress adopted a document
on economic system reforms. It did not advocate privatization, but it left
the door open slightly for the process. As for the small state-owned
enterprises, it stressed that the management of some can be contracted
out or leased. Others can be shifted to the partnership system in the form
of stock sharing, or sold to collectives or individuals (China Daily,
Supplement, Nov 17 1993; Cao, Qian, Weingast, 1999, p. 120).
However, by the time privatization was legalized and politically legitimized,
the process has already started: for example, Zhucheng city in Shandong
province, started privatizing SOEs in 1992, when two-thirds of its SOEs were
losing money or just breaking even. Almost 90% of county-supervised SOEs
in Zhucheng have already been privatized. Sichuan province was steadily
selling off money losing SOEs, and Guandong province was selling profitable
SOEs as well, in order to finance local infrastructure and to clear the debts of
unprofitable SOEs before putting them up for sale. Heilongjiang province had
announced plans to privatize 200 SOEs after having sold 160 successfully
(Woo, 1998, p. 180).
By allowing officially the purchase of smaller SOEs, and legalizing joint-
stock and limited liability company, the Party had willingly or unwillingly
a complex impact on local behavior. It provided another field for forced
resource redeployment on short term (privatization), allowed local
governments to get rid of unprofitable burdensome enterprises wile in turn,
acquired some resources for the conservation of the remaining net. On the
long run, central consent contributed to the relative and absolute shrinkage
of the net (C. Lin, 1989 p.113).
Parallel to political opening and spreading privatization, FDI increased
dramatically: from 1991 to 1993, the number of projects increased six-fold,
contractual value increased tenfold and realized value increased also six-
fold. From 1993, the number of projects and contractual value declined but
the realized value increased steadily. Foreign investments were
concentrated on the coastal region and overwhelmingly performed by
oversees Chinese in forms of joint ventures and cooperative enterprises
with local counterparts (Xiaojuan, 2001a, pp. 1, 2 Table 1, Table 3).
Revenue centralization efforts within the remaining net:
In consequence of the hardening of reproduction constraints within the net,
revenue centralization efforts continued, parallel to decentralization of22
expenses and economic liberalization. In 1994 a major general tax reform
was introduced. The new tax reform redistributed revenues within the net.
It introduced central, local and shared tax revenues, items to be taxed. It
also decreased SOEs’ tax contributions to the level of other type of
enterprises (see Wong, 2002, p.51, Table 4.1, in the Appendix 1).
The definition of the local and central discretion for tax revenues was
paired with strong political pressure for the institutional redistribution of
power towards the center (Wong, 2002, Likeping, 2002; Burns, 1994, pp.
470￿471). Meanwhile, several accompanying decisions were brought to
support the redistribution of power and through that, that of the extracting
capacity towards the center:
￿ The nomenklatura of the leaders of local branches of specialized
banks was re-centralized. Monetary authority was centralized and the
central bank have refused to accommodate monetary policy to the local
government’s behavior (World Bank, 1996; Cao et al., 1999, p. 117)
 13.
Central bank set up new regional network from 1995, delegating
personnel decisions to the regional organization instead of local
government (Wong, 2002, p. 175). Commercial banks’ party secretary
and management became subordinated to the central Financial Party
Committee in 1997 (Interview, 2000). As a result, a nationwide credit
crunch was imposed and inflation has declined drastically, from over 20
percent to about 2 percent in 1997
14 (Qian￿Roland, 1998, p. 1157, Chan
Morgan, 1997; Cao et al., 1999, p. 117)
￿ tax offices of central the Central Tax Bureau were set up at all levels
for collecting to-be-shared and central taxes separately from local taxes
￿ 1995 new Budget law prohibited the central government from
overdrawing the central bank and from deficit financing its current
account. Capital account could be deficit financed but only with issued
government bonds. Local governments were required to have their
                    
13 Before this measure 70 percent of central bank loans were made by its local branches
(Cao et al., 1999, p. 117).
14 This centralization went parallel to the introduction of several monetary institutions,
enhancing the rule of law: In 1995, People’s Bank of China Law, empowering it to
supervise and regulate the financial services industry; Commercial Bank Law; Insurance
Law; Securities Law;  Trust Law; Foreign Exchange Management Law; Township and
Village Enterprise Law, 199623
budgets balanced, the law strictly controlled their bond issues and
restricted borrowing in the financial market and to ensure enforcement
of the Budget Law, and independent State Auditing Agency was also
introduced (Cao et al., 1999, p. 116).
All the above measures were conducive to press through the redistribution
of revenues towards the center. In consequence of the one-off revenue
centralization, revenues increased the center’s share from 22 to 56 percent
(Wong, 2002, p. 37). Meanwhile, the distribution of expenditures remained
unchanged (Likeping, 2002, p. 11). As a result, tax and fiscal reform and
additional measures in 1994 further hardened local governments’
reproduction constraint.
Centralization efforts were again selective according to different bargaining
powers of the provinces. To ease the resistance of the provincial leaders at
the introduction, fiscally compensating compromises, tax rebates were
reached between center and province. Consequently, measures that paved
the way for the tax reform, simultaneously contributed to their formfitting
to the given power distribution (see measures in Wong, 2002, pp. 34, 35,
71). Formfitting may be further revealed in the partial success of power
redistribution measures: local branches of central tax offices soon joined
local interest network (Wong, 2002, p. 82).
Local governments’ reproduction constraints became harder both in conse-
quence of SOE loss and indebtedness, in consequence of the decreased ca-
pacity for credit pressure and selective distribution, the loss of revenues in
consequence of the tax reform of 1994, the decreased subsidies to SOEs, the
constraints to reduce enterprise tax as they did in the past, and the stable ex-
penditure assignments despite revenue reallocation.
Hardening reproduction constraints were even more salient at sub-provincial
levels, since there were no central regulations on the assignment of local taxes
and the redistribution of shared revenues and tax rebates, neither on the roll-
ing down of expenditures concerning sub-provincial level. These as we sup-
pose, varied according to the distribution of power within the province and at
lower levels
15. What we know is that after 1994 fiscal resources were con-
                    
15  This assumption is underlined in Wong’s book, who describes the sub-provincial
distribution of revenues and expenditures and being subject of individual
negotiations (p. 101). The difference in bargaining capacities among sub-provincial
levels is reflected for example in the categorization of the provinces into three groups24
centrated to the provinces (Wong, 2002 p. 46) while expenditures were dis-
tributed. This fact points to the faint attracting capacity in general of the sub-
provincial levels (Wong, 2002, p. 57). We also know that extra-budgetary
funds ￿ that are fees collected locally and run uncontrolled by upper levels ￿
had a high rise after 1994 tax reform (Wong, 2002, p. 101), as an effort to
compensate budgetary losses. We also know that after the tax reform privati-
zation and closedowns accelerated at lower levels and are spreading to upper
levels
16. The tendency of solutions was legitimized by the central govern-
ment: in mid 1995 it endorsed a slogan for SOEs on "grasping the large and
letting go the small" (Cao, Qian, Weingast, 1998, p. 121). The local SOEs
were working at a loss, the local governments spent their money to support
them, responsibilities for subsidize them were decentralized, so there was a
drive to get rid of these SOEs (Woo, 1998, p. 155, Wu, 2000).
Not only extra-budgetary revenues and privatization and closedowns in-
creased but local governments tried their best to hide resources from upper
levels even in constrained conditions. Local governments encouraged local
enterprise to pursue short-term profit maximization, hide profits, secretly pri-
vatize SOE under their control, tacitly encourage spontaneous privatization or
local revenues to go untaxed (Qian, 1996, p. 436).
Decline of the growth and hardening reproduction constraints within
the net:
By 1996, in overall, economic growth was slowing down: this did not only
concern SOEs but also collective enterprises. Profit rate of collective
enterprises (most of them rural): from 26,5% in 1980 dropped to 8,2 in 1996,
that of SOEs dropped from 24,9 to 6,5 respectively. (Smyth, 1998 p. 785). As
                                                                                                                                              
by Wong, according to the total, partial or no rolling down of tax-rebates received by
the province (Wong, 2002, p. 77-8).
16 Based on the model’s approach, we may suppose that bargaining capacity at sub-
provincial level was higher where tax rebates were totally redistributed. Bargaining
capacity was less where they were partially redistributed and faint where they were
totally kept at provincial level. Combining Wong’s data on rebate decentralization
and dispersion of extra-budgetary funds at sub-provincial level ￿ compared with that
of the budgetary funds ￿ we may suppose that the ratio of SOE privatization will be
lower in those provinces where both bargaining capacity and extracting capacity are
high. They will be somewhat higher where extraction ratio is lower no matter bar-
gaining capacity, and the highest ratio is where sub-provincial level bear neither ex-
traction nor bargaining capacity. We suppose, that this tendency will run parallel to
the frequency of sub-provincial governments that became deficit-financed  (Wong,
2002, p. 57). Unfortunately however, data on privatization are not systematically col-
lected, therefore, at present, there is not possibility to provide such table.25
a result, between 1997-98, the average personal income growth has fallen off
sharply and for large portions of rural and urban poor it has reversed.
(Adjusted for inflation personal income during the 1980’s rose 329 percent in
cities and 155 percent in the countryside. For 1990￿1995 it rose 226 percent
in the cities and 186 percent in the countryside (He Qinglian, 1998).
SOE decline had also accelerated by 1996. After 18 years of gradual
transition the SOE share in China’s total industrial output has declined from
77,7% to 28.8% in 1996
17; the share of employment in SOEs in 1996 was
57.4% of urban workers; it possessed 52.2% of total investment in
industrial fixed assets. SOEs were losing money, in spite of the large
amounts of implicit subsidies from low interest loans and other policy
protections (Lin at al, 1998, p. 426). The volume of explicit subsidies to
SOEs did not increase parallel to the losses. Therefore, its ratio compared
to losses declined steadily between 1986 and 1991 and so did the share of
subsidies to loss-making state owned enterprises in the GDP. The share of
subsidies to loss-making SOEs in the GDP from its 1985 height (5.66%)
declined to 0.27% in 2001
18. Overall, in 1996, 23 percent of the 390,000
enterprises reported losses (Jefferson and Rawski, 1999, p. 35). According
to Cao et al., 90 percent of loss-making enterprises were small. Losses in
1996 were suffered by 38 percent of SOEs, 40 percent of large and
medium-size SOEs, 60 percent of small SOEs, 18 percent of collectives and
34 percent of "other" (share-holding and foreign invested) enterprises
(Jefferson and Rawski, 1999, p. 35; Cao et al., 1999, p. 122). These data,
increasing towards the smaller and lower level, combined with the parallel
tendency of hardening reproduction constraints towards smaller and lower
levels and from SOEs to TVEs, and confronted with the declining chances
for bail-outs along the same line, forecast the upward spreading of
privatization.
Accelerating privatization and closedown:
Hardening reproduction constraints accelerated the privatization process.
Based on an investigation in 1996 on letting go the small SOEs, You and
                    
17 Large scale SOE consisted 5.6 of SOE in terms of number in 1996, contributing
63.3% of he gross output value of the SOEs (Lin, Cai, Li, 1998, p. 425).
18  Guoyouqiye Shichanghua Jincheng Yanjiu (A Research on the Marketization of
SOEs), by research team on the development of Chinese market economy, Institute
of Economic and Resource Management, Beijing Normal University, 2002. Source:
http://www.snweb.com.cn/gb/people_daily/2002/12/14/f1214001.htm26
Wang stress that by mid 1996 Heilongjiang had completed the privatization
of 91,4 percent, Shandong 65 percent, Hunan 60 percent, Jilin 56 percent
and  Anhui 39 percent of its small SOEs. According to another source
(Institute of Economic System Reform, 1997) Jiangsu had completed about
50% by the end of 1996 and Henan started privatization in 1996 with plans
to finish by the end of 1997 (Cao et al., 1999, p. 109). By the end of 1996
up to 70% of the small enterprises had been privatized in pioneering
provinces. Most counties moved from the experimentation stage to a
promotional stage. Many provinces have completed the change of
ownership in more than 50% of their small and medium sized SOEs on
county level (Cao et. al, 1999 p.109). By 1996 some pioneering counties
such as Yibin of Sichuan, Shunde of Guangdong, and Zucheng of Shandong
had privatized almost all of the state-owned enterprises under local
supervision. By 1997, most counties in the country had progressed to
privatize more than half of the state-owned enterprises under local supervision
(Qian￿Roland, 1998 p. 1157). Unfortunately there are no aggregate data on
privatization. We can estimate the scale only from the reduction of the
number of small industrial SOEs. From 1995 to 2000, the number of small
industrial SOEs dropped to its half, from 72,000 to 34,000. The difference
is 38,000 that had been either privatized or liquidated, or merged (World
Bank Interview, 2002). Since increasing sized enterprises are in general
subordinated to increasing rank of authority, and privatization is gradually
reaching larger enterprises, privatization is spreading upward. Upward
spreading is a relative term, since this tendency meets the tendency of
decentralizing inefficient enterprises to lower levels from all levels, in
order to get rid of burdens (see latest decisions of the 16
th Party Congress in
2002 on the decentralization of SOEs subordinated to the center). At the
same time an opposite tendency spices the dynamics: the centralization of
the subordination of efficient ones (CsanÆdi￿Lai, 2003).
Not only subordinated inefficient enterprises were closed down or sold, in
order to get rid of burdens and ease reproduction constraints. Local authorities
constrained by hardening reproduction conditions accelerated lay off in
subordinated SOEs: Between 1995 and 1997 local governments in China took
the initiative to massively lay off excess workers from state owned
enterprises. Lay-off was mostly organized at city level, privatization at county
level (Qian￿Roland, 1998 p. 1157). In recent years many cities began to
restructure medium SOEs, transferring laid off employees to non-state
enterprises, or sending them home, but workers still maintain some nominal
relationship with their enterprises, (subsistence salary, housing, health
care). More than 10 million workers lost their jobs in 1996, while 8,927
million were in compensation state. About 3,6 found jobs 2.3 went out
from labor market. Mostly in textiles, measurement instruments, coal,
metallurgy, chemical, forestry, machinery and electronics (Wang, 1997).
The narrowing of the circle of those preferred and the parallel spreading of
privatization, lay-off and the legitimization of multiple kind property was
shown on the 15
th Party Congress in September 1997. In the Congress Ciang
Co Minh declared that state owned industry should be decreased. He
announced that China would be undertaking massive privatization of its SOE
sector (Woo, 1998, p. 180). China would privatize 369,000 SOEs (Woo, 1998,
p. 155) In fact, this was the formalization and acceleration of the process that
begun five years earlier.
A report in the official China Securities in November 2000, citing a survey
by the National Bureau of Statistics, predicted that SOEs would eventually
withdraw from most industrial sectors, while the state would retain control
over a few key areas. The recommendation was that the state should pull
out of direct activity in 146 of the 196 industrial departments, including
garments, textiles, food, beverages, daily consumer goods and electronics.
The report suggests that the state relinquish its monopoly but maintain at
least partial control over 35 sectors, including coal, iron and other major
mineral resources, aerospace, new materials, computers, medicine,
electronics, petrochemicals and automobiles. A state monopoly should be
retained in 15 sectors, including military industries and electricity output
19
Emptying the rigid structures:
At the end of the interlinking and hierarchical lines not only close-down and
privatization puts an end to the concrete function of the interlinking threads
but also the emptying of the rigid structures. In other words, the transferring
of state assets outside the net through asset stripping went steadily further.
Already in December 1995, the State Administration of State Property
reported that asset stripping in the SOE sector "has been about 50 billion yuan
(annually) since the early 1980s" (Woo
20, 1998 p. 177). This process
                    
19 (SOE restructuring accelerates Economist Intelligence Unit, a U.K.-based
information provider, Chinaonline 6 December 2000).
20 The author refers to ("State Drain Must End" China Daily, Dec. 13, 1995, see also
"State Toughens Stand to Protect Its Possessions" China Daily, June 2, 1995; "Asset
Checks Can Stop Fiddles" China Daily, June 7 1995; "Market Investigated for Losing
State Assets", China Daily, June 2, 1995.28
accelerated to such an extent that State Council formed a leading group
under the direction of then Vice Premier Zhou Rongji to examine the issue.
This is not a problem that is restricted to joint stock and shareholding co-
operatives. Assets are being drained through various avenues such as joint
ventures, between state and non-state firms. In shareholding co-operatives
it arises because there are many instances where local officials understated
the true value of collective assets so that purchasers of shares, including
themselves, could benefit at reduced costs (Smyth, 1998 p. 798).
Increase of foreign direct investment:
By mid 1990’s foreign firms together with rural enterprises already
accounted for more than half of China’s industrial output (Cao et al, 1999,
p. 119).
According to some experts, as a result, competition pressure on SOEs
reached a new level. It had greater effects on SOEs supervised by local
government than on those supervised by the central because of local SOEs
are frequently in competitive industries where the non-state firms entered
(Qian and Roland, 1998 p. 1157).
The competitive pressure from outside the net combined with privatization,
closedown, lay-off and the emptying the rigid structure, also brought about
the weakening of interlinking threads that were connected to the economy. In
joint ventures, Party secretaries are not allowed to sit in the board of directors
as such. They potentially have a voice through the trade union, especially
since the Party Secretary is often simultaneously the trade union leader
(Pearson, 199 p. 69). In Guangdong and the Special Economic Zones had
succeeded in eliminating Party influence or activity. By 1995, in Guandong
the Party was essentially absent from joint ventures (Pearson, (1997 p.70).
Same process is occurring with the withdrawal of state shares in share holding
companies ("Fortune": Inside the New China A Special Report. 1999. Oct. 11.
No. 19. pp. 50￿86).
Supposedly in consequence of hardening reproduction constraints and the
decentralization process as an accompanying tendency, the absolute
shrinking of the net is taking place also in party and state hierarchies.
Competitive elections on village level government begun in early 1990s,
based on the Organic Law of the Village Committees passed in 1987,
including candidate choices (Tong, p. 216). Moreover, despite explicitly op-
posite central instructions, as a perfect example for the self-withdrawal of the
net, competitive elections to government leadership and in some places to
party leadership are being held since than on township and some at county29
level. These elections are organized by local level party committees at the in-
struction of higher level local party Organization Departments (Lai, 2003).
These solutions seem to be spreading upwards encouraged by the province in
order to win over the confidence and resource contribution of the population
in politically destabilizing economic situations (see Jiangsu province Lai,
2003).
Based on the above processes, we can stress that the hardening of
reproduction constraints within the net instead of promoting adaptive
transformation, enhances its accelerated withdrawal. Withdrawal (absolute
shrinkage) is perceived in the process of getting rid of burdens by
eliminating targets (close-downs and privatization), by cutting interlinking
and hierarchical threads (joint ventures and FDI, semi-free elections, by
ceasing functions and supervising institutions). Absolute shrinking takes
place also as an indirect result of the asset stripping (transfer of competitive
professionals, assets, partial and whole units outside the net).
It appears, however, that withdrawal, despite competition pressures, does
not imply the change of rationality and priorities within the remaining net.
It reacts only with the narrowing of the circle of those privileged. The
prevalence of political rationality and operating principles is suggested by
several factors. The nomenklatura prevails in the shrinking net, both
concerning the state owned economy
21, the bureaucracy and financial fields
22.
Government orders suggest the characteristic selectivity in bailouts: in direct
subsidies from fiscal authorities, cheap credits from the state banking system,
policy loans from the central bank financed with money creation, replacement
of indicative credit quotas with mandatory ones, strict restriction on the flow
of funds outside the state-owned banks and lending to projects outside the
credit plan, use of administrative credit plan and centralization of the
allocation through it, local leaders (government, ministry and bank) held
                    
21 Political rationality in appointments: According to official survey conducted in 1995,
about 80% of SOE managers, especially those of large and medium SOEs, were
appointed through political and administrative channels (referring to Window of
Hong Kong, published in HK, March 10, 1995, p. 10).
22 The autonomy of the banking system is relative. They are not private enterprises. In
order to prevent bank corruption the state intervenes and interferes and controls very
deeply the banking process and the punishment is very severe. It controls money
supply too and at every bank the PC has to play the leading role. The banks general
manager and its deputy are nominated by a central financial PC subordinated to the
State Council (Interview, 2000).30
individually responsible for credit plan fulfillment (World Bank interview,
2002, Brandt, Zhu, 2001, p. 441)
23. The increase and large share of extra- and
off-budgetary revenues of local and central governments
24 testifies to the
prevailing extracting capacities through dependency lines. Feedbacks are still
prevailing and being created in the case of important enterprise (State Owned
Assets Management Commission). Foreign capital is still attracted by large
enterprises that have efficient feedbacks
25 to make their way in the net. At
lower levels, share-holding cooperatives have not reduced the power of local
governments. Despite only partially owning shares, they still nominate the
director (Smyth, 1998 p. 798). Corruption is very high, also indirectly
testifying for the prevalence of the importance of party and state feedbacks.
Capital flight from SOEs during delayed bankruptcy procedure is taking place
in collaboration with local courts (Chinaonline, 2002). Some grassroots Party
and government officials have become the new bosses of business
corporations. Conversely, some successful private entrepreneurs joined the
party and have been incorporated into ranks of the political elite, those
remaining outside the net are being regularly consulted by local cadres on
major community issues (Tong, 1997, p. 216). Private enterprises still use
"red cap" as a method to drain the privileges still available within the net.
Moreover, also formfitting process within the net is still taking place
according to structural and dynamic characteristics. Since 1996-97, parallel to
the growing instability in reproduction of status quo, efforts may be detected
to re-strengthen the party’s role in SOE’s
26 and centralizing its control over the
strategic state property ￿ especially large enterprises ￿ while getting rid of
burdens (World Bank, interview, 2002). In 1998, 10 ministries were
abolished, and also enterprises formerly created and owned by other
ministries, military, police etc. were detached to decrease economic policy
                    
23  For example:
"However, SOE’s net losses deepened in early 1996, the state banks were ordered in
mid 1996 "to satisfy the funding demands of the large and medium-sized State
enterprises" (Central Bank urges support for faltering enterprises. China Daily, July,
8, 1996 (Sachs￿Woo, 1997, p. 44 )
24 For example, the creation of share-holding co-operatives provided a means for rural
enterprises to raise capital both for the enterprise and the local government. The
management forced sometimes workers or all were forced by TVGs (township and
village governments) to buy shares. (Smyth, 1998 p. 797).
25 (Dodsworth et al. 1996; Mallon and Irvin 1997 in Sun, 1997, p. 26￿27).
26  In 1997, there was a No.3 Document issued by the CC, emphasizing the role of party
(World Bank, interview 2002)31
intervention in enterprise management. The vacuum of power however was
soon filled up and form-fitted within the net. Instead of increasing enterprise
autonomy, the abolishment of the 10 ministries ended up in the redistribution
of power towards the party. Large Enterprise Working Committee (LEWC)
27
under the Politburo was set up. LEWC was responsible for appointments of
the enterprise leadership and about 180 strategic enterprise was selected and
subordinated to its nomenklatura function
28. From within them, the
leadership of a smaller number of even more important enterprises is
nominated by the CC’s Organization Department and appointed by the
Politburo. Similar committees were set up on provincial and prefecture levels
for strategically important SOEs subordinated to those levels.
LEWCs in theory do not fulfil economic policy function. However, in
practice, feedbacks to LWC and higher levels mean centralization of
allocation and extraction capacities from lower level governments on
strategically important enterprises. These enterprises cannot be privatized,
however they may go listed through their subsidiaries where they keep
majority shares. They are taking part in central government’s infrastructure
developing "bond project" that is practically compulsory for commercial
banks to finance (World Bank interview, 2002). In case of larger projects,
highest levels of Party and State administration approve their investments
29.
Lately, in early 2003, Economic and Trade Commission (ETC) and LEWC
and some sections of the Planning Office merged under the new name of State
Owned Asset Management Commission. The merger explicitly concentrated
assets to distribute and nomenklatura of the most important enterprises.
30 All
                    
27 The members of this committee were selected from the leadership of the 10 abolished
ministries (World Bank, interview 2002).
28 The managers, the party secretary, and chief accountant were appointed by it (World
Bank, interview 2002).
29 In fact, the Planning Commission, the State Economic and Trade Commission still
have regular power to be involved in the economic policy decision making in these
enterprises. Also, for very large companies like Petro China and Sinopec, economic
decisions, business decisions, are usually approved by the State Council and the dep-
uty prime minister or even the party secretary, for very large investments, like 10
billion or 40 billion worth projects (World Bank, interview 2002).
30 According to the head of the new commission, 64% of the total profits by produced
by state sector (160,000 SOEs) were contributed by the 196 SOEs under the new
commission￿s supervision. The strategy of reforming these 196 SOEs is to
￿encourage those SOEs to be listed in foreign stock market, to diversify the share32
the above suggest that the absolute and relative shrinking and weakening of
the net makes the selection stricter but does not change the selection criteria
within it.
Similar consequences may be drawn concerning the debt-to-equity swaps.
Debt-to equity construction was introduced in 1999 to provide relief and
solutions for 601 selected enterprises with bargaining capacity, (and to the
banks who granted those bad loans many times at government pressure).
These enterprises were selected from among the 6,600 loss-making
enterprises. The debt-equity swaps benefit China￿s SOEs by reducing their
interest payments and allowing them focus on modernizing and
restructuring (World Bank, interview 2002).
Prevailing politically rational selection criteria not only involved soft
reproduction constraints for the narrowing circle in consequence of
attracting and resisting capacity of its members. It further enhanced
extracting drives for the sake of allocation within the net and resource
creating drives outside the net of those to whom they were subordinated.
Since 1994 on, repeated revenue centralization efforts may be detected
through the introduction of newer and newer revenue-sharing techniques.
For example: the inclusion of formerly exclusively local tax into the rank of
shared taxes, the increase of the centralized ratio, the centralization of the
subordination of profitable and decentralization of inefficient enterprises,
the inclusion of extra-budgetary funds in controlled official budgets, the
decentralization of expenses, the transfer of SOEs’ social costs to local
budget and so on (CsanÆdi￿Lai, 2003).
In the following part of the study we shall relate about our empirical survey
that aimed to trace the above process in a selected number of lower level
governments. The question was how did this general process present itself at
county level. Can we really detect these impacts connected to the
introduction of the 1994 tax reform, what were its signs of this impact?
What was the reaction to the impact and what consequences did it have on
the party-state network at those counties?
PART III
IMPACT OF THE CHANGES ON THE SIX COUNTIES WITHIN THE THREE
SURVEYED PROVINCES AND PREFECTURES AND BETWEEN THEM
                                                                                                                                              
owners by inviting FDI to buy the shares￿ (Li Rongrong, head of the commission,
talked with his counterpart in South Korea, Workers Daily,July 8, 2008)33
4. METHODOLOGY
SELECTION OF INTERVIEW LOCATIONS:
We have tried to choose provinces geographically spread in Eastern, West-
ern and Central-Northern China. The other considered factor was to select
provinces in which power structure is characteristically different and the
strength of the party and government, the role of administrative planning,
and that of SOEs, collective and private sector, agriculture, industry and
heavy industry differs. Table 6 shows our choice:













Jiangsu 13 108 Wuxi (2c+6d) Jiangyin Yixing
Shanxi 11 119 Ghangzhi (11c+2 d) Changzhixian Wuxiang
Sichuan 21 180 Ya￿an (7c+1d) Yucheng Mingshan
Source: National Statistical Yearbook 2001, National Statistics Press, Beijing, 2001.
Criteria of our choice are shown on Table 7. From these provinces Jiangsu
is a well situated province: its location is coastal, industrialized, within that
light industry production almost equals to the size of heavy industry. In-
dustrial production is overwhelmingly contributed by TVEs. This province
is one of the few that attracted the large part of FDI (16 percent) and pri-
vate industry also has a significant share in production. GDP per capita is
very high (about 140 percent of the national average). Shanxi is a much
poorer province. It is located in Central-Northern China, industry contrib-
utes to production almost as much as in Jiangsu, but in overwhelmingly
heavy industry (coal mining). Agriculture plays similarly low roll as in
Jiangsu. SOEs are having a major share in industrial production compared
to TVEs. FDI is minimal. The contribution of private enterprises to pro-
duction is one third of the ratio of Jiangsu. Its per capita GDP is less than
half of this latter. Shichuan province, located in Western China is one of
the poorest provinces in China. Among the three provinces under survey, it34
is Sichuan where agriculture plays the most important part, but still, here
too, the industry takes the overwhelming share. Within that, light industry
is as important as in Jiangsu while SOEs play almost as large role in indus-
try as in Shanxi. FDI is also minimal, though twice as large as in Shanxi.
The role of private sector is much more significant than in Shanxi, but
somewhat less than in Jiangsu. The GDP per capita is lower than in Shanxi.35
Table 7 GDP per capital, share of industry and agriculture in GDP,
contribution of SOE, TVE, and PE to industrial production,





































Share of FDI in total
FDI %
0.5 15.8 1.1
Note: *  Production of all SOEs and non-SOEs that have annual turnouts above 5
million RMB.
** Counted by the author based on statistical yearbook. It includes share-holding
companies with majority of shares not held by the state, foreign fund
enterprises, and enterprises with funds from Hong Kong, Macao & Taiwan.
Source: National Statistical Yearbook 2001, National Statistical Press, Beijing, 2001.36
PLANS AND REALITY IN FIELDWORKS
Fieldwork had several constraints. Some were known before the start, oth-
ers turned out during the process of research:
￿  physical capacity constraints: only one person was interviewing. This
condition narrowed the circle of possible interview targets and sharpened
the focus on developments within the net rather than outside of it (joint
ventures, FDI, foreign investment are less thoroughly traced down)
￿  time constraint: possible time length the interviewer was allowed to
spend at one site by his office superiors was about two weeks
￿  interview length constraint: officials did not have time for more than one
interview and did not have more time in one sitting than about one and a
half hour
￿  unequal possibility to reach interview targets: party leaders were less
reachable on higher levels and in general those in the state apparatus
were more reachable than those in the party
￿  political constraints: empirical tracing of the power structure and bar-
gaining position of the given administrative level and that of those sub-
ordinated to them was only faintly possible through direct questions.
Similar difficulties emerged to track asset stripping activities. Archives
from where the main characteristics of the given level’s power structure
could be mapped up were unachievable
￿  Despite the project is beginning with 1994 tax reforms, we did not sub-
merge in the professional details of tax reform since there are really good
experts and excellent studies in this field (Likeping, Wong, Bahl). In-
stead, using this literature from our point of view we could proceed to
trace its impact at the surveyed locations and detect the reactions it has
provoked.
￿  methodological constraints: without knowing prior or during the research
the specific power distribution in each province, prefecture, county under
survey, one can only indirectly and retrospectively guess power structure
from the used instruments of resource extraction and the characteristic
consequences on the transformation of the net
￿  Statistical constraints (i): for the same reason, the application of statisti-
cal rules would have been impossible because even if we new prior the
power distribution, the factors of choice according to the net’s criteria are
not exact and therefore, sampling is very hard. Therefore, field-work tar-
gets were not chosen according to statistical rules but according to geo-
graphic and economic concerns and personal relationships from prior re-
search.37
￿  Statistical constraints (ii): The problem with official statistical data was
the usual: volatile data content, disappearing old and emerging new cate-
gories, inconsistent and missing data on different levels, or at same lev-
els but different locations, that is, incomparability in time and space and
different aggregation. We have also revealed the inhomogeneous basis of
collection of theoretically comparable indicators
31. Table in Appendix 2
demonstrates our efforts to collect the basic statistical data for a multi-
level data analysis between 1994 and 2001. It shows simultaneously
some of the main problems described above.
The table testifies to the fact that from the whole amount and type of data
supposed to be used there are only five (1) Government revenue; expendi-
ture; and balance; (2) Total Employment (SOEs Collective E Private E);
(3)Total investment in fixed assets by ownership (SOEs Collective Private
Es); (4)Total output share of SOEs in industrial production); and (5) SOE
profits that are available at all levels and more or less meet the date (close
to 1994 and 2001) requirements. Therefore, one had to take this extremely
desolating fact into consideration when trying to compare economic devel-
opments with the above basic statistical data.
Further problem is, that from the available data ￿ even if it were consistent
in every respect ￿ one may not directly conclude on the dynamics of the
net. This is because available statistics reflects its results rather than the
process itself that occurs behind it within the net. Reasons behind the num-
bers without the interviews would have remained a black box. Moreover,
analyzing strictly statistical data one may easily arrive to erroneous conclu-
sions concerning the dynamics behind it. On the other hand, interview
findings ￿ while they could be well quantified ￿ have no respective statisti-
cal data collection. For example: there no data systematically collected on
                    
31 For example, employment in and number of different enterprises: The employment
indicator takes all those enterprises that are at the given aggregation level, the enter-
prise number indicator takes the number of enterprises some-times subordinated to
the given administrative level, other all those at the aggregation level. Moreover, we
have the number of subordinated SOEs and Collective enterprises from township
level and above, but not knowing their number at each level in 1994. In 2000 we
have the number of SOEs and non-SOEs whose turnover is above 5 million yuan ac-
cording to aggregation level instead of subordination, and without specification of
how many are private and how many are collective enterprises from those non-
SOEs. Profits of SOEs are collected according to all SOEs in early 1990s but ac-
cording to those that have turnover above 5 million yuan in latter years.38
privatization, on bankrupt enterprises, closed-down enterprises, decentral-
ized or centralized nomenklatura, abolished discretion, abolished party and
state functions, abolished or created departments and functions, decentrali-
zation or centralization of enterprise subordination, administrative registra-
tion level of private enterprises etc.
Therefore, on the one hand, the available statistics ￿ while showing certain
tendencies, will not reflect the dynamics of the processes that interviews re-
flect. On the other hand, data surveyed by interviews may not be quanti-
fied.
Best example for this is Appendix 1 compiled by Bahl and quoted by Wong
in 2002 (p. 51, Table 4.1) on the different central, local and shared taxes.
Interviews revealed ￿ combined with our prior knowledge, that the table
cannot reflect several facts that from our point of view are very important.
These missing factors determine the real amount of revenues from taxes of
the different administrative units and levels: (a) Administrative levels, and
central tax collection: the center collects both central and shared taxes
without regard to ownership. (b) Administrative levels, SOE subordination,
location of enterprises and tax collection:  SOEs are subordinated to
different level government and party authorities concerning their operation
and leaders appointment. Taxes are collected by each level overwhelmingly
according to subordination and partly according to location of SOEs. The
lowest administrative level SOEs are subordinated to in general are the
counties, therefore, lower than county levels do not have those revenues.
(c) Administrative levels, SOE size and tax collection: The size of possible
taxes is greatly determined by the fact, that in general, decreasing fixed
asset size of SOEs are subordinated to decreasing administrative levels. (d)
Administrative levels, ownership and tax collection rights: local tax
collection rights of different levels differs by ownership. Besides the
above-mentioned SOE specifics, TVEs in general are taxed by townships,
private enterprises in general taxed by townships, or according to
registration level. In turn, in case of privatized enterprises taxes remain
collected by the level of authorities that had privatized them. (e)
Administrative levels, distribution of industrial production and tax
collection: The volatility of tax revenues is also determined by the fact that
the those enterprises are kept under central subordination that are in
monopolized industries while those enterprises are distributed to local
levels that are in competitive industries. Moreover, production structure
also differs at each administrative unit at the same level. (f) Administrative
levels, tax collection, final revenue target and power relations: revenue
collection and final targets of revenues do not match. Local tax offices39
collect local taxes, while local branches of central financial tax office
collect shared- and central taxes. Tax rebates will develop according to
provincial decision and lower level resisting and attracting capacity.
Similarly, collected revenues by townships, counties and prefectures and
finally received revenues by the same will depend on their resisting
attracting capacity towards the level above them.
Concluding from the above problems, what we could do is to use the avail-
able data to complement field work findings whenever it was possible
when differences among localities were on stake between 1994 and 2001.
THE INTERVIEW PLAN
CsanÆdi and Lai jointly prepared the interview plan. We have selected the
professional material that formed the background of our interview ques-
tions from the Chinese and English literature (see Reference list). The col-
lected material refers to intergovernmental fiscal relations, introduction and
problems and development of 1994 tax reform, central and local fiscal re-
lations, budgets and extra-budgets, economic policy decisions on decline of
budgetary revenues, case-studies on local government’s role and behavior,
case studies on privatization, market incentives, ownership-reforms, spatial
disparities in the distribution of investments, case studies on private busi-
ness, its relationship to local governments etc, and case studies on local
power relations. The concrete material complemented the researchers’ em-
pirical experiences both in China and Hungary. In turn, the IPS model pro-
vided the theoretical background to analyze the literature according to our
point of view and purpose of research.
The plan contained wide-ranging and deep-reaching questions that covered
the maximum possible, in order to trace the given administrative level’s po-
sition in the net, the impacts on the reproduction of the net since 1994, re-
actions to those impacts and consequences of those reactions on the posi-
tion of the administrative level, and the reproduction and transformation of
the net. The interviewer had the difficult task to select from the prepared
questions according to the administrative level, institution, organizational
section, activity and position of the interviewee.
Communication and on-line consultations between collaborating partners
and further adaptation of interview plans to the concrete situation was made
possible through Internet. Up-to-date information on the interviews for the
partner remaining in Hungary was made possible by the fact that the es-
sence of interviews was soon summarized in one to three pages in English,40
according to the main pre-determined terms and points of view of the re-
search. The number of interviews amounted to 71. Interviewees according
to locality and position were the following (see Table 8).
Table 8 Location, Organization and Position of Interviewees
Shanxi Province Jiangsu Province Sichuan Province Org.
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Positions of the cadres interviewed within each organization:
Finance Bureau: cadres in charge of budgeting (director or vice-director);
Organization dept.: cadres (director or vice director) in charge of appointing
economic cadres;
Planning commission: cadres (director or vice director) in charge of (capital
construction) investment planning;
ETC: cadres (director or vice director) in charge of (technique upgrading)
investment planning;
Policy research: head of vice-head;
Bank: head;41
Industry bureau: vice-director;
LGOER: member of the group;
Enterprise Working Committee: director of division of cadres appointment.
TVE administration: director (in case of Wuxi: vice-director of agriculture
working committee);
Abbreviations:
Loc.: Location Prov.: Province
Org.: Organization Pref.: Prefecture
Comm.: Commission Ch.z: Changzhi county in Changzhi
pref.
Re: research WX.: Wuxiang county in Changzhi pref.
TVE: Township and Village enterprise  J.yin: Jiangyin county in Wuxi prefecture
Adt.: Administration Yix.: Yixing county in Wuxi prefecture
ETC: Economic and Trade Commission  Yu.C.: Yucheng county in Ya￿an prefecture
M.S.: Mingshan county in Ya￿an prefecture.
INTERVIEW ANALYSIS
The essence of interviews were structured according to main points of re-
search simultaneously meant the first step in the process of analyzing their
content. We have analyzed interviews from the point of view of the dy-
namics of reproduction and transformation defined in the model. We took
its most important dynamic factors and pursued a kind of content analysis.
The factors searched were representing the elements of hardening (soften-
ing) reproduction constraints, respective reactions to it and consequences
on the net. Both the definitions of elements and reactions became subtler
with interview experience. Factors were the following: Reproduction con-
straints ￿ centralizing resources, centralizing resource targets, decentraliz-
ing resources, decentralizing resource targets. Reactions ￿ raising extra
budgetary funds, stricter selection, funds from outside the net, getting rid of
burdens (close-down, bankruptcy, privatization), withdrawing the net in the
state (D1), and party (D1 and D2) fields, emptying the net (transfers and
asset stripping), enhancing private sector.
The content analysis followed three paths: (1) selected the above factors
according to time (from 1994 to 2002), (2) according to different variations
of those factors and (3) according to space (differences between different
aggregations and among locations of each aggregation level). The first was
not a complete analysis of the interviews, since factors were not conse-
quently connected to dates. The second compensated the shortcomings of
the first. The third combined the positive traits of the first two type of42
analysis to relate about the differences among prefectures and counties ac-
cording to the above factors.
In the first case, a search was done registering events connected to impacts
on reproduction constraints and reactions according to time and location
and source of the information and its consequence on the net (see Appendix
3). This made possible to get a picture about the general and specific im-
pacts and reactions at a given year and follow the developments from 1994
until 2002. The analysis of the "timetable" provided information about the
implementation of different means in those years and could point to the
tendencies of those actions concerning the net.
In the second case, we made the search according to the different variations
of actions representing those factors. This procedure allowed us to demon-
strate the different kind of possible impacts on the given administrative unit
and possible reactions that we have also illustrated with interview parts. This
analysis lets the reader have a much deeper insight in the rich variability of
impacts and means. It also forges an analytical tool for the reader to get a
wider picture of the developments on lower revels and be able to locate dif-
ferent events from the point of view of the transformation.
In the third case we could give a picture on the differences among the sur-
veyed prefectures and counties according to their reproduction constraints
and the differences in their reactions in measures, in timing the measures,
and in the intensity of applying those measures. We could also reveal the dif-
ferences of the impact of these factors on the transformation of the net on the
given level and between prefecture and county levels between 1994 and
2002. Experiences from interviews were completed by statistics where it was
possible to demonstrate the changes.
5. STRUCTURAL AND DYNAMIC BACKGROUND OF CHANGES  (ANALYSIS OF
THE INTERVIEWS ACCORDING TO THE CATEGORIES OF THE MODEL)
CHANGES IN TIME, FROM 1994 TO 2002
Theoretical part and macro-level analysis stressed and demonstrated that
China as a whole belongs to the self-withdrawing pattern within the model.
Interviews revealed that characteristics of the dynamics of self-withdrawing43
pattern could be detected also on the surveyed prefecture and county
levels
32.
On national aggregated level (see Table 4) between 1994 and 2001 the
government deficit increased four fold, since expenditures increased faster
than revenues. This means that the comprehensive tax-reform introduced in
1994 on national level did not increase faster revenues than expenses.
However, its impact has radically changed the share of revenues between
central and local authorities, by decreasing the share of local revenues. This
was due to the fact that central revenues increased much faster (seven fold),
than local revenues (two-fold). This radical shift however was not followed
by similar move in the development of expenditures. Local and central dis-
tribution in expenditures only slightly changed towards the detriment of the
center. The slight move was due to the fact that the increase of central ex-
penditures was somewhat faster than local ones.
In consequence of this dynamics, central government balance of revenues
and expenditures turned from negative to positive and local government’s
balance turned from positive to negative. The size of the deficit at local
level was more than twice as large as the surplus at central level. In our
terms, central government softened its reproduction constraints, while that
of local government, according to these data, has hardened.
Behind the scenes, 1994 tax reforms had much deeper and broader conse-
quences apart from central actions. The overall impression from the
empirical survey according to the search tracking the dates and events
supports the above. As we have already stressed, the "timetable" does not
represent all the events revealed in the interviews, since not always were
they attached to dates, the focus of this search. But even though, we can
follow from the signs ￿ completed by available statistics ￿ that the 1994 tax
reform within our surveyed provinces has soon rolled down and hardened
reproduction constraints at all levels within the net resulting in government
deficits (see Appendix 4). Exceptions were either due to the usual selection
criteria: for example, resources distributed according to political position as
Wuxiang county that once was one of the guerilla base for the party in
1940s (Wuxiang Party Secretary), or by chance when prescriptions of the
taxation reform turned out to be more advantageous for the locality after
than prior as in the industrialized Jiangyin county (Jiangyin planning com-
                    
32 This does not exclude the theoretical possibility that we could have found units on
different levels or units at the same level that belonged to other patterns.44
mission). Exceptions also derived from phase delay concerning the devel-
opment of TVEs and their decline (see later).
Appendix 3 that shows according to dates, the events of hardening (sof-
tening) reproduction constraints (HRC, SRC) and reactions and its conse-
quences on the transformation of the net. Moves and impacts within the net
and outside of it are represented with the following signs:
R↑; R↓; ←R; R→: revenue  centralization,  decentralization, emptying
the net and attraction  of revenues from outside
the net (e.g. TVEs using dual-track system or FDI
or private profit)
Exp↑; Exp ↓;  Exp →:  centralization of expenses, decentralization of ex-
penses, decrease of expenses (e.g. merger)
D1↑; D1↓; D1→: centralizing state decisions within the state, de-
centralizing decisions, winding up (withdrawing)
intervention at local level state bureaucracy
D2↑; D2↓; D2 →: centralizing nomenklatura or other party inter-
vention, decentralizing nomenklatura, winding up
(withdrawing) party intervention
I3↑; I3→:  creating (acquiring) feed-back, withdrawing feed-
back (political privileges)
P (D1→D2→I1→I2→I3): privatization means the withdrawal of the net in
state and party bureaucracy by cutting targets off
the links
P+: direct increase of the field outside the net (market)
Timetable (Appendix 3) indicates that independent of the year under focus
that as a reaction to declining economic performance of subordinated units,
state bureaucracy is loosening control on investments or completely with-
draws from intervening in enterprise development strategy. Parallel to these
moves we can track the withdrawal of the net in party control: party ceases
higher political rank of enterprises, decentralizes nomenklatura to less im-
portant and lower levels and than either withdraws interlinking threads be-
fore privatization or enterprises are cut off interlinking threads through pri-45
vatization. In general first TVEs disappear, later SOEs, first smaller eco-
nomic units than larger, first at lower levels, later on higher aggregations
33.
Disappearance is due overwhelmingly to privatization
34 or more seldom to
closedown. All these moves have significant consequences on the absolute
shrinkage of the net.
If we group signs in the timetable according to types that increase or de-
crease the hardening of reproduction constraints shrink the net relatively
and absolutely, we can find the unequivocal tendency of the absolute
shrinkage of the net. This is however far from being an exact indicator,
since interviews do not reveal all measures, and not all measures revealed
in the interviews are connected to dates. Moreover, though these moves
happened in one year and reached county level, yet they attained different
counties. What we can stress therefore, that according to the interviews,
where the interviewees mentioned dates, measures vary according to differ-
ent years. However, for the abovementioned incompleteness of the inter-
views attached to dates it is not possible to analyze the frequency of the
implementation of the different measures. Therefore, acceleration of certain
type of measures may not be detected.
•  In 1994 revenue centralization from and expenditure decentralization to
counties was overwhelming, while counties reacted in the field of state
hierarchy, withdrawing the net by decreasing state responsibilities
and/or engaging in privatization (cutting off targets from party and state
dependency threads). The one act of revenue decentralization was for
political reasons (being the county the main site of guerilla movement of
the party in 1947). Impact on the reproduction of the net: hardening re-
production constraints and absolute shrinkage of the net.
•  In 1995 centralization of revenues and decentralization of expenditures
did not appear. Instead, we can see the ceasing of some political privi-
leges (which means indirectly the decentralization of the nomenklatura
and ceasing feed-back), the withdrawal of the net in the field of state bu-
                    
33 The statistical data underline this perception, since according to the number,
employment and contribution to the industrial production both at prefecture and
county level we experience the decrease (Table 12, 14, 15, 16, and Appendix 6, 7).
34 As we have already mentioned, in the case of privatized enterprises the taxes remain
collected by those levels where these enterprises were formerly subordinated, also
workers may remain employed. This means that there is no counter-interest in
privatization from this respect.46
reaucracy, privatization and the increase of the field outside the net. Im-
pact on the transformation of the net: narrowing of the circle of those
selected, and the absolute and relative shrinkage of the net.
•  In 1996 revenue centralization appears again, decentralization of the
nomenklatura, the withdrawal of the net both in state and party bureauc-
racy and overwhelming privatization, that is, cutting off targets from
state and party dependency lines. Impact on the transformation of the
net: hardening reproduction constraints decentralization within the net
and absolute shrinkage.
•  1997 does not show too much characteristics on county level: decen-
tralization of nomenklatura, withdrawal of the net in state and party bu-
reaucracy and late development of TVEs in one county that brings reve-
nues to the government. Impact on the transformation of the net: decen-
tralization within the net, absolute shrinkage in both bureaucracies and
in one county the density of party and state dependency threads in-
creases and the net expands.
•  1998 finds the counties active in centralizing decisions from township
level in consequence of townships’ hardening reproduction constraints,
which brings both expenditures and revenues, high frequency in privati-
zation cutting off burdens from the net and increase of the field outside
the net by attracting FDI
35. Impact on the transformation of the net: in-
ternal restructuring of responsibilities to ease township reproduction
constraints, spreading of absolute and relative shrinkage.
•  In 1999 revenue was siphoned away from county, nomenklatura decen-
tralized, party and state dependency threads withdrawn and market field
increased by attracting FDI. Impact on the transformation of the net:
hardening reproduction constraints, siphoning away revenues, decen-
tralization of responsibilities, absolute and relative shrinkage of the net.
•  In 2000 looks a very active year
36 when overwhelmingly revenue and
decision-making power was siphoned away from counties. This was the
                    
35 This simultaneously weakens those dependency lines that are attached to economic
units within the net where FDI enters, if not green-field.
36 At least three big issues happened at this year in the surveyed counties and prefec-
tures: firstly, the restructuring of governmental organizations initiated by Zhu Rongji
cabinet at central level in 1998 rolled down to prefecture and county levels in 2000,
resulting in a wave of merging of governmental organizations. Secondly, party and47
year after prefectures were transformed from transmission belt to ad-
ministrative power units, central sources were directly allocated to
townships that also relieved higher level authorities from expenses, state
and party dependency lines were withdrawn, mergers in bureaucracy oc-
curred to decrease costs and privatization cut off burdening targets. Im-
pact on the transformation of the net: hardening reproduction con-
straints, extraction of revenues and power instruments hardened from
above, direct central transfers to townships and mergers in townships
softened from below the counties’ reproduction constraints, privatization
increased the absolute shrinkage of the net.
•  2001 Revenues were further siphoned away from counties and further
mergers at county level to simplify the bureaucracy and further with-
drawals of dependency lines (both party and state) to detach enterprise
behavior from direct demands increase their responsibility on economic
behavior. Also privatization took place this year. Impact on the trans-
formation of the net: hardening reproduction constraints, cost decrease
by mergers and absolute shrinkage of the net through withdrawal of de-
pendency lines and cutting of targets from it.
•  In 2002 revenue was further centralized from counties, more decision-
making power was delegated to SOES and swift growth of private sector
occurred. Impact on the transformation of the net: hardening reproduc-
tion constraints, decentralization of responsibilities, absolute and rela-
tive shrinkage of the net.
Taking the difference in these yearly events into consideration one may
find that in most of the years (in six from nine) revenue was siphoned
away, hardening reproduction constraints. We can experience in most of
the years either the withdrawal of the dependency threads or the cutting off
of economic units from them shrinking the net absolutely. Interviewees
mentioned less frequently the growth of the private sphere (the relative
shrinkage of the net).
Reviewing the possible variations of the restructuring and transformation of
the net concerning expenditures, revenues, state and party dependency
lines, some moves ￿ at least according to the interviewees ￿ seldom oc-
curred. For example, the centralization of expenses, the decentralization of
                                                                                                                                              
state leadership in most of the surveyed localities, including provincial level,
changed in 1999 and 2000, bringing new policies. Thirdly, two of the surveyed
provinces ￿Jiangsu and Sichuan ￿ made a major effort of further centralize fiscal
revenues from lower levels, further hardening reproduction constraint at prefecture and
county levels).48
revenues, the extension of the state dependency lines and extension of party
dependency lines and extension or centralization of interlinking depend-
ency threads, factors that would point to a stable and developing party-state
network during its reproduction. What happened indeed was the opposite:
the network is disintegrating, decentralizing and withdrawing. Based on the
experienced dynamics we can also exclude the chance of any of the sur-
veyed units belonged to the self-exploiting of self-disintegrating pattern.
Next we shall analyze the interview essences according to the above factors
without the data constraints. We shall find out the variations in the ways of
hardening reproduction constraints and the great variety of solutions to ease
it and in the variety of ways the net may transform.
CHANGES IN KIND
Variety of impacts on reproduction constraints
It is obvious from the interviews that reproduction constraints are harden-
ing in the surveyed levels. Reproduction constraints harden within the net
at a certain level unit by all means, when (1) expenditures (allocation re-
sponsibilities) are decentralized, (2) revenues are centralized, (3) transfers
from above are decreased, and (4) possibilities to extract resources within
the net from lower levels decline. In the terms of the model, attracting, re-
sisting, extracting and allocating capacity of the given units worsens. If any
one of those factors takes place while the other factors do not increase, the
tendency of hardening prevails. Hardening reproduction constraints at one
level is already the cumulated consequence of similar developments and con-
secutive reactions on the levels above and below the given level. We shall
demonstrate this dynamics in the field of our research. Let us see what are
the concrete signs of hardening reproduction constraints at county level.
1.  Responsibility for allocation (expenditure) was decentralized: for
example, a) responsibility for subsidizing loss-making SOEs was de-
centralized by the province to local levels (Changzhi prefecture Finance
Bureau). b) The center mandated that salaries to governmental staff at
all levels to be increased but did not transfer according resources to
lower levels (Yucheng county Finance Bureau, Shanxi province Finance
Bureau). c) province decentralized the task for bankruptcy procedure to49
lower level
37 (Sichuan province ETC) d) A special way of increasing
local expenditures was when the center level ordered counties to take
over township expenditures on primary and high-school teachers’
salaries (and pension fund, health care, unemployment insurance,
bonus) since townships were unable to finance them from local
budgets
38. The compulsory restructuring of expenditures was not
followed by equal size transfers from central level, thereby increasing
county burdens
39 (Yixing county Finance Bureau, Changzhi county
Finance Bureau) e) Expenditures on infrastructure, capital constructions
and so on before mid 1990s were covered by provincial authority. In
mid-1990s, these expenditures were decentralized to prefectures and
lower levels (Changzhi prefecture Finance Bureau).
2.  Institutions and organizations  decentralized. Criteria for decen-
tralization is on the one hand, to get rid of inefficient and first of small
enterprises (this latter even if has political rank, but influences the
economy to a small extent) or those consuming large revenues (Wuxi
                    
37 We did not do the bankruptcy procedures. We simply did not have enough resources
to conduct the bankruptcies. Our solution was to first decentralize them to prefecture
and/or lower levels. Then let prefecture and/or lower levels to conduct bankruptcies.
Provincial authority gave some subsidies to particular authorities that carried out
these bankruptcies (Sichuan province ETC).
38 Since townships from time to time were not able to pay salaries to staff, especially
teachers working for primary schools and gymnasiums. From 1998 on, the county
recentralized the expenditures of salaries to teachers. The fixed amount of submitting
and subsidizing was recounted. The due amount of submission for some townships
was increased. Also the due amount of subsidies to some townships was decreased.
However, the increased submission and the decreased subsidies did not cover the
salaries due paid to teachers, the county had to give some money to cover this
expenditure, which means a further burden on the county (Changzhi county Finance
Bureau).
39 Since townships from time to time were not able to pay salaries to staff, especially
teachers working for primary schools and gymnasiums. From 1998 on, the county
recentralized the expenditures of salaries to teachers. The fixed amount of submitting
and subsidizing was recounted. The due amount of submission for some townships
was increased. Also the due amount of subsidies to some townships was decreased.
However, the increased submission and the decreased subsidies did not cover the
salaries due paid to teachers, the county had to give some money to cover this
expenditure, which means a further burden on the county (Changzhi county Finance
Bureau).50
Policy Research Office). On the other hand, to keep the good ones or
those large ones with assets that guarantees large VAT
40. For example
(a) the institute for searching natural resources (coal) was decentralized
from central to provincial level. The responsibility of covering the
expenditures emerged at the operation of the institute was also
decentralized (Shanxi Finance Bureau). (b) Loss-making SOEs first
middle later larger size were decentralized to lower levels (Sichuan
province Finance Bureau)
41. (c) There are cases when inefficient SOEs
were decentralized even from county to township level
42 (Wuxi
Agriculture Working Department). This means not only subsidizing
expenditures, but to ensure minimal wages, expenditures on social
security for the workers, taking care of laid-off workers’ unemployment
funds, educational programs for retraining them for different jobs,
pensions, health-care conduct, and bearing the responsibility of the
tensions (interview with Luoshe township governor). (d) A specific way
of decreasing allocation capacity was to cut off the nomenklatura
discretion of local level PCs over local branches of People’s Bank in
1997. Appointment of CEOs was delegated to the discretion of the 7
newly formed regional bureaus of the Central Bank
43 in the case of
county, prefecture and province levels. Central Bank has to approve the
                    
40 Upper levels would not decentralize SOEs with good performance. Only loss-making
ones would be decentralized. We were doing the same thing. We decentralized loss-
making ones to townships. However, all of those had already been privatized (Yixing
county Finance Bureau).
41 In 1990s, center decentralized loss-making enterprises to us. We also decentralized
them to prefectures. There were few enterprises centralized to province. Most
enterprises in Sichuan are not in good performance, and therefore few enterprises
worthwhile being centralized. We did not centralize revenue by centralizing
enterprises. We did it by changing the taxation regime (Sichuan province Finance
Bureau).
42 In 2002, 11 loss-making SOEs were decentralized to Luoshe township from Xishan
Qu (county level). Luoshe township simply did not have enough resources to bail out
these enterprises. The result of the bargaining between Luoshe township and Xishan
Qu was that, accumulated losses in previous years were to be solved by Xishan Qu,
Luoshe township were to solve the problem of compensating laid-off workers,
supporting their social security, and preserving social stability By decentralizing
loss-making SOEs, townships run out of resources. (Wuxi prefecture agriculture
working department)
43 Nomenklatura and appointment on local level branches of commercial banks is
always delegated to one level higher since the late 1980s.51
appointment. In 1999 even the supervision of party activities of both
commercial and central banks had been centralized to Central Financial
Working Committee. The cutting off of existential bonds ￿ though
informal ones remained ￿ made possible for banks to resist with more
success to inefficient loans or to loans to loss-making enterprises
44
(Ya’an Industry and Business Bank).
3.  Revenues siphoned away (extraction)
45: the rolled down taxation re-
form in 1994 and its continuous revision, showed the tendency of in-
creasing extraction of resources in several forms and ways
46.  a) in-
creasing the share of higher level authorities in shared taxes. This may
concern either the ratio of the total or that of the increased revenues
(Wuxi prefecture Finance Bureau, Yixing Finance Bureu). b) shifting
taxes originally deemed for local discretion to the group of shared
                    
44 Banks became more cautious since stricter requirement on loans being paid back was
imposed on them. Before 1999, banks would almost automatically give loans to
investment projects if leaders of the prefecture or ETC make coordination. From
1999 and 2000, banks began to make their own assessments on each project.
Investment project coordinated by ETC and prefecture leaders were not ensured to
get loans from banks (Wuxi prefecture ETC).
45 There is annual task of revenue collection assigned from upper levels. Provincial
party committee and provincial government assign the task (amount of revenue given
authority should collect) to prefecture, prefecture further assigns it to county, then to
township level. County branch of state taxation bureau, county branch of local
taxation bureau, county financial bureau, and their township counterparts, are the
technical organizers of revenue collection. It is the party committees and
governments that urge or pressure economic entities to pay taxes and revenues. Party
committee is driven to put pressure, since tax extraction is one of the top priorities
for authorities at every level. If these tasks were not met, first to get bad scores by
higher level authorities and whose promotion outlook declines is the party secretary
rather than the head of the taxation bureau. Since party committees have sufficient
influence only on SOEs, tax collection from private sector proves to be very
inefficient.
46 The composition of fiscal revenues at county level in Mingshan was: 1) agriculture
tax and land tax, 7 million RMB, near 1/3 of the total revenues; 2) tax from industry
and commerce, 8 million, 1/3; 3) fines, 7-8 million, 1/3. Since 2000, provinces
centralized a part of revenues from 8 taxes: VAT, business tax, individual income
tax, natural resources tax, real estate tax, stamp tax, contract tax, and urban land tax
(Mingshan finance bureau).52
taxes
47. This may occur for example either by declaring it shared taxes,
e.g. individual income tax and corporate income tax from locally
subordinated enterprises
48; or by merging it to VAT taxes. For example,
business tax in service industry and construction industry, which was
previously a full local tax and which was one of the main sources of
revenue for locality, will be incorporated into VAT. The center will take
75% and 25% will remain as local revenues and will cause immediate
revenue decline in the county (Financial bureaus at Changzhi prefecture,
Changzhi county, Wuxiang county, Ya￿an prefecture, Yucheng county,
Mingshan county). c) Shifting originally local tax to provincial level tax
(in some cases that of urban construction) (Ya￿an prefecture financial
bureau). d) Decreasing the rebated ratio of VAT tax (25%) formerly
distributed by province to lower level by increasing the ratio kept at the
province (Changzhi county local taxation bureau, Wuxi Finance Bureau,
and Ya’an Finance Bureau). e) assigning tax increase as political task to
county level party and government leaders and increasing the weight of
tax performance in the yearly evaluation of their performance (Ya’an
prefecture Finance Bureau)
49. f) assigning tasks to taxation bureau on
                    
47 From 2002 on, corporate income tax from newly established enterprises at any level
and ownership by any level apparatus is going to be collected by state taxation
bureau. Also from 2002 on, individual income tax and corporate income tax is going
to be shared tax. But individual income tax and corporate income tax from
enterprises set up before 2002 is still going to be collected by local taxation bureau
(Changzhi prefecture local taxation bureau).
48 The center is further centralizing revenues from us. Corporate income tax was to be
changed from a local tax to a shared tax with center. The sharing ratio will be 50 (to
center) to 50 (to localities) in 2002, 60 (to center) to 40 (to localities) in 2003, and 70
(to center) to 30 (to localities) in 2004. Corporate income tax is one of the main
sources of resources for us. This new change will greatly decrease our capacity of
retaining resources. 2002 after all the deductions by upper levels, for each increased
100 RMB of revenues contributed by entities in Yixing, only 39 RMB would be
retained by us. Next year (2003), only 31.2 RMB would be retained (Yixing county
Finance Bureau).
49 One of the measures was to put more pressure on main cadres at county level (county
party secretary and county governor) to collect more fiscal revenues. Previously,
while evaluating particular cadres￿ performance, weight of performance in collecting
fiscal revenues and stimulating its growth was 5%. Since 2000, it was 15%.
Prefecture authority urged every governmental organization and staff to introduce, to
attract investors from outside the prefecture. Prefecture authority determined the
amount of attracted investment as a political task. Each county, each governmental
bureau was assigned a certain amount (Ya’an prefecture Finance Bureau).53
tax increase, disregarding economic growth that drives the bureau to
either borrow from banks or individuals or to extract taxes from targets
in advance that were supposed to be paid the next year or the next two
years (Yucheng county local taxation bureau). g) Centrally forbidding
tax deference (Changzhi county Local Taxation Bureau)
50. h) Centrally
forbidding the issue of local government bonds. i) setting up local
branches of central tax offices to prevent tax deference and separate
collection of local and central taxes (Changzhi prefecture local taxation
bureau). j) Specific way of granting taxes: ordering enterprises to pay
taxes prior paying back bank loans (Wuxi prefecture ETC)
51  k)
prefecture centralized taxes of larger enterprises supposed to flow to
county level, with the compromise of rebating a fixed smaller portion to
the county (Jiangyin financial bureau). l) Even FDI may be siphoned
away by higher level authorities (Jiangyin county ETC)
52.  m) taking
advantage of increased bargaining capacity through feed-back to exert
greater pressure on lower levels to extract more revenues (Wuxi
                    
50 There had been certain amounts of tax payment deferments. From 2000 on, tax
payment deferments have been decreasing. In the local taxation system, a regulation
was and is implemented, which requires that tax payment deferments should not
surpass a certain ratio. If it does, head of local (in our case, county) taxation bureau
would be dismissed by higher level local (prefecture) taxation bureau. Moreover, tax
payment deferments granted before should be due. A certain ratio of those formerly
deferred taxes should also be collected. Otherwise, head of local taxation bureaus
would be criticized and punished by upper level bureaus (Changzhi county Local
Taxation Bureau).
51 Another change took place in 1994 accompanying the reform on taxation, which was
that before 1 May 1994, SOEs could pay back loans for technique upgrading before
paying taxes, but after that day, SOEs could only pay back loans for this purpose
after paying taxes. This measure greatly decreased SOEs investments in technique
upgrading. This measure was a shock to all SOEs. Many SOEs went into deep
trouble since that year. Since after paying taxes, they did not have resources to pay
bank loans (Wuxi prefecture ETC).
52 Prefecture robbed FDI from Jiangyin through administrative instruments. For
example, once Jiangyin authority nearly concluded a bargaining with a Japanese
investor on an investment project. Two parties were going to sign the agreement in a
fancy hotel in downtown area of Wuxi. It happened that prefecture governor visited
the hotel and knew the project. Later, the project was mandated to be done in the
area where prefecture headquarter was located (Jiangyin county ETC)54
prefecure Finance Bureau)
 53. n) keeping taxation bureau and finance
bureau as separated entities for leaving less room for manoeuvre at local
level (Wuxi prefecture Finance Bureau). o) transform SOEs and TVEs
into share-holding companies and making workers buy shares to raise
fund (Changzhi prefecture ETC). p) special revenue centralization when
tasks are redistributed to higher level and respective resources are
driven to these same, e.g. responsibilities for urban construction
redistributed from county to prefecture level (Yucheng county
Construction Committee)
54
4.  Institutions, organizations siphoned away
55: a) There were cases of
centralizing targets from county to prefecture or higher up in exchange
                    
53 Wuxi prefecture in 2002 began to centralize 2% of the total increased amount of
revenues from counties. Suzhou, neighboring to Wuxi, centralized 4% of total
increased amount of revenues from its counties since 1994. Reason for the difference
and the new development in Wuxi was that Wuxi prefecture party secretary began to
be a member of standing committee of Jiangsu provincial party committee, and that
Suzhou prefecture party secretary had already been a member of standing committee
of the provincial party committee. Party secretary being a member of standing
committee of the provincial party committee increased the prefecture￿s authority
over lower levels (Wuxi prefecture Finance Bureau).
54 We owe debts to everybody except to provincial and upper level organization. We
owed debts to other administrative organizations, to private enterprises (most of the
debts were to them) and to banks. The reason why we owe debts to private
enterprises was that we actually did not invest any money while undertaking urban
construction like building roads, improving lights besides the roads and so on. We
promised to pay for the construction in a later stage. Private enterprises poured
money into the projects with the hope of being paid back later by us. Also as a
general rule, we asked private enterprises to give us certain amounts of money to
guarantee that they would go on with the projects to their complete ends. While the
projects were finished, these amounts of money must be given back to particular
enterprises. These money became debts to the enterprises too because we did not
give back to them as promised. Before the transformation of prefecture and the
accompanied centralization, we could pay parts of the debts by getting new resources
by undertaking new urban construction projects. Now that we did not initiate any
new construction projects due to the centralization, no resources were flowing in. We
were unable to pay the debts. Yucheng construction committee)
55 In general, revenues from economic entities basically go to levels according to their
subordination, especially in the case of Corporate Income Tax and rebated VAT.
Enterprises located in areas where prefecture headquarter is located, taxation is
according to subordination. If an enterprise in this area was subordinated to Yucheng
county (the county where prefecture headquarter is located), Yucheng county local55
of fixed, later declining compensation
56. (Ya’an prefecture Finance
Bureau, Changzhi county Finance Bureau, Yucheng county Finance
Bureau). b) Registration of private enterprises is in general at township
level and this means the same location for taxation. However, if the
possible revenue becomes large, the upper levels may centralize this
discretion
57 (Ya’an local taxation bureau). c) centralizing revenue targets
leaving behind the debts generated by this enterprise to former
subordination level (Yucheng county Finance Bureau).
5.  Declining transfers from above a)  From 1990 on, there are no
resources at ETC for the purposes of technique upgrading, investment
projects, and subsidies to enterprises for them to pay interests to banks
loans (Mingshan ETC, Mingshan leaders group on enterprise reform
58).
b) decentralizing the authority of permission on larger value investments
to lower levels parallel to declining transfers (ETC at the 3 surveyed
prefectures and 6 surveyed counties). c) using political position for
granting resources from the center (Wuxiang county). d) central
supports were reduced to centrally designated poverty counties
59
                                                                                                                                              
taxation bureau would collect local taxes from it. If it was subordinated to the
prefecture, prefecture local taxation bureau would collect local taxes from it.
Concerning private enterprises in this area, it depends on the level to which given
enterprise made its registration. This caused prefecture and Yucheng county compete
with each other for private enterprises to get registration at its own level (Ya￿an
prefecture local taxation bureau).
56 The number of enterprises supervised by us tended to increase. Many enterprises
actively came to contact us, asking us to supervise them. We made decisions on it
after consulting with related bureaus and organizations. Anyhow, we wouldn￿t
accept enterprises that were small scale, and in not good performance (Sichuan
EWC). Since 1994, the subordination of 6 SOEs was shifted to the prefecture. In
1994 these were profitable enterprises. Therefore the compromise was that prefecture
should give 10 million RMB to Yucheng every year. This was still the case after
1996 Unfortunately, these enterprises gradually became loss-making and burdens
and bankrupt. Compensation decreased to 1.8 million in 2001 to Yucheng authority,
and meanwhile Yucheng authority has to take the responsibility of paying their debts
and paying social security to laid off workers (Yucheng county Finance Bureau)
57 Exception of township level taxation for private enterprises is when it is located at the
township or district, or county or city where the county, the prefecture or province
headquarters is located. In these latter cases the given level will dispose of the taxes.
58 Leaders Group on Enterprise Reform consists of county vice-party secretary in charge
of industry, county vice-governor in charge of industry, and heads of related bureaus.
The group’s office is fequently located at economic and trade bureau. Its task is to
decide on, prepare and implement privatization (Changzhi county ETC).
59 Poverty counties designated by the State Council also have the right to grant tax cut
for entrepreneurs willing to invest in the county.56
(defined GNP per capita) (Finance bureau at Changzhi prefecture and
Wuxiang county). e) counties got direct transfers called "general
transfers" used to pay government staff (Shanxi Finance Bureau). f)
Earmarked transfers e.g. for education, agriculture (Shanxi finance
bureau).  g) bailing out poor counties in unpredicted situations h)
Subsidies to SOEs were decreasing
60. In economic plans, certain amount
of money was announced to be transferred to SOEs. But in fact, only a
very small part of the money was actually implemented as planned
(Shanxi Finance Bureau, Ya’an prefecture Finance Bureau). i) state
bonds were declining in the region, soon will expire (Yucheng Planning
Bueau)  j)Transfers to counties from prefectures in general were
decreasing (Ya’an prefecture Finance Bureau 
61.
6.  Extraction of resources from below for counties: a) in some
prefectures townships did not have treasuries, county centralized all
revenues and than redistributed to them according to expenditures. If
expenditures were higher than prior set, townships had to find resources
by themselves, if revenues were higher than the prior set expenditures
they shared extra revenues according to county regulations (Ya’an
prefecture Finance Bureau). b) For stricter control and securing taxes,
Party organs at county branch of local taxation were formed and
supervised by Organization Department of county party committee.
Appointments on main administrative cadres (non-party positions) were
done by prefecture bureau of local taxation (Mingshan Finance Bureau)
c) pressing out loans for industrial growth of TVEs from peasants that
                                                                                                                                              
60 Since the 2001 (2001), there were no subsidies allocated to SOEs: no subsidy for
prices; no subsidy for capital construction; no subsidy for technique updating (Ya’an
prefecture Finance Bureau).
61 51.4% of prefecture expenditure was for salaries to governmental staff. At county
level, this part of expenditure composed 95.14% of the total expenditure. We had to
subsidize the counties for covering the following expenditures of counties: 1) social
security fund to laid off workers; 2) health care expenditure for those who worked in
governmental and/or quasi-governmental organizations; 3) fund for ensuring social
stability, to pacify discontent 4) fund to facilitate laid off workers to find new job; 5)
fund to cover local part of state bond projects, since resources from upper level only
finance about 20% of the projects (the rests were financed by bank loans). Deducting
these subsidies, we only had full autonomy over 15%-20% of our total expenditure,
which were basically used in economic development and public (mainly urban)
construction. (Ya’an perecture Finance Bureau).57
keeps local government increasingly indebted and local grievances
sharpening
62
Variety of reactions to hardening reproduction constraints: all these re-
actions in turn will have an impact on the given unit’s reproduction con-
straints and on that of the levels above and below it.
1. Restructuring administration to reduce costs and meanwhile, redis-
tribute decision-making over material and subordinated entities: a) In
1994, 4 large-scale wholesale companies were transformed from
administrative way of management to commercial way of management.
With transformation subsidies were cut and appointment discretion of
cadres in their field of business decentralized to the companies, ceasing the
county authorities￿ administrative power over them (Yixing county
Organization Department) b) at the sample of central administrative
measures, ETCs were formed from EPC. Industrial bureaus were merged
into ETCs while enterprises were detached from the bureaus, merged into
fewer economic entities, and subordinated to Enterprise Working
Committee (Jiangsu ETC)
2. Restructuring economy: a) restructuring towards service industry that
does not contain VAT (Yucheng local taxation bureau). b) help enterprises
to evade non-local taxes (Mingshan Finance Bureau). c) accumulating tax
debts to higher than local levels by TVEs and SOEs ending up in tax-cut by
the center (Mingshan Finance Bureau). d) easing investment permissions
(Wuxi prefecture ETC)
63. e) facilitating the different projects in different
regions to decrease parallel structure (Sichuan Planning Commission)
                    
62 The reason for privatization was that TVEs then were in deep trouble. They were
setting (social and political) fires everywhere. Investments in TVEs were financed by
borrowings from residents. Before 1994, economic growth was abnormally high.
And the fact that TVEs￿s assets were not sufficient to pay the debts, was covered by
the over-heated economy. In 1995 and 1996, economic austerity policy was
implemented. No more resources were pooled into TVEs. Debts problem suddenly
emerged. Residents everywhere surrounded township authorities. Even party
secretary of Xishan county was put under house arrest by residents for a short time.
Residents sit in roads. State Council was alerted. There was no way other than re-
form (Wuxi prefecture Agricultural Working Departent).
63 In 1997, alarmed by a tendency of shrinkage in investments, ETC at all level strived
for promoting investments. Investments were encouraged. Investment projects were
easy to get approval from ETC. ETC also coordinated with banks to issue loans to
enterprises (Wuxi prefecture ETC).58
3. Stricter selection
3.a Narrowing the circle of those fed-back: a) ceasing political privileges
of enterprises, transferring their nomenklatura from Organization
Department to industrial bureaus’ PC
64 (Changzhi county PC secretary). b)
forming EWC-s with wide discretion over SOEs subordinated to the
locality and also sometimes those subordinated to higher levels settled in
the locality, generally headed by local PC secretary. Selected large
enterprise nomenklatura and appointment were transferred to EWC￿s
discretion from Organization Department and industrial bureaus. This
move induced a drive for enterprises to enter this group (feedback) with the
hope of better access to governmental organizations
65 (Sichuan EWC). c)
concentrating on the facilitation of large projects at lower levels (Sichuan
Planning Commission).
3.b Narrowing the privileged in distribution of resources:  a)
distributing resources to fewer and the larger enterprises (Changzhi
prefecture ETC). b) The solution was and still is to decrease the investment
initiated by the governments in economic development (in SOEs, TVEs)
(Changzhi county Finance Bureau). c) Tax payment deferments were
reduced increasing the hardening of enterprise reproduction constraints and
closing down those that did not pay taxes due (Changzhi county local
Finance Bureau). d) few enterprises were selected to be bailed out through
debt-equity swaps
66 (Sichuan EWC).
4.  Getting rid of functions that became liabilities or emptied:
                    
64 Also because of the deterioration of the performance of the SOEs and the inefficiency
of the measure of political treatment for the SOEs, county party committee decided
to cancel the political positions for SOEs, and cancel the political positions for CEOs
of SOEs as well (Changzhi county PC secretary.)
65 The background for forming enterprises working committee was that: 1)there were
enterprises that were vital to the economic development and social stability; 2)these
enterprises were supervised in scattered way (some by Organization Department,
some by ETC, some by other industry bureaus 3)enterprises were required to detach
from governmental organizations in late 1990s, resulting in the situation that some
enterprises were left unsupervised; 4)enterprises also require some party
organizations to supervise their activities (Sichuan province EWC).
66 Concerning debt-equity, firstly very few enterprises in Sichuan were included in that
program. Secondly, they were large-scale enterprises. Thirdly, they were enterprises
with bad performance. Fourthly, they were labor-intensive enterprises (Sichuan
province EWC)59
4a Withdrawing functions and abolishing organizations in the state
bureaucracy: This measure was the result of a longer process pressured by
the decline of SOEs subordinated to the state bureaucracy and decline of
the resources distributed from above within the net. a) The first effort was
to let enterprises retain some of the interests they created. b) Then the
measure taken was to simplify supervision on enterprises and to delegate
more decision making power to enterprises. c) Then the measure was to
change grants to enterprises to loans to enterprises so as to make enterprises
be responsible for decisions they made. d) Then efforts were made to cut
off the links between authorities and enterprises. Though no official
announcements were made that they were failure, all these reforms de facto
failed (from points a to d, Wuxi leaders Group on Enterprise Reform and
Wuxiang county ETC)
 67.  e) withdrawing from giving permission on
material input (Wuxi prefecture Planning Commision). f) Instead of
permission granting only registration of SOE investments was expected
(Jiangyin county ETC, Jiangsu ETC, Wuxi prefecture Planning
Department, Sichuan province Planning Department)
68.  g) withdrawing
from government initiated investments in economic development of TVEs
                    
67 Administration functions of industry bureaus were transferred to economic and trade
bureau. It is not as formidable as people think about the transferring, because the
administration functions of each industry bureau had already shrunk a lot in past
years (mainly grant registration for projects to enterprises now), as shown later by
the example of economic and trade bureau ourselves. One administration in our
charge is that enterprise should come to us to make registration for each of their
investment projects. However, the nature of the registration had already changed a
lot. It is much simpler than before.
In 1980s and early 1990s, getting registration meant that funds for the project were to
be given. Therefore it was very hard for projects to get registration then. Now
registration does not mean more than just registration. We do not have a say on funds
and enterprises do not ask for funds when they come for registration. This is also the
case for economic and trade bureaus at upper levels (Wuxiang county ETC).
68 Concerning the decline of planning commission, taking the example of division of
industry under planning commission, years ago, staff at that division were crazy busy
everyday, because only after being approved by this division could an enterprise get
registration in Industry and Business Administration. Now this stage of getting
permission from us was cut off. Enterprise directly went to Industry and Business
Administration for registration. Now people set up firms everywhere. We (not only
planning commission but the whole authority) don￿t know the whole picture. We
even don￿t know how much the GDP is. I don￿t think the data on statistic books are
real. (Wuxi planning commission).60
and SOEs (Changzhi county Finance Bureau). h) withdrawing sequentially
from small, middle and large-scale enterprises (Jiangsu ETC)
69.
Withdrawing prior all-mighty functions of the Planning Bureau (Yucheng
county Planning Bureau)
70. i) Bank-loans are not any more requiring prior
ETC approval (Sichuan province ETC)
71. j) leaders group on development
of TVEs at county level (that consisted of leaders of the party committee,
of county government, of county people￿s congress, of banks, of land
administration, and so on) did not convene since 2001
72 (Ya’an prefecture
                    
69 Strategy on SOEs development is basically withdrawal. State would completely
withdraw from small and middle scale enterprises. In 2003, it is expected that state
would withdraw from 60% of small and middle scale enterprises. In 2004, the
complete withdrawal would be done. Concerning large scale SOEs, state would
withdraw from most of them. The aim is to reduce the number of large-scale SOEs to
less than 200. The reason is that SOEs generated too many problems. Those
preserved SOEs would be those in natural monopoly, in infrastructure, in strategic
industries (like electronic information) Jiangsu province ETC ).
70 Concrete instruments for us to coordinate economy declined since early 1990s. Since
1993, there were no longer any within-budget resources at us county level for us to
make coordination. Since mid-1990s, there were no longer any within-budget
resources from prefecture for us to enable our coordination job. Presently, we only
have two instruments: state bonds to us; and within-budget resources from province.
Resources from upper level (state bonds, and provincial budget) have been obviously
declining. Before 1995, planning bureau was seen as minor government. We were
very powerful at that time. We set tasks that each enterprises and/or line bureaus
should accomplish, and coordinated almost all aspects of economic activities to
ensure the tasks to be achieved. Since 1995, due to the abolishment of compulsory
indicators, our power greatly decreased. Our function continuously declined in late
1990s. Especially since the end of last year (2001) when organizational restructuring
was accomplished, our function changed a lot. Since then, we did not coordinate any
economic activities except for projects partially funded by state bonds. Our main
function is now doing investigations on economic activities, analyzing collected
data, and facilitating the county party committee and government to formulate
strategies for economic development (Yucheng county Planning Bureau).
71 Previously (last year, the year before last, and so on), banks would only issue loans to
those projects that got approvals from us. Now, the practice is that loans were not
related to approvals. Banks would give loans to projects without our approvals. In
the meanwhile, banks would not necessarily give loans to projects with our approvals
(Sichuan province ETC).
72 This group got together regularly to deal with issues concerning TVE development, to
facilitate loans to particular TVEs, to help them get using rights on particular plots of
land, to help them get preferential treatment from the taxation bureau.61
TVE Administration). k) extra budgetary resources of TVE administration
were abolished (Ya’an prefecture TVE Administration)
4b Withdrawing functions in the party bureaucracy: a)  cut off
nomenklatura responsibility of county PC organization (Changzhi county
PC Organization department)
73.  b) withdrawing through organizing
leadership election by employees with increasing voting ratio according to
the increasing size of the enterprise loss (Changzhi prefecture PC
organization Department)
74. c) cut off career transgressions between party-
state apparatus and economic entities in enterprises without feed-back and
for cadres appointed after 1996. In turn, administrative cadres could not be
appointed to positions at economic entities (Wuxi economic policy
department). d) cut off dependency threads through privatization (Minshan
county organization Bureau)
75.  e) Cut off dependency threads through
                    
73 Further changes happened in 2001. The new county party secretary decided to reform
the running mechanism of SOEs and TVEs thoroughly. He decided that county and
township authorities should withdraw from all enterprises activities (see the
interview with the county party secretary Wang Doulin). Since then, the cadre
responsibility for enterprises cadres was cut off. Now, we do not involve in
appointment or dismissal of management for enterprises any more (Changzhi county
PC Organization Department).
74 After 1996, things began to change. The main reason was that performance of some
enterprises declined dramatically. Many SOEs were making losses. And the losses
were enormous. Prefecture authority decided to increase participation and
transparency in appointing SOE cadres. SOE cadres were not directly and secretly
appointed by Organization Department any more. Nomination process was open.
People could participate in the competition for particular positions based on his/her
own will. We made examination on them (basically on political correctness). Then
candidates who passed the examination were required to give and defend his/her
speech in front of a election college consisting of leaders from related prefecture
bureaus and organs and the whole employment of the enterprise. New methods
began to be applied in 1997. Three different cases were distinguished: 1) in case of
losses made by particular SOEs being not very large, the weight of votes by
employees was 40-50%, the weight of votes by leaders was 50-60%. 2) in case of
losses being quite large, the weight of votes by employment was 70-80%, the weight
of votes by leaders was 20-30%.. 3) in case of losses being extremely severe, it was
solely voted by employment (Chiangzhi prefecture Organization Department).
75 With the weight of private sector increasing, reform on authority will be accelerated.
The more SOEs, the wider and deeper authority (its bureaus) had to intervene. After
privatization, nobody will come to authority. And authority will accelerate reform on
itself. For the authority, as long as it is favorable to keeping social stability, as long62
decreasing state shares in transformed companies (Wuxi Leaders Group on
Enterprise Reform)
76. f) Party secretaries function remaining in privatized
or shareholding enterprises radically declined, secretaries were elected
instead of being appointed, party membership and party activity declined
(Mingshan County PC Organization Bureau)
77.  g) Party secretaries in
remaining SOEs and TVEs are part-time. There are very few party
secretaries employed as full time (Ya’an ETC). h) party’s role collapses in
SOEs and TVEs if enterprise becomes bankrupt
78 (Changzhi county
Organization Department). i) responsibilities over party organizations in
privatized enterprises were shifted to Street Offices from local level party
organizations (Yucheng county Organization Department).
5.  Getting rid of assets that became liabilities
79:
                                                                                                                                              
as it helps people to get fed, privatization is not a taboo that authority fears to make
(Wuxi planning commission).
76 It was difficult to sell enterprises to outsiders, because workers (management and
ordinary workers) did not trust outsiders. Privatization would be opposed by them.
We intervened into the formation of the leadership of the newly privatized
enterprises. Because if leadership did not enjoy the support of majority of ordinary
workers, workers would come to us complaining. However, we only intervened at
the first stage. We did not intervene into the later changes of leadership at particular
enterprises (Wuxi leaders Group on Enterprise Reform).
77 Party organs were not dissolved after reform was made in enterprises. However,
operation of the party organs changed. For example, heads of the party organs were
elected by party members. Usually they were the leadership of the enterprises. There
were no special party cadres at enterprises. Party members decreased after the
privatization. Presently, number of party members at enterprises at most was 30, at
least 10. Some party members left the enterprises going to coastal lines or big cities
for better chances for life. Party activities also decreased at enterprises (Mingshan
County PC Organization Bureau).
78 Even in SOEs and TVEs not yet reformed, if they are facing bankruptcy or closing-
down, party activities also collapse. The only party activity that is being carried out
in above-mentioned enterprises is to collect the party fee (around 10 RMB (about
one-two dollars) each month for each member) from party members. (Changzhi
county Organization Department).
79 Reform strategies varied: 1)as to those enterprises with net assets less than 50 million
RMB, they would be gradually privatized to management. They could also be sold to
legal persons or foreign investors. 2) as to those with net assets over 50 million
RMB, diversifying the investors would be a choice. That is to say, state assets will
still be part of them (especially in those with good performance and that are
competitive). Part of the assets will be sold to management. Part of them to foreign
investors. Part of them to legal persons. 3)as to those that are really unworkable,
those without competitive products, without competition, close-down and
bankruptcy would have to be implemented. In this case, the most difficult thing was63
5.a Close-down (cost may be reduced -workers have to be dealt with, D1
and D2 are cut off): a) enterprises that do not pay taxes may be closed
down (Changzhi county local taxation bureau)
 80. b) closing down enter-
prises that are small, assets are fewer than debts, without competitive prod-
uct, without competition (Wuxi Machine Industry Bureau). c) closing down
fed-back SOEs (Ya￿an prefecture organization department). d) leading
bankruptcy procedure in fed-back SOEs￿ leaving debts unpaid and renam-
ing enterprises (Ya￿an leaders group on enterprise reform, Yucheng county
leaders Group on Enterprise reform
81) e) changing workers identity from
state workers to ordinary workers shifting dependencies and responsibili-
ties from the state to the private owners (Changzhi county Economic and
Trade Bureau )
5.b Diversifying ownership by transforming enterprises into share-
holding companies (taxation is retained while, costs reduced, D1 and D2
dependency weakens or is cut off where state has minority shares) a) trans-
forming enterprises into shareholding as the first stage of privatization,
where the state still retains decisive share, workers could not be easily
fired, and enterprise were still taking the social security responsibility for
them (Mingshan county ETC) b) transforming enterprises into share-
holding with domestic private individuals as share-holders (Ya’an leaders
Group for Enterprise Reform) c) enhancing joint ventures with FDI decided
by Party Standing Committee (Wuxi prefectue leaders group on enterprise
                                                                                                                                              
to look after SOE workers. Handling SOE workers is more difficult than handling
assets. Some workers had to be laid off with some compensation. Some had to be
shifted to other enterprises. SOE workers had to be taken care of, otherwise, social
stability would be hard to keep (Wuxi machine assets management company)
80 A new Tax Collecting Law was passed on May 1
st, 2001. On October 15, detailed
regulations on how to implement the law will be passed on October 15, 2002.
According to the new law and its detailed regulation, local taxation bureau would
confiscate certain assets of the enterprise, or even close down the enterprise if it does
not pay tax due (Changzhi county local taxation bureau).
81 A lot of them were announced bankrupt. But our bankruptcy was different from those
in western countries. In western countries, bankruptcy means that remaining assets of
certain enterprise would be shifted to the debtors. But we did not do that. Debtors of
those enterprises with bad performance were state owned banks (local branches of
commercial banks). We did not give the remaining assets to banks, otherwise we
would have had no resources to compensate workers in the process of reforming the
property rights of SOEs. Local branches of state owned banks did suit particular
enterprises for not paying debts. But the courts  stood on our side, because they are
parts of us local authorities. By my counting, banks in the process of reforming
enterprises￿ property rights lost 200-300 million RMB (Yucheng leaders group on
enterprise reform).64
reform)
82 d) transforming SOEs into workers’ share-holding with and ad-
ministrative act, workers did not have to buy the shares, state did not have
to compensate workers for changing their identity from state to ordinary
workers (Yucheng county leaders group on enterprise reform) e) transform
SOEs into shareholding with the size of state-owned shares decreasing ac-
cording to enterprise size and with the time (Wuxiang county Organization
Depertment). Shares in privatization were concentrated to former manage-
ment instead of workers shares that failed profitability expectations
(Jiangyin leaders group on enterprise reform)
5.c Cutting off liabilities by privatization (taxation is retained by the lo-
cality from the privatized enterprise while both costs and D1 and D2 de-
pendency lines are cut). Privatization spread at lower levels motivated by
hardening reproduction constraint
83, first despite higher level (central and
provincial) authorities’ explicit disagreement at more remote places, than
with their tacit agreement, than with explicit official encouragement from
the 17
th Party congress
84. Criteria of what to preserve and what to privatize
is overwhelmingly connected to size and losses
85, to competitive pressure
                    
82 Concerning those enterprise that are very large-scale, and those that are with good
performance. The approach was to form joint venture so as to dilute the shares held
by state sector. What had been reformed (privatized) so far were loss making ones or
would-be loss making ones. (Wuxi leaders group on enterprise reform)
83 The momentum of privatization came from county authority. The main reasons for
privatization were that those former collective enterprises were not able to pay loans
due, and that workers in them did not get salaries or wages and therefore were much
discontent. Those enterprises not only could not go on with their business, but also
became trouble-maker for the county authority (Wuxiang county TVE admini-
stration)
84 The purpose of forming this group(Leaders Group on Enterprise Reform)and its
office and sections was to reform the property rights relations of SOEs (means
privatization). We tried many ways of reforming SOEs, like delegating more rights
of making decisions to management, making contract with management￿ They
were not efficient enough. In the meanwhile, some localities within our province
already began to make reforms involving change on property rights of SOEs. Our
party secretary being accompanied by many of the main cadres of our county went to
those counties to learn their experience. Also, the center first agreed then advocated the
strategy of grasping those large scale ones and letting the small ones go. We thought it
was the right time to make the reform (Yucheng leaders group on enterprise reform)
85The features of the enterprises reformed were as follows: 1)they were small scale but
tried to produce everything (obviously not competitive); 2)assets were not enough to
cover debts (bank loans and/or taxes; 3)workers were in older and older age who65
from outside the net and also to the level of administrative coordination ne-
cessities. In some places, provincial authority￿s policy was that autho-rities
at county level should completely withdraw from economic fields that were
competitive (Sichuan province Research Office of the Party)
 86. Those that
are still large and resourceful and those natural monopoly (railway, airline,
banking), or those in infrastructure and in strategic industries (like
electronic information) are preserved for tax and serving extra-budgetary
purposes for local government investments (Jiangsu EWC, Jiangsu ETC,
Jiangsu Planning Commission). a) letting domestic private entrepreneurs
purchase SOEs and TVEs (Shanxi Organization Department) b) giving
away enterprise with bad performance free of charge, as long as the
entrepreneur guarantees workplace to former employees (ETC and coal
mining administration at Changzhi prefecture) c) forming joint ventures
and share-holding companies with foreign capital for large enterprises
(Wuxi machine asset management company) d) introducing enterprises to
be sold to "outside" investors (domestic private settled in other province)
(Yucheng county ETC) e) provide using rights to particular plots of land on
advantageous prices (even for free) and provide better infrastructure and
provide better service in the respect of administrative works, or even build
houses for rent for attracting FDI (Wuxi prefecture ETC). f) Provide VAT
rebate to FDI for three or four years if investing in the locality (Wuxi
prefecture ETC, Yixing county Finance Bureau). g) Lifting administrative
barriers to foreign investment and assigning as task for the apparatus to
attract FDI (Yangyin county ETC)
 87.
                                                                                                                                              
were less and less capable of catching up the new development; 4)there were no
promising products, projects; 5) they lacked finance; 6) equipment being used were
backward. In a word, they were the enterprises eliminated by market competition
(Yucheng leaders group on enterprise reform)
86 Privatization on TVEs was much easier than that on SOEs. In case of TVEs, with the
decision of township party secretary, privatization could be done. Therefore, there
were cases that all TVEs in a township were privatized in one year. Privatization on
SOEs was much more troublesome. SOEs were tied to enormous links. Countless
organizations involved in SOEs: labor bureau, personnel bureau, social security
bureau, party committee, organization bureau, finance bureau, banks, industry
bureau￿It was impossible that privatization on SOEs could be done with the single
decision of any leader (Wuxi agriculture work department).
87 About 20% of the investment were done by FDI. Other investments were done by
self-raised (or self-accumulated) resources by enterprises and resources by domestic
enterprises outside the county (bank-loans were scarce in the county). Changes in
attracting FDI were the following: before 1995, and 1996, level of FDI was low. FDI
at that time was basically from overseas Chinese. In mid and late 1990s, FDI
increased gradually. After 1999, FDI accelerated. Now we are in the road of trying to
attract investments from first 500 leading companies in the world. Special Economic66
6.  Emptying rigid structures a) workers and resources from large-scale
TVEs with huge losses, that were impossible to be privatized, were shifted
to start up new private enterprises, leaving behind an empty carcass and the
debts (Wuxi agriculture work department) b) transferring bad debts to local
authorities in consequence of bankruptcies, close-downs and privatization
leaving banks without payment (Ya￿an prefecture TVE administration) c)
fleeing the net individually while stripping off the rigid structure forging
one factor to privatization (Jiangyin Leaders Group on Enterprise Re-
form)
88
7.  Enhancing private sector's development: while private sector is
increasingly becoming  an alternative source of production and revenue and
employment, its development is exerting increasing pressure on both small
and large-scale enterprises located within the net
89 a) enhancing private
sector to absorb unemployment deriving from closed-down, privatized,
bankrupted and part-time working enterprises to keep social stability
(Jiangyin Leaders Group on Enterprise Reform) b) letting private
enterprises use red hat and work under TVE denomination for easing bank
loans otherwise overwhelmingly denied by banks  (Jiangyin leaders group
on enterprise reform). c) letting private sector to flourish since it forges
increasingly large share of the local GDP (Sichuan province Policy
Research Office)
90 d) enterprises that otherwise would stop running were
contracted out to private entrepreneurs. In case private entrepreneur had
funds, D1 and D2 rights (transferring rights to appoint and dismiss
                                                                                                                                              
Zones since 1995 were not special any longer, because local authorities across the
land self-liberated from restrictions imposed by planning economy system (Jiangyin
ETC).
88 Privatization was in indirect consequence of the growth of private sector. In 1990s,
with the development of private sector, entrepreneurs in TVEs and SOEs found that
they were not accordingly paid for their contributions, therefore behaved in passive
or negative way, transferring business to private sector that were in collusion with
them. Corruption in TVEs and SOEs erupted. TVEs and SOEs￿ performance rapidly
declined. Losses increased enormously. County and township authority lost control
over them. This was the main reason why we made the privatization (Jiangyin
leaders group on enterprise reform).
89 Performance of the 97 companies under us are so far good. But they are under two
kinds of pressures. As to small-scale enterprises, they were greatly affected by
competition from domestic private enterprises. As to large-scale enterprises, they
were increasingly affected by FDI (Wuxi policy research office).
90 Private sector in some prefectures was creating a large proportion of GDP. In Leshan
prefecture, Chengdu prefecture, and Luzhou prefecture, 60-70% of GDP was created
by private sector. The share will soon reach 80% (Sichuan Policy Research Office of
the Party).67
management to the entrepreneur) in exchange of transferring a certain
amount of the revenue to the county and employing former employees
(Wuxiang county Organization Department)
91. In case private entre-
preneurs did not have enough fund worker’s identity remained at the state
authorities, creating a transitional condition (Wuxiaing county ETC)
92
The above picture relates on the broad variety in the dynamics of hardening
reproduction constraints at provincial, prefecture and county level. It also
provides a sweeping kind of reactions and measures implemented to ease
reproduction constraints. Sorting these measures according to the factors of
the model, it gives an opportunity to the readers to have a consistent picture
on the developments and place further measures where they fit. Fitting im-
pacts and measures in their place, one may draw conclusions on the nature
of transformation of the net.
We have analyzed interviews according to the differences in reproduction
constraints and reactions in time since 1994. We have also surveyed the
different ways of the appearance of hardening (softening) reproduction
constraints at surveyed localities and the range of different instruments ap-
plied by them as a reaction to hardening reproduction constraints. The next
step is to detect the differences between different aggregations of the net
(prefecture and county level), and in space, among units at one given level
                    
91 Management of TVEs were always selected by townships and village party groups (in
some cases, villagers committees). Since most TVEs has been rent out or contracted
out, townships and villages are not involving in selecting management for the TVEs.
Only one or two (in other words) TVEs are still run by township authorities. The
reason why townships and villages did not sell out those enterprises is that township
and villages still want to have access to them for off-budgetary resources (mainly
administration charge). If they had been sold out, they would have lost the access.
Therefore, there had been very few cases of selling out TVEs. (Wuxiang county
Organization Department).
92 Still these transformed enterprises are different from those originally private ones in
the respect that workers in the privatized ones are still SOE workers. This sounds
bizarre. But it is the fact. In private enterprises, owners do not pay funds for workers￿
pension, unemployment insurance, health care insurance and so on. But in these
newly privatized enterprises, new owners still do not have the responsibility of
above-mentioned issues. Workers in these enterprises are still considered as SOE
workers. At least, many of them think so themselves. Therefore, when they had
problems, one of their actions is to come to the government for solutions. For those
enterprises that have funds, workers￿ identity had been changed. For those that have
not, this has not been done (Changzhi county ETC).68
within the net (prefectures or counties). These differences will be traced ac-
cording to (1) impact: hardening/softening reproduction constraints, (2) re-
actions to the impact: kind, sequence, timing, and intensity of implementa-
tion of the measures and (3) consequences of these reactions on the trans-
formation of the net.
CHANGES IN SPACE AND AGGREGATION LEVEL
Below we shall detail the differences in the transformation among counties
and prefectures and between prefectures and counties. Apart from the
common features in terms of transformation among the surveyed counties
and prefectures, differences appeared among them in every respect: from
the starting points, to the ongoing processes, and to the results. Let us see
first the changes that may be tracked from the available data in the
traditional way of analysis (See Tables 9-12, and Appendix 5-9).
In Wuxi prefecture, revenues doubled, while expenditures increased five-
fold that made the balance surplus decline close to zero. Number of loss-
making SOEs did not change in Wuxi, while losses increased four-fold.
Number of SOEs and TVEs  has dropped radically to its one-fifth.
Employment has also declined in both SOEs and TVEs. Number of and
employment in TVEs decreased more than that in SOEs. Based on number
and employment, we may suppose here that small enterprises have
disappeared but not the large loss-making ones. Meanwhile, investments in
remaining SOEs increased more than three-fold, while investment in
collectives somewhat decreased. Despite of increased investments, SOE’s
share in industrial production slightly decreased. The share of TVEs in
industrial production dropped to its half. Both SOEs and TVEs lost share to
domestic private and foreign capital.
In Changzhi prefecture revenues increased almost three folds. The increase
of expenditures was a bit slower but still more than doubled and deficit
increased more than two-folds. The number of loss-making SOEs
decreased while losses increased three-folds. Number of SOEs dropped to
their two-third and so did employment in SOEs to the same extent. We may
suppose that it was harder to get rid of larger loss-making enterprises.  We
do not have data on the number of TVEs but we can see that employment in
TVEs decreased even more than they did in SOEs. Investments in
remaining SOEs increased, parallel to investments by private enterprises,
and so did their share in industrial production. The largest increase in
investments was in TVEs, however, their share in industrial production
decreased. Share of domestic capital in industrial production also
decreased, while that to FDI increased.69
In Ya’an prefecture the revenues also increased but to a lesser extent than it
did in the other two prefectures, expenditures increased faster, therefore de-
ficit was more than double by 2000. The number of loss-making SOEs
decreased and so did losses. Number of SOEs decreased to its one-third and
the similar was the decline in TVEs. Decline in employment reflected the
changes in number, but to a lesser extent (we may suppose that mostly
smaller SOEs and TVEs have disappeared) Investment in remaining SOEs
increased more than four-fold, so did that of private enterprises, while in
TVEs decreased to its half. Both SOE and TVE share in industrial
production decreased while domestic and foreign capital’s share increased.
Similar data on county level is less complete, yet, they unveil substantial
differences among the surveyed counties (Tables 13￿16, and Appendix 10).
While the number of SOEs and TVEs radically declined between 1994 and
2001, the employment in these sectors decreased much less. Meanwhile,
except for Changzhi county, the number of loss-making SOEs dropped and
so did losses. Investments by SOEs grew during these years, except in
Yucheng (Ya’an). Developments both in number, employment and loss-
making SOEs suggest that also at county level the small enterprises
disappeared first. SOEs share in industrial productions increased only in
Chanzhi county, otherwise decreased all over. TVEs’ share also declined
radically, the most dramatic drop was in Yiangyin (Wuxi). Except for
Wuxiang county in Changzhi prefecture, investments by TVEs increased
less than those by SOEs, or declined. Investments in private sector
increased in all surveyed counties
93.
Next we shall analyze these data abandoning the traditional way. We shall
keep to the general approach of the model introduced in the analysis and by
adding interview results. The model’s approach helps to locate the changes
within the net, interviews expose the reasons, motivations, behavior, and
applied instruments and the consequent structural changes in the net in the
background of these developments. They also reveal the differences in the
above mentioned factors among them according to prefectures and
counties.
Differences in the growth of hardening reproduction constraint
                    
93 We do not have county level data on investments in private enterprises within Wuxi
prefecture.70
In general, as a consequence of the 1994 taxation reform reproduction
constraint of local authorities has been hardening. But it had not hardened
to the same extent in our surveyed counties and prefectures and at county
and prefecture levels.
Table 9 shows the revenues, expenditures, and balance in 1994 (93) and
2001 (00) in the surveyed prefectures.
Table 9. Revenue, expenditure and balance at surveyed prefectures in
1994 (93) and 2001 (00) DFF (million RMB)
Prefectures 1994 (93) 2001 (00) Difference Rate
Revenues 356.5 998.1 641.6 280
Expenditures 745.0 1890.3 1145.3 254
Changzhi
prefecture
Balance -388.5 -892.2 -503.7 230 def.
Revenues 3462.5  /93 7509.8 4047.3 217
Expenditures 1460.4  /93 7249.3 5788.9 496
Wuxi
prefecture
Balance 2002.1  /93 260.5 -1741.6 13 surplus
Revenues 141.1 233.4   /00 92.3 165
Expenditures 328.4 653.8   /00 325.4 199
Ya’an
prefecture
Balance -187.3 -420.4  /00 -233.1 224 def.
Source: counted by the author based on Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook:
1995, edited by Changzhi prefecture statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press
(Beijing), 1995, p.138, 148; Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 2002, edited by
Changzhi prefecture statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 2002
p.170; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook: 1994, edited by Wuxi statistic bureau, published by
China Statistic Press (Beijing), 1994, p.128; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook 2002, electronic
version, edited by Wuxi Center for Economic Information, 2002; Ya￿an Statistical
Data: 1995, edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 1995, p.56-60;
Ya￿an Statistical Yearbook: 2001, edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic
bureau, 2001, p.93-98.
Among the three prefectures, Table 8 shows that there was still budgetary
surplus in Wuxi prefecture in 2001, though the amount of surplus
decreased dramatically compared to that in 1993. In Changzhi prefecture,
both in 1994 and in 2000, expenditures were the double of revenues, while
both increased close to three-folds (increase in expenditures somewhat
slower than in revenues). Therefore, budgetary deficit in Changzhi
increased close to the same pace as expenditures and revenues did. In
Ya￿an prefecture, expenditures in 1994 were the double of revenues, but
while expenditures increased close to two folds by 2000, revenues
increased at a slower pace, therefore budgetary deficits increased faster71
than both expenditures and revenues. All in all, Changzhi prefecture was
worse than Wuxi prefecture its deficit growth surpassed that of Ya￿an
prefecture, despite faster growth of revenues than in this latter.
Differences in the size and dynamics of tax revenues, expenditures, and
balance are only one of the indicators that point to the differences in
reproduction constraints at different places. At current stage, and based on
the level of statistical data at our disposal, it would be irresponsible to try to
consider all non-budgetary inputs and allocations. Moreover, we are aware
of the fact that extra budgetary and off budgetary sources play an important
role in the localities’ reproduction and that tax revenues had a minimal share
in the value of fixed asset investments both at national and local levels (see
Table 10). We also know that several other factors that contribute to the
reproduction of the status quo within the net are not quantifiable. Despite of
these facts, using interviews and data combined, we made efforts to examine
the possibility and tendency of extraction of resources from and
decentralization expenditures to lower levels, attraction of subsidies from and
transfer of revenues to higher levels, and attraction of resources from the
private sector. Taking these factors together that point to the chances to
reproduce the status quo at each locality within the net, we suggest tendency
of the hardening or softening of reproduction constraints.
Table 10. Total investment in fixed assets by source of finance in 1994
and 2000 (Billion RMB)
1994 2000 Difference Rate
State budgetary
appropriation 53  3.0* 211  6.0* 158  3 398
Domestic loans 400 22.0 673 20.0 273 -2 168
Foreign investment 177 10.0 170  5.0 -7 -5 96
Fundraising and
others 1153 65.0 2258 68.0 1105  3 196
1783 100.0 3312 100.0 1529 190
* Share of difference sources of investments
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1995, compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of
China, Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1995, p.137-139. China Statistical Yearbook,
2001, compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of China, Beijing: China Statistics
Press, 2001, p. 157￿161.
Table 11 shows that inflow of FDI had been huge in Wuxi prefecture, and
few in the prefectures in Shanxi province and Sichuan province.
Table 11. FDI at prefectures in 1994 (93) and 2001 (00) (USD million)72






476.31 1357.46 881.15 285
Ya’an
prefecture
4.86 ￿ ￿ ￿
Source: counted by the author based on Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook:
1995, edited by Changzhi prefecture statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press
(Beijing), 1995; Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 2002, edited by Changzhi
prefecture statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 2002; Wuxi
Statistical Yearbook: 1994, edited by Wuxi statistic bureau, published by China Statistic
Press (Beijing), 1994, p.301; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook 2002, electronic version, edited
by Wuxi Center for Economic Information, 2002; Ya￿an Statistical Data: 1995, edited
and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 1995, p.110; Ya￿an Statistical
Yearbook: 2001, edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 2001.
On table 11, no data on FDI in Ya￿an prefecture in 2000 and Changzhi
prefecture in any year were available. As interviewees revealed, FDI in
these two prefectures were negligible.
Domestic private sector in Wuxi prefecture had been much larger than in
the other two surveyed prefectures (see table 12).
This difference in FDI inflow and in domestic private capital contributed to
the softening of the reproduction constraints in Wuxi prefecture, and to the
hardening of the reproduction constraints in Ya￿an prefecture and Changzhi
prefectures.
As shown before in the former section, different surveyed prefectures and
counties also had different possibility to siphon away resources or resource
targets from below, decentralize inefficient enterprises, decentralize
expenditure responsibilities and so on.
Except that in Wuxi, we did not find evidence on major decentralization of
burdens from surveyed prefecture level to county level, as opposed to the
relevance of such actions from the center to province, from province to pre-
fecture.73
Table 12. Each sector’s share in industry production in surveyed
prefectures in 1994 (93) and 2000 (01) (%)
1994 (93) 2000 (01) Difference
SOEs 37.81 51.08 13.27
Collective 36.28 11.02 -25.26
Pes 18.58 4.31 -14.27
Changzhi
prefecture
Others* 7.33 33.59 26.26
SOEs 12.94   /93 7.49 -5.45
Collective 75.80   /93 19.33 -56.47
Pes 7.48   /93 45.39 37.91
Wuxi
prefecture
Others* 3.63   /93 27.79 24.16
SOEs 33.08 8.35   /00 -24.73
Collective 34.26 22.17   /00 -12.09
Pes 26.07 57.19   /00 31.12
Ya’an
prefecture
Others* 6.59 12.29   /00 5.7
* Include jointly owned enterprises, share-holding companies, FDI, Enterprises invested
by overseas Chinese.
Source: counted by the author based on Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook:
1995, edited by Changzhi prefecture statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press
(Beijing), 1995, p.138, 148; Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 2002, edited by
Changzhi prefecture statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 2002
p.170; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook: 1994, edited by Wuxi statistic bureau, published by
China Statistic Press (Beijing), 1994, p.128; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook 2002, electronic
version, edited by Wuxi Center for Economic Information, 2002; Ya￿an Statistical
Data: 1995, edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 1995, p.56-60;
Ya￿an Statistical Yearbook: 2001, edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic
bureau, 2001, p.93-98.
Extraction of revenues on provincial level by surveyed provinces and at
prefecture level by surveyed prefectures differed much. Sichuan extracted
higher ratio of resources from lower levels than the other two provinces
did. Sichuan province kept higher ratio of the 25% of VAT retained to
localities ￿ about 9% since 1994 compared to 8% in Shanxi since 2002 and
5% in Jiangsu since 2000 (interviews with finance bureaus in Sichuan,
Shanxi, and Jiangsu). Sichuan  also siphoned away 35% of 8 main local
taxes (interviews with Ya￿an finance bureau and Ya￿an local taxation
bureau). Among the three prefectures, only Wuxi succeeded in further
extracting 2% of the increased revenues from the two surveyed counties
within it. The other two prefectures ￿ Changzhi prefecture and Ya￿an ￿74
could neither further extract revenues from surveyed counties nor could
they siphon away resource target from the counties.
At county level, Table 13 shows that all surveyed counties’ situation
deteriorated from 1994, though to a different extent. Even the balance of
those two in Wuxi that were in the best situation among all declined
substantially. The balance surplus of Yiangyin, dropped to its one-third, in
Yixing it has shifted from surplus to deficit. All others’ initial (1994)
deficits increased further by 2000. The largest increase in deficit evolved in
Changzhi county, followed by Wuxiang, both in Changzhi prefecture The
reason of the overall decline was the faster increase of expenses compared
to that of revenues. The fastest increase in expenditures compared to that of
revenues was in Yangyin than in Yixing (Wuxi), but even this skyrocketing
increase influenced revenues less than the slower increase in other surveyed
counties.
Table 13. Revenue, expenditure and balance at surveyed counties in
1994 and 2000 (million RMB)
Counties 1994 (93) 2001 (00) Difference Rate
Revenues 26.8 65.2 38.4 243
Expenditures 40.7 115.8 75.1 285
Changzhi
county
Balance -13.9 -50.6 -36.7 364 def.
Revenues 11.8 27.4 15.6 232
Expenditures 34.9 84.5 49.6 242
Wuxiang
county
Balance -23.1 -57.1 -34 247 def
Revenues 629.2  /93 1837.0 1207.8 292
Expenditures 318.1  /93 1725.7 1407.6 543
Jiangyin
county
Balance 311.1  /93 111.3 -199.8 38 surplus
Revenues 349.1  /93 717.9 368.8 206
Expenditures 197.9  /93 758.8 560.9 383
Yixing
county
Balance 151.2  /93 -40.9 -192.1 27 def.!!!
Revenues 22 33.3   /00 11.3 151
Expenditures 57.8 94.5   /00 36.7 163
Yucheng
county
Balance -35.8 -61.2  /00 -25.4 171def.
Revenues 18.8 23.3   /00 4.5 124
Expenditures 39.1 57.9   /00 18.8 148
Mingshan
county
Balance -20.3 -34.6  /00 -14.3 170 def.75
Source: Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 1995, edited by Changzhi prefecture
statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 1995, p.213; Changzhi
Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 2002, edited by Changzhi prefecture statistic bureau,
published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 2002 p.269; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook:
1994, edited by Wuxi statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing),
1994, p.317; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook 2002, electronic version, edited by Wuxi Center
for Economic Information, 2002; Ya￿an Statistical Data: 1995, edited and published by
Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 1995, p.116-117; Ya￿an Statistical Yearbook: 2001,
edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 2001, p.136-137.
Yixing county’s deficit reached about 5% of its revenues by 2000.
Changzhi county (Changzhi prefecture) had deficits as large as its revenues
both in 1994 and 200l. Mingshan county (Ya￿an prefecture) had deficits as
large as its revenues in 1994, and the deficit increased to about 1.5 times
larger than its revenues in 2000. In Wuxiang county (Changzhi prefecture)
where despite the three-fold growth of the revenues deficits both in 1994
and 2000 remained more than two times larger due to the faster growth of
expenditures. Unfortunately we do not have relative data that would show
the differences in the size of budgetary revenues among localities according
to either population or workers etc.
Hardening reproduction constraints suggested by overall deterioration of
the budgetary balance were in some cases softened from above. Transfers
from higher levels took place on account of political bargaining capacity.
For example, Wuxiang county within Changzhi prefecture was one of the
most important guerrilla bases for the party during the Second World War,
and therefore had more feedbacks to provincial and central authorities.
From time to time, Wuxiang got resources in various forms from higher
levels, which neither other counties in the same prefecture enjoyed nor did
counties in Ya￿an and Wuxi prefectures. However, transfers did not
radically improve, only temporary relieved Wuxiang’s reproduction
constraints as a poor agricultural county.
Different counties had different possibilities to get resources from outside
the party-state network. Direct data on domestic private capital and FDI is
not available. Only indirect data ￿ the share of different ownership sectors
in industrial production ￿ suggest their existence, moreover expansion.
Table 14 shows each sector￿s contribution to industry production at the 6
surveyed counties.76
Table 14. Each sector’s share in industry production at surveyed
counties in 1994 (93) and 2000 (01)(%)
1994 (93) 2000 (01) Difference
SOEs 6.03 73.5 18.99 45.3 12.96




* 26.49 54.75 28.26
SOEs 27.23 76.1 12.41 21.5 -14.28 Wuxiang
county** Collective 48.91 9.05 -39.86
Pes and other
* 23.86 78.54 54.68






Pes 6.49 34.98 28.49
Jiangyin
county
Others* 3.88 23.73 19.85






Pes 8.83 46.85 38.02
Yixing
county
Others* 0.08 45.48 45.40








Pes 13.69 55.14 41.45
Others* 5.77 22.05 16.28






Pes 30.96 73.20 42.24
Mingshan
county
Others* 4.42 2.75 -1.67
* Including jointly owned enterprises, share-holding companies, FDI, Enterprises
invested by overseas Chinese.
** In the case of these two counties, deta on the share of private and other enterprises
was missing . We have calculated them through the deduction of the share of SOEs and
collectives from 100 percent.
Source: Counted by the author based on Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 1995,
edited by Changzhi prefecture statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing),
1995, p.138, 146; Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 2002, edited by Changzhi
prefecture statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 2002 p.170-173;
Wuxi Statistical Yearbook: 1994, edited by Wuxi statistic bureau, published by China
Statistic Press (Beijing), 1994, p.133-135; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook 2002, electronic
version, edited by Wuxi Center for Economic Information, 2002; Ya￿an Statistical Data:
1995, edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 1995, p.57-60; Ya￿an77
Statistical Yearbook: 2001, edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 2001,
p.99-102.
Among the surveyed counties, private sector’s contribution at Yixing
county increased the most during second half of 1990s. It increased more at
Yucheng county, Wuxiang county and Jiangyin county than at Mingshan
county. Private sector’s contribution at Changzhi county grew the  least.
Between 1994 and 2001 private sector’s share increased all over to the det-
riment of the collective and state contribution (except for Changzhi county,
where SOEs’ share increased somewhat). The difference among counties
concerning this expansion was that in some places domestic private sector’s
share increased the most (Mingchan in Ya’an), in other places FDI was the
dominant (Yixing)
94. Growing share was partly due to the decline of the
state and collective sector, and partly to the absolute increase of the private
sector. Data on FDI was available only at Jiangyin and Yixing counties in
2001, FDI at Jiangyin county in 2001 was three folds of that at Yixing
county. Interviews revealed that at other surveyed counties, FDI was negli-
gible. This difference contributed to the softening of reproduction con-
straint at Yixing county, Jiangyin county and the hardening of that at other
surveyed counties.
Moreover,  different counties encountered different pressures exerted by
prefecture and upper levels to siphon away resources and resource targets
from counties. Their capacity to resist these pressures was also different. In
Ya￿an, prefecture authorities in early 1990s siphoned away quite a few
resource targets from counties (see footnotes 54, 55, 56, 57 and the
according texts), hardening the reproduction constraints at the two
surveyed counties within it. Among the two surveyed counties in Ya￿an
prefecture, more resource targets were siphoned away at Yucheng county
by the prefecture than those at Mingshan county, due to the fact that
headquarter of prefecture authority was located at Yucheng county (see
footnotes 57)
95. In the other two prefectures, few such actions were
initiated. In Wuxi, however, another kind of extraction was implemented.
Since counties and townships are quite rich, prefecture authorities could not
only extract revenues from lower levels by siphoning away 2% of the
                    
94 We do not have separate data on the share of these two in the case of Changzhi and
Wuxiang counties.
95 What is worthwhile to notice is that Ya￿an prefecture never succeeded in extracting
resource targets from counties since 1994.78
increased fiscal revenues since 2002 but also decentralize expenditures to
those levels. We suppose, based on interviews that in Wuxi prefecture,
counties still have resources to be extracted by the prefecture, while in
Changzhi and Ya￿an (since 1994) there was few resource or resource base
to siphon away without the menace of economic collapse of these counties.
Concerning the possibility of decentralizing burdens to lower levels, only
the two counties in Wuxi prefecture could still decentralize burdens to
townships. They decentralized the responsibility of paying bonus and
health care for teachers at primary and secondary schools (interview with
Luoshe township governor, and see footnote 42 and the according text).
Taking all the above factors into consideration, we tend to believe that,
among our surveyed counties and prefectures, reproduction constraints of
Ya￿an prefecture in Sichuan province, and Yucheng county, and Mingshan
county in Ya’an were the hardest in every respect and had been hardening
consecutively. In Changzhi prefecture in Shanxi, and within the prefecture
Changzhi county, and Wuxiang county’s reproduction constraint was hard
and had been hardening. That of Yixing county and Jiangyin county was
hard but not hardening too much further, and that of Wuxi prefecture was
the softest and Wuxi prefecture authority still has the possibility of further
softening its reproduction constraint through extraction from lower levels.
Differences in kind, sequence, timing, and intensity of the implementation
of reform measures
Differences in the growth of hardening reproduction constraint coincided
with the differences in kind, sequence, timing and intensity of
implementation of resource acquisition measures among the three
prefectures and six counties.
Different frequency and success: According to the predictions of the model,
hardening reproduction constraints, as a reaction, bring about the drive for
the extraction of revenues, decentralization of expenditures, narrowing the
selection, privatization, and so on. These measures were implemented in all
the surveyed counties and prefectures. However, different localities
implemented some measures more frequently than others and with more
success than others.
For example, though Sichuan province in 1994 and 2000, and Shanxi
province in 2002 further extracted revenues from lower levels by changing
the share of tax revenues between provincial and lower levels in favour of
the province, and so did Jiangsu province in 2002. Neither Ya￿an prefecture
nor Changzhi prefecture could implement similar strategies toward levels79
lower than theirs. It was so, because, as local cadres in these two regions
complained, there was no possibility of further extraction from lower levels
that had already huge deficits.
There was a failed effort in 1998 by Changzhi prefecture authority to
siphon-away profitable SOEs subordinated to counties. Counties’ resistance
blocked the proposal before it was submitted to prefecture party standing
committee for formal discussion and decision. Counties’ resisting capacity
was in the political and economic menace that they would just collapse if
those SOEs that could still contribute something to county finance were
siphoned-away by the prefecture (interview with Changzhi prefecture
Organization Department).
Not only efforts to siphon away resource targets from counties failed at
these two prefectures. So did efforts to get rid of burdens by decentralizing
loss-making SOEs to counties. Prefectures remained the last stations in the
hierarchy to whom loss-making SOEs could be decentralized from the
province and/or the center. Resisting capacity of counties was due to the
menace of their collapse. This move led the prefecture and county
authorities to narrow the circle of those fed back, and to narrow those
privileged in distribution of resources (see footnote 64 and the according
text). Political privileges of enterprises were ceased. Their nomenklatura
were transferred from Organization Department to industrial bureau PC.
Resources were distributed to fewer and larger enterprises. Also
investments initiated by governments in economic development were
decreased.
In Wuxi, however, since counties and townships are quite rich, prefecture
authorities could not only extract revenues from lower levels but also
decentralize expenditures to those levels. Since 2002, Wuxi prefecture has
reformed the intergovernmental fiscal relations. Under the new
arrangement, 5 counties should submit tax revenues to the prefecture with
an annual increase rate of 12%; the other two counties, Jiangyin and
Yixing, should submit 2% of the increased tax revenues compared to 2002
to the prefecture authorities. Meanwhile, cadres at Wuxi prefecture related
on the decentralization of loss-making enterprises to lower levels, though
no exact numbers were given. One of those decentralized was an SOE that
originally belonged to the central authorities. As a loss-maker, it was
decentralized to Jiangsu provincial level, then to Wuxi prefecture, then to
Xishan county within Wuxi prefecture, and finally to Luoshe township in
Xishan county last year (Interview with governor of Luoshe township).80
Just as Wuxi prefecture siphoned away resources or resource targets from
counties, so did Jiangyin and Yixing county in 2000 and 2001 extract some
revenues from townships (interview with Wuxi policy research office of
the party committee, Jiangyin Finance Bureau, Yixing Finance Bureau).
Merging townships in these counties provided the means for extraction of
further revenues. Mergers relieved counties from financing larger number
of staff at township level. No similar actions were revealed in the other four
surveyed counties. Meanwhile, in Jiangyin and Yixing county not only
siphoned away revenues, but also decentralized some expenditures to
townships. For example, expenditures on funding bonus, health care, and
some other benefits for primary and high school teachers were
decentralized to townships in these two counties (interview with the
governor of Luoshe township, and also see footnote 42 and the according
text). According to interviewees, in the other four counties, no similar
decentralization occurred.
The other unique strategy that had been successfully implemented in Wuxi
prefecture and the two counties within it is to attract FDI. Barriers to FDI
were lifted. Moreover, taxes from FDI were given back to FDI to attract
them (see footnote 87 and the according text).
Not only the success of the decentralization of burdens and extraction of
revenues but also the speed, intensity and success of other measures for
easing reproduction constraint differed substantially among the surveyed
counties and prefectures.
In mid 1990s TVEs became heavily loss-making due to the rapid growth of
private sector in Wuxi. TVEs that in 1980s provided resources for township
and county authorities within Wuxi prefecture turned into their liabilities in
1990s. Parallel to the TVE decline, tensions grew in the society and TVEs
became serious sources of political instability at the locality
96. There was
no other way out than privatization (interview with Wuxi rural issue
working committee of the prefecture PC). Privatization of TVEs was
                    
96 The background of tensions originated from the weak position of TVEs within the
net. Since TVEs could hardly get loans from state owned banks in 1980s and early
1990s, TVEs raised funds from ordinary citizens. Almost every citizen living in the
townships and counties lent some money to local TVEs. When declining TVEs
started not to serve debts due, citizens demonstrated: they siege townships and
sometimes county authority headquarters; they blocked roads. Social and political
stability was shaken, raising concerns even at the central authority.81
intensive everywhere once authorities decided that these actions were
needed.
Meanwhile, privatization on SOEs was drawn out in time in some places
but intensive in others. In Yucheng  and Mingshan counties, and Ya￿an
prefecture (Sichuan province) where reproduction constraint was hard and
had been consecutively hardening, privatization of SOEs was basically
done in one or two years. By the end of 2002, according to interviews,
there was no longer any SOE in Yucheng county; only 2 SOEs remained in
Mingshan county, and only a few were still supervised by Ya￿an prefecture.
It seems that resistance to privatisation was faint. Privatization within this
prefecture and its counties began in 1997. In the early stage most
enterprises were privatised to workers. However, shares were too scattered
for efficient decision-making and enterprise performance kept declining.
Within two years mostly management buy-out or outsider investment
dominated.
Based on the interviews done in Yucheng and Mingshan counties (Ya￿an
prefecture) concerning SOEs and in the townships of Yixing county and
Jiangyin county in terms of TVEs we suggest that where reproduction
constraints were hardening from above and below, authorities were more
determined to privatization and presumably SOEs’ or TVEs￿ resistance was
overcome. In these localities privatization was done within short period.
Where reproduction constraints were less hardening since revenues could
be extracted increasingly from below, and burdens decentralized for
example, in Wuxi prefecture and the two counties within it, they were less
pressured to put down SOEs￿ and worker￿s resistance in SOEs
subordinated to them, and also had financial background to appease
possible grievances.
In the surveyed counties and prefecture in Shanxi province where
reproduction constraint seemed to be less hard compared to those surveyed
in Sichuan province, privatization was drawn out, and in some cases not
even initiated. At Changzhi prefecture level in Shanxi province,
privatization of SOEs are still being discussed and yet to be implemented in
2002. This is despite of the fact that according to Changzhi prefecture￿s
Organization Department and local ETC, many SOEs subordinated to the
prefecture were forced to operate part-time due to the lack of resources.
Authorities made efforts to privatize them but some of the cadres at
prefecture authorities and workers at those SOEs resisted privatization.
However, according to the same cadres, resistance to privatize SOEs
subordinated to the prefecture decreased by 2002 due to the persistent lack
of resources. On the one hand, workers￿ hope for the SOEs to revive82
vanished. On the other hand, the prefecture authority was forced to admit
that it lacks resources to continue to fund the SOEs.
Despite of this fact, few of the SOEs subordinated to Changzhi prefecture
were successfully privatized so far. Instead, hardening reproduction
constraints of counties were softened through selective withdrawal of party
and state responsibilities from subordinated large enterprises. Selectivity
was adapted to the extent of the liabilities SOEs meant for the prefecture.
Changzhi prefecture classified the 17 large scale SOEs ￿ whose leadership
nomenklatura was subordinated to prefecture party committee￿s
Organization Department ￿ into three categories. In those SOEs where
losses were huge, Organization Department of the prefecture PC let
workers elect the leadership that the department approved after the
elections. Simultaneously, substantial decision making power was
decentralized to these SOEs. In case of SOEs with little losses,
Organization Department worked together with some representatives of the
workers to select leadership. Parallel to this process, limited decision-
making power was also decentralized to the SOEs. As to those SOEs that
are still profitable, both appointment discretion and decision-making power
remained unchanged (interview with Changzhi prefecture Organization
Department).
Just as in the prefecture, Changzhi county’s (Changzhi prefecture) first
efforts to privatize SOEs in 1997 had also limited success. Efforts ceased in
1998, and were successfully renewed in 2001. According to authorities at
all visited levels, the failure of privatisation efforts in 1997-1998 was a
common phenomenon in Shanxi province. Efforts seemed to have been
half-hearted from the side of the authorities in Shanxi while, in turn, the
resistance by SOEs and some representatives was initially strong (interview
with Changzhi prefecture ETC).
Similarly, in Wuxiang county (Changzhi prefecture), there were two failed
privatization efforts, one in 1997 the other in 2000. The third privatization
effort ended up with limited success in 2002 (interview with Wuxiang
ETC).
At Wuxi prefecture (Jiangsu province) level where reproduction constraint
was the softest among all the surveyed counties and prefectures, small scale
loss-making SOEs ￿ where resisting capacity is relatively weaker ￿ were
successfully privatised in late 1990s. Middle and large scale SOEs were not
privatized so far. Neither the strategy of withdrawing nomenklatura from
loss-making larger SOEs, similar to Changzhi prefecture, was
implemented. The only major reform measure was to decentralize83
nomenklatura responsibility over part of the subordinated SOEs from
prefecture party Organization Department to party committees at branch
ministries. In 1996, 95 out of 147 SOEs were decentralized this way
narrowing the circle of those with higher level feed-backs. Since then, no
major restructuring was carried out (interview with Wuxi policy research
office).
In Jiangyin and Yixing counties (Jiangsu province) where reproduction
constraint was harder than that of Wuxi prefecture, interviews revealed that
almost all TVEs and SOEs had been privatized. Those loss-making SOEs
that are not yet privatized underwent a process of emptying. Authorities did
not have enough resources to compensate workers and other debtors in case
of one-off actions (close down, bankruptcy, privatization), since these
SOEs were large-scale and loss-making. The other reason was that many
other enterprises with business ties to these enterprises would not have
enough time for safe reorientation if these one-off strategies had been
implemented. Instead, workers gradually left these enterprises and business
activity declined. At a certain stage these SOEs were merged into one but
this action did not halt the deterioration process. Similar decline and
mergers are taking place in both counties (interview with Yixing county
Organization Department).
All surveyed counties and prefectures made efforts to attract resources from
the field outside party-state network. But as we have seen from table 11, 12
and 13, success was not unanimous. Cadres in Changzhi and Ya￿an and the
surveyed counties within them believed that foreign investors had little in-
terest in doing business in their regions due to the disadvantageous
geographic position and the lack of tradition of international engagement.
Practically no FDI was present in 2002.
Opposite to Ya￿an and Changzhi, Wuxi is one of the favourite regions of
the FDI
97. Both in Wuxi prefecture, and Jiangyin and Yixing counties
within it, great efforts had been made in promoting FDI. And due to its
geographic position on coastal line, its industrial and commercial traditions,
these efforts paid off. The capacity of attracting FDI, however, differed
even within Wuxi. Usually, Jiangyin county attracted much more than
                    
97 Statistics show that, in 2000, among the 31 provinces, Jiangsu province attracted one
sixth of the total FDI in China. And among the 13 prefectures in Jiangsu province,
Wuxi prefecture attracted more than one fifth of the total FDI in the province. (China
statistical yearbook 2001, p.607; Wuxi statistical yearbook, electronic version).84
Yixing county did. In 2001, about one third of total FDI was located in
Jiangyin county, and only about 7 percent in Yixing county.
From the analysis, it seems that where alternative resources emerged and
also extracting capacity was high (Wuxi) only decentralization of the
nomenklatura occurred and privatization of mid-and large SOEs was yet to
be an issue, partly because middle and large SOEs were profitable, partly
because prefecture had enough resources to ￿pacify￿ workers at loss-
making enterprises of large scale. Meanwhile, loss-making small SOEs
were privatised. Where transfers from above were possible (Shanxi,
political subsidies, state bond project, increase in coal prices), selective
withdrawal of the nomenklatura occurred and several failed actions of
privatization took place. Where no resources from above and no extraction
and no alternative resources emerged and there was low chance for
resource extraction from below (Sichuan and the surveyed counties), SOE
privatization occurred fast. Similar procedure took place in case of the
TVEs at township level in Yixing and Jiangyin counties, where many of the
burdens were decentralized
98 to townships. In these two counties TVEs
played a decisive role in early 1990s (about 80 percent of the industrial
production) and inefficiency could not be afforded.
Different sequence and timing: Though all surveyed authorities
implemented ￿ or at least tried to do so ￿ instruments to centralize
revenues, decentralize expenditures, decentralize decision making power,
decentralizing nomenklatura, merging SOEs, merging governmental
organizations, privatizing TVEs, privatizing SOEs, and so on, different
localities implemented these measures in different sequence and timing.
Jiangyin and Yixing counties in Wuxi (Jiangsu province) first privatized
TVEs and SOEs and  later on, in late 1990s and early 2000s, they made
successful efforts of centralizing revenues from townships . This
centralization was done in 2000, parallel to township mergers as further
                    
98 According to interviewees, decisions to privatise TVEs were much easier than in case
of SOEs. TVEs had few links (township party, government, financial department).
Moreover, these few links￿with few exceptions￿could hardly reach prefecture
level. SOEs however were deeply submerged in the network, embraced by large
quantity of links (labor ministry, social security, housing ministry, banks, party,
government, youth League, women association, trade union, planning commission,
ETC, financial department, taxation office, etc). Moreover, SOEs were frequently
fed back to higher levels within the net.85
steps to siphon away resources. Privatization of TVEs and SOEs in these
two counties was carried out in different periods. Privatization of TVEs
was much earlier in Yixing county (began in late 1993, high tide in 1994
and 1995) than in Jiangyin county (began in late 1996, high tide in 1997
and 1998).
Early privatization of TVEs in first part of 1990s was taken as ideologically
incorrect. Therefore township and county authorities￿ efforts in
privatization encountered strong opposition from higher, mainly at
provincial level. Nevertheless, pressure from above on different counties to
delay privatization of TVEs differed and so did different counties￿
capability of handling problems caused by loss-making TVEs. Both factors
strongly influenced the timing of the privatization.
Since opposite to Jiangyin, Yixing was not a geographically and politically
focal point, these two counties￿ and their superior Wuxi prefecture￿s
inexplicit strategy was to let Yixing county do privatization without
publicizing the events, but to shift some resources to Jiangyin county to
help to delay the privatization. This practice prevailed until official
ideology on this issue changed in 1996 and especially in 1997 after the 15
th
party congress. (interviews with Wuxi rural issue working committee,
Jiangyin leaders group on enterprise reform, and Jiangyin planning
commission).
In Yixing county TVE privatization was done at one stroke in 1994 and
1995, while in Jiangyin TVE privatization process was scattered in time.
Jiangyin’s first wave of privatization took place in 1997 and 1998. The
second wave occurred in 2000 and 2001. This period was the turn of large
scale TVEs that were not privatized or only partially privatized in 1998.
According to interviewees, the reason for not privatizing large scale TVEs
in late 1990s was that private sector was not large enough to take them
over.
In Yucheng county and Mingshan county within Ya￿an prefecture (Sichuan
province) TVE development was slower, limited in scale and had not
developed as important as those in Jiangyin county and Yixing county
within Jiangsu province. High tide of TVE creation evolved later and they
began to make losses also much later. When this period arrived, problems
caused by TVEs were by far less subversive than those in the two surveyed
counties in Jiangsu province.
On the other hand, in these two surveyed counties in Sichuan province,
most SOEs began to make losses by mid 1990s. In Yucheng county, losses
developed  after Ya’an prefecture siphoned-away a group of relatively large86
scale profitable SOEs from the county in 1993. The county quickly found it
difficult to afford to bail-out remaining loss-making SOEs.
Four years later, when two other counties in Sichuan and a very few
counties in other provinces made pilot privatization of SOEs, leaders group
on enterprise reform in Yucheng county was formed to privatize SOEs. In
1997 and 1998, Yucheng county made a successful and leading effort in
privatizing SOEs. By the end of 2000, according to cadres at Yucheng
county all SOEs had been privatized (Yucheng Planning Commission and
leaders group on enterprise reform). Mingshan county implemented similar
privatization to Yucheng in 1999. By the end of 2002, only two profitable
SOEs were still run by the county authority.
The privatization of SOEs, was followed soon by the privatization of TVEs
in these two counties. According to Ya￿an prefecture TVE administration,
majority of TVEs were privatized in 1999 and 2000. In this two counties
SOEs were the dominant source of revenues. Problems and burdens caused
by them may have caused harder reproduction constraints than TVEs for
townships in these counties. This sequence and timing is very much
different from that in Jiangyin and Yixing counties and different from that
in Changzhi and Wuxiang counties where privatization of SOEs usually
came after or at least parallel to TVE privatization
99.In Changzhi and
Wuxiang counties within Changzhi prefecture (Shanxi province) compared
to the other surveyed counties both SOE privatization and TVE
privatization were very much delayed. While in Jiangyin and Yixing
counties (Jiangsu province) TVEs began to decline in early 1990s and in
mid 1990s in Yucheng and Mingshan counties (Sichuan province), in
Wuxiang TVEs began to decline only in 1999 after a high tide of
development in 1997 and 1998 (interview with Wuxiang TVE
administration). It is not clear when TVEs began to decline in Changzhi
county. We did not directly find reasons for the delayed development and
decline of TVEs in these two counties. We assume that it was partly
                    
99 This fact does not mean that TVEs become earlier loss-making than SOEs. Time-
sequence may be due to the differences in the hardness of reproduction constraints.
TVEs were usually subordinated to townships and villages, while SOEs￿ last
subordination level is usually the county. It may occur that SOEs become loss-
making earlier than TVEs and losses are much larger than those of TVEs, but usually
townships encounter harder reproduction constraints earlier than counties do. This
will lead them to get rid of burdens earlier than higher levels do. On the other hand,
if particular TVEs are efficient sources of extraction, privatisation will not occur.87
because most TVEs in this region were engaged in coal mining. This
industry might not be as sensitive to market as other industries since free
entry in this sector is hindered. Meanwhile, during those high tide years
there was a general increase in coal prices.
In terms of intensity of TVE and SOE privatization, significant differences
emerged between Changzhi and Wuxiang counties. Privatization in
Changzhi county was intensively done while the privatization process in
Wuxiang county was stretched out in time. Reasons may be drawn back to
leadership change. In Changzhi county, there was a change of leadership in
2000 after the corruption case of former county party secretary was
revealed. The new county party secretary’s strategy was to privatize most of
TVEs and SOEs in about one year ￿ from early 2001 to mid 2002
(interview with county party secretary, ETC and Organization Department).
In Wuxiang county, none of the interviewees talked about any clear-cut
privatization strategy. According to them the latest effort in privatizing
TVEs and SOEs was in 2002 with limited success. This was the third round
of making efforts in privatisation, preceded by two failed rounds in 1998
and 2000. (interview with Wuxiang ETC, Wuxiang TVE administration).
At prefecture level, sequence and timing of implementation of reform
measures were different from those at county level. Moreover, the three
surveyed prefectures differed from each other as well.
In general, except for Ya￿an, the surveyed prefectures did not make as
much privatization as county level did. Instead, prefecture level took
several measures of resource extraction and expenditure decentralization:
further extracted revenues, decentralized expenditures, decentralized
decision making, decentralized nomenklatura, centralized efficient
enterprises and so on. This means that surveyed higher levels had more
varied facilities to acquire resources and get rid of burdens than lower
levels had, prior getting definitely rid of liabilities and withdrawing party
and state dependency threads. Privatization was not only less frequent but it
was also much later implemented. This fact also underlines our supposition
that privatization is spreading upwards in time and size.
For example, as shown above, Wuxi prefecture (Jiangsu province) in 2000
extracted further revenues from lower levels, in 1996 decentralized
nomenklatura responsibility over some large scale SOEs from the
Organization Department of the prefecture party committee to the party
committees within prefecture level line ministries, and in some years
decentralized loss-making SOEs to counties. Meanwhile, gradually
increased decision making power in SOEs (interview with Wuxi policy88
research office of the party). All these efforts did not end up loss-making.
In 2001, Wuxi prefecture authority began to privatize small scale loss-
making SOEs subordinated to it. Compared to privatization in Jiangyin
county and Yixing county, privatization of SOEs subordinated to the
prefecture was delayed for at least three years.
Changzhi prefecture (Shanxi province) did not begin to make privatization
until 2002. As we have mentioned before, many SOEs subordinated to the
prefecture had been running part time for years, while making losses. They
could operate only a few months or even weeks in a year. Some of them
stopped running for years. However, prefecture leadership still wanted to
keep them so that they could get resources from them in case it was needed.
For example, the cost of their travelling to Western countries in the name of
studying Western experience and attracting FDI. Workers also wanted to
keep them. They feared that privatization would make them lose salaries,
pension, health care, and other benefits. Some workers in Changzhi
prefecture demonstrated, asking prefecture authority to bail-out their loss-
making SOEs so that they could at least get part of their benefits. However,
the prefecture authority could hardly do anything, because they simply did
not have resources. After years of hopeless protest, demonstration, and
demands, some workers began to accept the idea that they could not
survive through SOEs and began to engage in private sector through one
way or the other (interview with Changzhi prefecture ETC) (also see
section Difference in the kind and intensity of implementation of resource
acquisition measures).
Ya￿an prefecture authority implemented the most radical reform measures
compared to the other two surveyed prefectures. It encountered hardening
reproduction constraints earlier than the other two prefectures. More SOEs
were making losses, Sichuan province extracted more revenues from the
prefecture, had less transfers from above and less chance to extract from
lower levels. Prior to privatization, beginning in 1999, prefecture authority
also made efforts to siphon away revenues and decentralize expenditures,
nomenklatura, and decisions. As shown before, some expenditures were
decentralized to counties; some revenues were siphoned-away to the
prefecture with the change of prefecture authority from a transmitting belt
to a concrete level of authority (Ya￿an Finance Bureau, Yucheng
Construction Commission). Organization Department decentralized
nomenklatura over a few SOEs to ETC. Some decision making power had
also been decentralized to SOEs. Nevertheless, SOEs were still problematic
and sources of trouble to the prefecture authority. By the end of 1998,
Leaders Group on Enterprise Reform was formed at the prefecture level. In89
1999 and especially in 2000, most of SOEs subordinated to prefecture level
in Ya￿an were privatized.
Differences in the consequences on the transformation of the party-state
network
Different extent of reproduction constraint, different kind, intensity,
sequence, and timing of implementation of reform measures resulted in
different consequences on the transformation of the net in the surveyed
counties and prefectures. Differences in the transformation emerge
however among different levels and among units of one level.
Differences between prefecture and county levels: According to statistics,
absolute and relative shrinkage of the net at surveyed counties seems much
more radical than at higher levels. However we should be cautious how to
draw conclusions from aggregated numbers that do not specify results
according to enterprise subordination. Without this concern, we easily
could misjudge the tendencies of transformation of the net at different
levels. For example, not mentioning statistical comparative constraints, if
aggregated prefecture level results show the decrease in the number of and
employment in SOEs, that does not necessarily mean that number and
employment in SOEs subordinated to prefecture level has also decreased,
shrinking the net at that level. Yet, despite the above data, theoretically the
net may even expand at prefecture level.
According to Appendix 6 and 7, within the surveyed prefectures an overall
decline in the number of and employment in SOEs and TVEs was
experienced, parallel to the growth in the number and industrial
contribution of private enterprises. At this aggregation, the absolute and
relative shrinkage of the net was somewhat slower than in our surveyed
counties subordinated to them, but the difference in the rates among these
latter was much more extreme. Surveyed prefectures show characteristic
differences in the contribution of different ownership sectors to the
industrial production.
Based on the above, aggregated numbers in general show the relative
withdrawal of the aggregated net. Absolute withdrawal of the net is
suggested from the aggregated number of and employment in SOEs and
TVEs. From these numbers however we can only suppose that in fact, the
net has shrunk at levels where these economic units were subordinated.
According to the numbers, Wuxi as an aggregated unit seems to go under
the most radical transformation of the net. However, interviews reveal that
this dynamics is very differentiated according to levels, used measures,90
sequence and timing of the implementation. The net at Wuxi prefecture
level did not really change, only small SOEs were privatized
100 in
consequence of its soft reproduction constraint due to its capacity to
decentralize burdens to and siphon away revenues and revenue sources
from lower levels and large SOEs. Instead, decentralization and relative
shrinkage seemed to dominate the transformation of the net at this level.
The net was restructured at prefecture level by narrowing the number of
those enterprises that were fed back. Nomenklatura of the leaders of less
meaningful enterprises were transferred (decentralized) from prefecture
Organization Department to PC-s at government authorities within the
prefecture. Relative shrinkage and emptying or withdrawing the net at this
level took place through the attraction of resources from outside the net to
SOEs subordinated to prefecture level
101.
As opposed to Wuxi prefecture level, transformation of the net was much
more radical at surveyed county and township levels. Even among those,
meaningful differences may be tracked according to timing of the changes.
Since first the TVEs that gave overwhelming part of industrial production
were privatized in large numbers. The net shrunk absolutely first at Yixing
that was less fed back, therefore out of the sight of higher level authorities
and later at coastal Jiangyin. First small, than larger TVEs were at stake. In
Yixing privatization of TVEs took place at one stroke, in Yiangyin was
scattered in time.
Privatization of TVEs not only ceased township burdens but also decreased
counties’ capacity to further decentralize burdens and siphon away
resources from townships. After TVEs also SOEs at county level were
privatized. Meanwhile, the share of domestic and foreign capital increased
dramatically in both counties. These changes brought about the radical
                    
100 Privatization was not the option partly because these SOEs are usually very large
scale therefore few single private entrepreneur could take over them at one stroke.
Moreover, these SOEs are still resourceful and prefecture authority do not want to
lose them.
101 Prefecture authority is aware of the fact that SOEs performance declines in
consequence of the competition with domestic and foreign private sector. Therefore,
to keep some possibility of resource extraction, the so far solution was to involve
private sector and ￿dilute the state￿s share". Authorities attracted FDI in order to
decrease the share of state assets to "desirable level￿ and compensate market
competition of foreign enterprises (interview with leaders group on enterprise reform
of Wuxi prefecture).91
absolute and relative shrinkage of the net at surveyed counties. Among
them the network in Yixing shrunk to a minimal size.
SOEs and TVEs in Ya’an prefecture, as a whole aggregation had relatively
high, but lower role in the industrial production compared to those in Wuxi
prefecture, relative to private enterprises. This suggests that at this field the
net was less expanded in Ya’an than in Wuxi’s case in 1994. Changes
therefore, though also quite radical in Ya’an as a whole, did not reach the
size of that in Wuxi. This may be confirmed in the differences in the
decrease in the number of and employment in SOEs and TVEs in Ya’an as
a whole compared to Wuxi as a whole and the similar dynamics in the
growth of private sector.
Meanwhile, according to interviews, at prefecture (non-aggregated level)
the absolute shrinkage of the net was the most radical in Ya’an among the
three surveyed prefectures.
Transformation of Ya’an prefecture as a whole seem to be less radical than
that of Wuxi. Here we also find large differences in dynamics at different
levels and at units on the same level in the transformation of the net. Ya’an
prefecture level did not have the chance to decentralize burdens to lower
levels, did not get resources from above and could not extract further
resources from below. According to interviews most SOEs subordinated to
prefecture level have been privatized and prefecture party-state network in
Ya’an was largely withdrawn from economic field. The net at prefecture
level shrunk absolutely to its minimum.
Counties in Ya’an were poor, and so were townships. Counties could not
decentralize burdens towards townships. Privatization of SOEs and TVEs
occurred soon at one stroke. Counties in Ya￿an prefecture encountered even
harder reproduction constraint than the prefecture level. And the net at
counties also shrank to its minimum absolutely and relatively. The
difference between county level and prefecture level in Ya￿an had been
much less than that in the other two surveyed prefectures.
As a whole aggregation, Changzhi prefecture seems to show the least
dynamism in the transformation of the net. Interestingly, the share of
private enterprises decreased (unfortunately, lacking data, we do not know
if this was due to the decrease in the number of and employment in private
enterprises within the province). What we can see however, is that number
of SOES and employment in SOEs and TVEs has declined. This may
suggest both the absolute and relative shrinkage of the net at aggregated
level.92
Interviews revealed that dynamics was even slower at Changzhi prefecture
(non-aggregated) level. Here none of the interviews revealed any clear case
of SOE privatization. According to interviewees, privatization is being
done but they could not give any example of completed action. Burdens
could not be decentralized in consequence of resistance, and the siphoning
away of resources also failed. Despite of these circumstances, dynamics
was low at prefecture level.  Strategy was to withdraw nomenklatura over a
few heavily loss-making SOEs. Interviewees also detailed the events of
desperate SOE workers leaving SOEs to engage in private sector. We
assume that the net at prefecture level in Changzhi is undergoing a slow net
restructuring through decentralization and a process of absolute shrinkage
through the emptying of the net.
Counties in Changzhi prefecture also could neither extract resources from
nor decentralize burdens to townships. Due to the fact that in eras before
1990s, prefecture level had got larger and better SOEs than counties did,
state sector at the counties had encountered problems earlier and severer
than prefecture level did. These earlier and severer problems led counties to
make reforms to get rid of the burdens earlier than prefecture did too. At
both counties, interviewees reported clear strategy and achievement of
privatising SOEs and TVEs, while at prefecture level no such picture was
revealed.
Differences in the transformation of the net among surveyed counties:
Table 14, and 15 show the change in number of each type of enterprise,
employment in each sector between 1994 (93) and 2001 (00) at each
surveyed counties. Based on these data, together with table13 that showed
each sector￿s contribution to industrial production, the combination of
relative and absolute shrinkage of the party-state may be suggested. The
common feature is that shrinkage of the net in 1990s in terms of decrease of
the number of enterprises, employment, and SOE and TVE contribution to
industrial production (with the exception of Changzhi county) had all been
dramatic. The difference is that some were more dramatic than others. And
this difference coincides with the difference in hardness of reproduction
constraint. For example, shrinkage of net at Yucheng county (Sichuan),
Mingshan county (Sichuan), and Yixing county (Jiangsu) were more
dramatic than other surveyed places. Meanwhile, reproduction constraint in
these counties happened to be harder than those in other surveyed places
(see section Difference in the growth of hardening reproduction constraint).93
Table 15. Number of enterprises at county level according to ownership
in 1994 and 2000
1994 (93) 2000 (01) Difference Rate
SOEs 19 17 -2 89.5
Collective 511 ￿ ￿ ￿
Changzhi
county
Pes 1102 ￿ ￿ ￿
SOEs 24 12 -12 50.0
Collective 625 ￿ ￿ ￿
Wuxiang
county
P e s 7 1 2￿￿￿
SOEs 92 13 -79 14.1
Collective 3288 969 -2319 29.5
Jiangyin
county
Pes 4949 9476 4527 191.5
SOEs 24 19 -5 79.1
Collective 625 183 -442 29.2
Yixing
county
Pes 712 4845 4133 680.5
SOEs 42 10 -32 23.8
Collective 387 108 -279 27.9
Yucheng
county
Pes 2336 6375 4039 272.9
SOEs 29   14    /00 -15 48.3
Collective 640  222   /00 -418 34.7
Mingshan
county
Pes 2371 1816  /00 -555 76.4
Source: Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 1995, edited by Changzhi prefecture
statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 1995, p.138, 146, 147;
Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 2002, edited by Changzhi prefecture statistic
bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 2002 p.138; Wuxi Statistical
Yearbook: 1994, edited by Wuxi statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press
(Beijing), 1994, p.133, 135; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook 2002, electronic version, edited
by Wuxi Center for Economic Information, 2002; Ya￿an Statistical Data: 1995, edited
and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 1995, p.56; Ya￿an Statistical
Yearbook: 2001, edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 2001, p.93.94
Table 16. Employment in enterprises at county level according to
ownership in 1994 and 2000
1994 (93) 2000 (01) Difference Rate
State unit 14,049 12,195 -1584 86.8 Changzhi
county Collective 7,518 1,334 -6184 17.7
State unit 11,493 7,842 -3651 68.23 Wuxiang
county Collective 3,101 1,719 -1382 55.43
State unit 53,457 46,247 -7210 86.51 Jiangyin
county Collective 47,004 14,001 -33003 29.79
State unit 68,411 36,691 -31720 53.63 Yixing
county Collective 33,601 6,453 -27148 19.2
State unit 51,900 37,200 -14700 71.68 Yucheng
county Collective 6,900 5,600 -1300 81.16
State unit 11,600 9,000 -2600 77.59 Mingshan
county Collective 2,100 900 -1200 48.26
Source: Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 1995, edited by Changzhi prefecture
statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 1995, p.332, 340;
Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 2002, edited by Changzhi prefecture statistic
bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 2002 p.412, 420; Wuxi Statistical
Yearbook: 1994, edited by Wuxi statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press
(Beijing), 1994, p.55; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook 2002, electronic version, edited by
Wuxi Center for Economic Information, 2002; Ya￿an Statistical Data: 1995, edited and
published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 1995, p.112; Ya￿an Statistical Yearbook:
2001, edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 2001, p.144.
Absolute shrinkage went parallel to relative shrinkage of the net in all
counties. We can see from Table 14 that private enterprise’s share in
industrial production increased in all surveyed counties. This increase that
suggests the relative shrinkage of the net was partly due to the absolute
decrease of the role of enterprises belonging to the net and partly to the
absolute increase of the number of private enterprises. Unfortunately we do
not have county level data in Changzhi prefecture (Shanxi) for 2000 on the
number of collective and private enterprises. Comparing the surveyed
counties in Jiangsu and Sichuan provinces we can see that in Mingshan,
relative shrinkage of the net was overwhelmingly due to its absolute
shrinkage, since also the number of private enterprises decreased, but that
of collectives and SOEs decreased even faster. The other extreme is Yixing,95
where the number of private enterprises increased almost seven folds while
employment within the net declined the most. Since SOE privatization was
more streched out and delayed than TVE privatization, and emptying and
merging seemed to dominate the SOE transformation, employment at SOEs
could decline much faster than the decrease of the number of SOEs.
We also see that Yixing was less radical than Jiangyin in decreasing SOEs
but presumably more radical in privatizing or closing down mid- and large
enterprises (both SOEs and TVEs) since employment declined more in
Yixing than in Jiangyin compared to the number of enterprises. Also the
domestic private sector increased more radically in Yixing. Shares in
industrial production shows that the net in Yixing has practically shrunk to
its minimum, since less than 8 percent is contributed by units within the in
2000. Yixing￿s change was the most radical, since the share of the
enterprises belonging to the net was the largest in 1994 (91 percent) and it
has dropped to the lowest among all surveyed counties. This change is due
to both absolute and relative shrinkage of the net.
At Changzhi county and Wuxiang county, the net had undergone an
absolute shrinking in the sense that both number of SOEs and TVEs, and
number of employment of SOEs and TVEs declined. At Wuxiang county,
both SOEs￿ and TVEs￿ contribution to industry production declined much
(table 13), showing that the net also relatively shrank fast. At Changzhi
county, on the contrary, SOEs￿ contribution to industry production
increased, which was the only case among the 6 surveyed counties.
However, the increase rate of SOEs was much less than the decrease rate of
TVE￿s contribution, showing the net had also relatively shrunk, but in a
much slower pace. And among the 6 surveyed counties, the net shrank the
least in terms of the contribution to industry production by the units within
the net.
Interviews at these two counties reveal more radical measures at Changzhi
county than at Wuxiang county. It seemed that change of the net at
Changzhi county had been in larger intervals. And at each wave of change,
it changed dramatically. At Wuxiang county, change of the net had been
less dramatic, and more stretched out.
Mingshan’s reproduction constraints were the hardest, the net decreased
radically but chances for the increase of the field outside the net also
declined. The net shrunk absolutely but poor relative shrinkage may be
detected.
Compared to Mingshan county, partly due to the fact that the headquarters
of prefecture authorities were located at in Yucheng, prefecture level96
competed for resources with the county, and extracted more from it. The
net at Yucheng county encountered hard reproduction constraint earlier
than in Mingshan, and was forced to change dramatically too. However,
also due to the same factor of locations, private sector had more access to
resourceful business and therefore had more chances to growth. Therefore,
in Yucheng county, the net experienced a swift absolute shrinking, and a
rather slow relative shrinking.
PART IV
CONCLUSIONS
6. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE TRANSFORMATION DURING REPRODUCTION
ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE SHRINKAGE OF THE NET
Reviewing the changes in time, in kind and in space, we can conclude the
following concerning the transformation of the net. According to our
empirical survey, the transformation of the net varied according to levels
and among units of the same level, but all were explicitly strong examples
of the self-withdrawing pattern. More concretely, both prefectures and
counties were experiencing a relative shrinkage of the party-state network ￿
with the development of private sector (both foreign and domestic). All
surveyed units were also undergone a process of absolute shrinkage  ￿ with
the privatization of TVEs and SOEs and withdrawal of party and state
dependency lines.
Surveyed prefecture level, except for Ya￿an, underwent a faint absolute
shrinkage of the power network. The surveyed prefectures did not make as
much privatization as county level did. Prefecture level took several
measures of resource extraction and expenditure decentralization. They
extracted further revenues, decentralized expenditures, decentralized
decision making, decentralized nomenklatura, centralized efficient
enterprises and so on. This means that surveyed higher levels had more
varied facilities to acquire resources and get rid of burdens than lower
levels had, prior getting definitely rid of liabilities and withdrawing party
and state dependency threads. Privatization was not only less frequent but it
was also much later implemented. This fact also underlines our supposition
that privatization and the shrinkage of the net is spreading upwards in time
and size. Instead, a process of relative shrinkage, decentralization,
withdrawal or emptying of the net took place. This also means that absolute
shrinkage of the net is occurring earlier at lower levels than at higher ones.97
Moreover, even among those at higher levels, those shrink earlier
absolutely where reproduction constraints are harder.
Counties at surveyed prefectures in general had harder reproduction
constraints than prefecture level had and in general it occurred earlier.
Surveyed counties, except those within Wuxi could not decentralize
burdens to lower levels and siphon away revenues or revenue targets to
soften reproduction constraints. Absolute shrinkage of the net took place in
all of them, since privatization of TVEs and SOEs was carried out without
exception, only sequence and pace, timing, methods and the extent of the
shrinkage are different. Also the relative shrinkage may be traced at all of
them. Variations emerged in the extent of growth of the private sector, its
infiltration in the net and according to the counties’ capacity of attracting
either domestic and/or foreign capital.
Concerning the changes of elements of the net behind the relative and
absolute shrinkage, vertical dependency lines within the state sphere of the
net became scarcer (merger of supervising organizations) and have shrunk
radically. Shrinking took place by cutting functions, resources and
discretion and cutting off targets from functions. These developments
occurred not only at county, but higher and lower levels too. Retained tasks
and functions of the remaining organizations became decentralized along
the levels of hierarchy and authorities became less interventionist and with
decreased power lacking distribution potential
102.
Interlinking threads of the party towards enterprises and state bureaucracy
became also radically scarcer. This happened indirectly because enterprises
were detached from state subordination or state organizations were merged,
or decentralized or centralized from the given level. It happened also
directly, since many were interlinking threads to economic units were
withdrawn or cut (e.g. privatization, mergers, centralized, decentralized,
closed down). Those remaining became weaker (eg. at joint ventures or
                    
102 The change was mainly on issuing permissions. Some of the permission issuing had
disappeared, like distribution of materials and productive means. Coordination on
these issues was substituted by market. Change in this respect was not undergoing at
one stroke. It was a gradual process. Planning commission gradually withdrew from
this field. Another change was that some permission issuing was decentralized to
other bureaus. For example, some permission issuing on urban construction was
decentralized to construction commission. (Wuxi prefecture Planning commission).98
share-holding companies) and emptied (e.g. those attached to state
organizations without effective distributive function).
Remaining direct interlinking threads to economy have been differentiated.
Some cross-hierarchy (from state-owned economy to party hierarchy)
feedbacks disappeared, their nomenklatura was decentralized, thereby the
circle of those fed back was narrowed. Selection of decentralization was
according to usual criteria: size and resourcefulness. Larger SOEs were
transferred to the LEWC, smaller ones to Organization Department or to
PCs located at ministries. Some transfer of nomenklatura responsibility also
occurred, according to the higher level’s capacity to siphon away efficient
economic units.
New party and party-state organizations emerged under which authorities
concentrated first the nomenklatura and subordination and than allocation
of potential resources: first EWC was formed under the party, than EWC
merged with ETC and planning sections. Other organizations emerged
(leaders group on enterprise reforms and TVE reform) for implementing
the self-withdrawal: detach SOEs and TVEs from interlinking threads
through privatization and deciding on privatization. Traditional party
organizations (County Party Organization Department) are engaged in
leading self-withdrawal at township and county levels by organizing county
and township semi-free elections and free elections at village level.
Remaining party linkages to the state and remaining SOEs and TVEs ￿
even if strongly bound ￿ are attached to a weakening state in its capacity of
extraction and distribution within the net and therefore, less activity
through it. Many of the remaining direct links to economy turned to be
liabilities instead of assets (those attached to loss-making enterprises).
CHANGING RELATIONSHIP AMONG DECISION-MAKERS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE
THE NET
In consequence of the hardening reproduction constraints within the net,
the absolute and relative shrinkage of the net, the emptying of the rigid
structures, the decreasing resources to extract and distribute within the net
and the emerged alternative resources outside of it substantially changed
and continues to change dependency and interest promotion of actors
within and outside the net. While in the remaining net principles of con-
nection of party-state elements remain unchanged, characteristics that de-
fine the principles of operation of the party-state are vanishing: dependen-
cies, interest promotion and extraction and distribution of resources are not
any more monopolized. Empirical evidence suggests that changed operat-99
ing conditions gradually transform the relationship among the actors, both
among those within the net and with those outside the net.
Changing relationship between state and enterprises: a) privatized
enterprises have restricted contact with authorities with declined power
103
(Changzhi county ETC), monopolized power vanished together with
monopolized responsibility: workers’ grievances and expectations are not
only addressed to the authorities but the private owner b) The change of the
function and the decline of resources of the Planning and Economic
Commission enterprises began not to obey instructions
104 with increasing
fequency (Yucheng county ETC).
Changing relationship between party authority and enterprises: a) less re-
sponsibility after privatization, while self-reproduction and social stability
is manageable through the further improvement of the private
105 b) less
possibility for economic and political intervention for the party in eco-
nomic management affairs both in share-holding or rented or contracted out
enterprises (Changzhi county Organization Department, Wuxiang county
Organization Department), c) less capacity for the party to mediate resource
distribution through resource-less state, consequently, less reasons for eco-
                    
103After the enterprise reform and organization restructuring, our supervision on
enterprises had been largely simplified (weakened). We had already lost the power
over business decisions in enterprises. We finally lost the power over personnel in
enterprises. We now only call representatives for the enterprises to attend meetings
that disseminate policy, intents, suggestions or instructions of the authorities
(Changzhi county ETC)
104 Permission issuing (approval granting) is needed from the point of view of the
existence of a governmental bureau. From our experience, if a governmental bureau
was deprived of all (did not have any) administrative power and/or control over
permissions, it would soon shrink (decline) greatly. It is of no use that it wanted to
actively provide service to enterprises and society. People just did not care (Wuxi
prefecture Planning commission).
105 Before privatization, when enterprises were in bad performance, people came to
require authorities for solution, authorities were held responsible and heavily
pressured; after the reform, authorities had little to do with economy. Only when
unemployment was high would government pay attention to it. And the solution was
and will be nothing else than further promoting the development of private sector.
Only if economy is in development could social stability (one of the top priorities for
the authorities) be kept (Jiangyin leaders group on enterprise reform).100
nomic management to comply with the party’s instructions
106. d) more ca-
pacity to attract alternative resource from outside the net decrease depend-
ence from party mediation e) increased capacity to flee and/or empty the
net or buy out and decreased attraction of party career decreases the inter-
ests and willingness of those embraced by the nomen-klatura threads to
comply for the sake of individual and organizational interest f) decreased
capacity of the members of the party apparatus to enter the economic
sphere bring about more willingness to compromise with economic man-
agement g) assets that became liabilities (subjects for mass demonstration
against the party instead of mass mobilization for the party) incite the party
to withdraw.
Changing relationship between party and state: On the one hand, despite
the strong remaining bonds between party and state, we experienced more
conflict, less adaptation, more frequent denial of party’s orders or
expectations by state authorities. Weakened state as distributor acquires
this capacity to resist partly due to the development of alternative
legitimacy: that of state leaders as winners of multi-candidate semi-free
elections at village and township level (Lai, 2003), moreover at a few but
growing cases at People￿s Congress at county level. In consequence of the
development of an alternative field for existential mobility (private sector),
Party career is not any more so attractive. On the other hand, hardening
reproduction constraints and assets turning into liabilities incite the party
(and the state) to redistribute responsibilities and power for the sake of
social stability, getting rid of burdens and easing the extraction of new
resources by re-acquiring the compliance of local population. We suggest
that just as reproduction constraints are likely spreading upwards, so will
these actions spread within the net, providing one way of its absolute
shrinkage both at state and party dependency lines. Lower level
government leaders acquire more legitimacy through semi-free elections.
Party seems to compete for legitimacy acquired by governors at lower
levels. At village level only those may be party leaders at local level who
won direct elections as governor. Moreover, some cases of direct elections
for party secretary at village level and in few cases at township level also
occurred.
                    
106 In reformed SOEs and TVEs, and private enterprises, it is very hard for Organization
Department to intervene to handle party affairs. If party secretaries at particular
enterprises do not support the management, the management would lay-off the
secretaries (Organization depart at Changzhi county).101
Changing relationship between party-state authority and private entities:
on the one hand, hardening reproduction constraints, and drive to get rid of
burdens and ease competition pressure within the net, the stripping off the
state assets, on the other hand the emergence and increase of alternative
resources outside the net, incited the invitation of domestic and foreign
private capital into the net.
Hardening reproduction constraints and pressures from below and
spreading upwards and from agriculture to industry gradually softened
economic policy and ideology in relationship to market and private capital.
Though domestic private enterprises are still suffering from biased credit
policy, local authorities are increasingly friendly towards private
entrepreneurs and do their best to attract FDI. Local private entrepreneurs
play focal role in local social life, authorities try to suck them into the
network and offer them crucial positions in economic policy management.
At central level economic policy gradually conceded to the pressure of
letting go first the small, than middle and presently large SOEs. Private
capital is allowed to enter loss-making enterprises, share in the debt to
equity project, to enter the money market, in B shares, in insurance, in
banking, and lately in buying shares in the largest ￿ most fed back￿
enterprises under central subordination. Entering the WTO requires the
liberalization of regulations, lifting former barriers to FDI inflow, the
introduction of the rule of law, etc.
Changed relationship between party-state and the society: the trans-
formation of the net changes the relationship between party-state and the
population. Gradually, and in a scattered manner ￿ where the net was
withdrawn, emptied or weakened ￿ spots of civil society are emerging in
consequence of hardening reproduction constraints. Examples for this are
the direct elections at village level, semi-free elections on township and
county level, where peasants and other citizens become electors in
government leadership and party and consequently, the emergence of
legitimate leaders; the formation of horizontal links (groups) in growing
grievances and siege, mass demonstration of fired workers or unemployed
in consequence of close-downs; strikes of those long-lastingly unpaid;
workers becoming electors in enterprises from where authorities have
withdrawn; workers becoming share-holders in enterprises that authorities
had privatised.  Partly due to the weakening of power within the net, partly
to growing social pressure and non-compliance, efforts were made to
enforce rule of law. Information channels multiplied and more foreign
pressure was encountered for openness, in consequence of multiplying102
information channels. Criteria of officials’ selection have changed and more
and more corruption cases are revealed.
SHIFTING RATIONALITY FROM POLITICAL TO ECONOMIC?
It seams that a specific shift in rationality is taking place within the net in
consequence of the hardening reproduction constraint. Besides narrowing
the circle of those selected, getting rid (decentralization, close-down, share-
holding, from smaller to larger ones and from lower to higher levels),
political measures and power serves to siphoning away and feeding back
those large-scale that are resourceful. Resourcefulness may and may not
mean efficiency. This dynamics suggests that former politically rational
selection criteria in conditions of soft reproduction constraints is becoming
more differentiated in hardening reproduction constraints and in the
presence and pressure of growing field outside the net. Selection criteria
from the point of view of distribution seems still politically rational,
pressure exerted on banks for loans by authorities are politically rational.
Meanwhile extraction criteria are indirectly becoming economically
rational. The reason of this latter is that despite the criteria remains the
resourcefulness for more resource extraction, and therefore, on the short
term, larger annual production may be more important than larger profit
107.
However, on the long-term, those enterprises will remain economically
resourceful in the shrinking net and hardening reproduction constraints
within it, who are able to adapt and compete with the field outside the
net
108. Therefore, selection criteria for the sake of more extraction within
the net may shift in the long-run. a) banks are giving loans to large
enterprises for profitable projects for their own sake and in view of
growing competition by entering the WTO (Ya’an bank) b) Organization
Department politically awarding position to those with good performance
and decentralizing those to Industrial Bureaus with declining
performance
109. However, these latter signs (banks, politically awarding)
                    
107 Rebated VAT tax in volume is much more important than corporate income tax.
108 SOEs were encouraged by local authorities to make investments as they possibly
could. Due to the increased economic activity, local finance did benefit from it for a
short time. However, since these economic activities were not profitable and
therefore self-sustaining, these SOEs declined sharply as soon as resources were
exhausted in late 1990s.
109 Before 1996, 147 enterprise nomenklatura was kept in Organization Bureau. After
1996 only 52 enterprises were kept, those with large scale and good performance.103
remain either a kind of will or are selectively implemented. Giving loans to
profitable projects have been advocated for decades, but no substantial success
in this respect was achieved. It turned out that those projects that got loans were
loss making ones. Bad loans are still accumulated by banks, though great
efforts and political pressures were put to decrease them. Authorities wanted to
keep large SOEs with good performance. But bad ones resisted and some of
them managed to be merged into good ones. Especially successful were those
large ones with bad performance, since they could still menace authorities.
Therefore, though there is a will to change according to economic rationality,
the system (and particular authorities) just could not achieve it, or could only
achieve it partially, faintly, or delayed. Therefore it could not prevent the state
sector, the links, the dependency from declining.
Concluding the above the empirical research on the transformation of the net at
prefecture and county levels has proved that the model may be used as an
instrument for empirical analysis. It has also proved that the dynamics of self-
withdrawing pattern may be verified both at prefecture and county levels. Also
differences in extent of self-withdrawal in different aggregations and in
different units of one aggregation level may be traced.
The relative and absolute shrinking of the party-state￿s net, its accelerating
disintegration, and the growing extent of activities outside its influence and
changing relationships among the actors within the net and those within and
outside of it point to the characteristics of the self-withdrawing pattern:
disintegration, parallel to transformation.
All these dynamics were traced from the point of view of the authorities, since
interviews did not include the views of one major actor in this disintegration
and transformation process: that of the economic units linked to the net. In
order to acquire a more comprehensive picture, one should also reveal the how
do economic units in different bargaining position within the net react to the
transformation of the net and the growth of the field outside the net.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1
Current Revenue Assignments between the Central and Provincial
Governments
                                                                                                                                              
But even the number of these may change. Not all of those 52 SOEs were for sure to
be appointed by Organization Department. If the performance of an enterprise
declined, it would be dropped out of this panel. If an enterprise previously outside
this panel developed to an enterprise whose scale is large enough and which was
with good performance, it could be promoted into the panel (Wuxi policy research
office).104
I. Taxes exclusively assigned to the Central Government
1. Excise taxes
2. Income tax of all central government enterprises
3. Taxes collected from the Ministry of Railroads and from the
headquarters of banks and insurance companies
4. Income taxes, sales taxes and royalties from offshore oil activities of
foreign companies and joint ventures
5. Energy and transportation fund contribution
6. Seventy percent of the three sales taxes collected from enterprises owned
by the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Power, SINOPEC
(petrochemicals), and the China nonferrous metals companies.
7. All customs duty, VAT and excise taxes on imports
8. Enterprise income tax collected from banks and other financial
institutions.
II. Taxes shared between the central and local governments
1. Value-added tax (75 percent central, 25 percent provincial)
2. Natural resource taxes (coal, gas, oil, and other minerals if the
enterprises are fully Chinese owned.)
3. Construction tax on the cost of construction of buildings that are outside
the plan and financed from retained earnings
4. Salt tax
5. Security and exchange tax (50 percent central, 50 percent provincial)
6. Industrial and commercial tax, and income tax levied on foreign and
joint venture enterprises.
III. Taxes exclusively assigned to local governments
1. Income tax and adjustment tax of locally owned state enterprises,
collectives, and private enterprises.
2. Business (gross receipts) tax falling on sectors not covered by VAT
(transportation and communications, construction, finance and in-
surance, post and telecommunications, culture and sports, entertainment,
hotels and restaurants, and other)
3. Rural market (stall rental) trading tax105
4. The urban maintenance and construction tax (a surcharge on the tax
liability of enterprises for business tax, consumption tax, and VAT)
5. The urban land use tax
6. Vehicle and vessel utilization tax
7. Thirty percent of the product and VAT revenues collected from enter-
prises owned by the Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Power,
SINOPEC, and the China nonferrous metals companies
8. Individual income tax
9. Value-added tax on land
10. Education surtax
11. Entertainment and slaughter taxes
12. Property tax
13. Surtax on collective enterprises
14. Resources tax
15. Fixed asset investment tax (discontinued in 1999)
16. Fines for delinquent taxes.
Source: Updated from Bahl, R. (1999). Fiscal Policy in China: Taxation and Inter-
governmental Fiscal Relations. San Francisco: 1990 Institute and the University of
Michigan Press. In Wong 2002, p. 51, Table 4.1.106
APPENDIX 2
Data collected from different level statistics and their possible
homogeneity
LEVELS
NATIONAL PROVINCIAL PREFECTURE COUNTY
INDICATORS dates dates dates dates
Number of SOEs x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 x 94 (93), 01 (00) x 94 (93), 01 (00)
Total Employment
SOEs x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 x 94, 00 (01)
Collective E x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 x 94, 00 (01)
Private E x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 x 94, 00 (01)
Output of SOEs x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 x 94 (93), 01 (00) x 94 (93), 01 (00)
Total profits by SOEs x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 x 94 (93), 01 (00) x
* 94 (93), 01 (00)
Total subsidies to SOEs x 1994, 2000 ––
–
Loss
￿making SOEs –– x 94 (93), 01 (00) x 94 (93), 01 (00)
Losses of SOEs –– x 94 (93), 01 (00) x 94 (93), 01 (00)
Total investment in fixed assets by ownership
SOEs x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 x 94 (93), 01 (00) x 94 (93), 01 (00)
Collective x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 x 94 (93), 01 (00) x 94 (93), 01 (00)
Private Es x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 x
** 94 (93), 01 (00) x
*** 94 (93), 01 (00)
Jointly owned x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 ––
Shareholding x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 ––
Foreign funded x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 ––
Overseas Ch. x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 ––
Others x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 ––




x 1994, 2000 ––
domestic loans x 1994, 2000 ––
foreign
investment
x 1994, 2000 –– –
fundraising
and others
x 1994, 2000 –– – –
Share of enterprises in total industrial output
SOEs x 1994, 1999 x 1994, 1997 x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000
Collective E x 1994, 1999 x 1994, 1997 x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000
Private E x 1994, 1999
– x 1994, 2000 x
**** 1994, 2000
Share￿hold. x 1994, 1999
– x 94 (93), 01 (00) x
**** 1994, 2000
Investment in fixed assets of SOEs by source of finance
state
budgetary
x 1994, 2000 –– –107
appropriation
domestic loans x 1994, 2000 –– –
foreign investment x 1994, 2000 –– –
Fundraising x 1994, 2000 –– –
Others x 1994, 2000 –– –




x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 ––
domestic loans x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 ––
foreign investment x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 ––
Fundraising x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 ––
Others x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 ––
central projects x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 ––
local projects x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 ––
FDI x 1994, 2000 x 1994, 2000 x
**** 1993, 2001 –
Investment by administrative subordination (central￿local)
Value x 1994, 2000 –– –
Ratio x 1994, 2000 –– –
Government Revenue at central and local level
Value x 1993, 2000 –– –
Ratio x 1993, 2000 –– –
Government expenditure at central and local level
Value x 1993, 2000 –– –




x 1990, 1995 –– –
Government revenue,
expenditure, and balance
x 1994, 2000 x 1995, 2000 x 94 (93), 01 (00) x 94 (93), 01 (00)
Government revenue by source
total re. x 1994, 2000 –– –
Taxes x 1994, 2000 –– –
subsidies to
loss making
x 1994, 2000 –– –
fundraising for
infrastructure
x 1994, 2000 –– –
budget adjust-
ment fund
x 1994, 2000 –– –
extra-charges
for education
x 1994, 2000 –– –
Other x 1994, 2000 –– –
Notes:  x available; - non-available
* except in Changzhi county and Wuxiang county108
** except in Wuxi prefecture
*** except Jiangyin county and Yixing county
**** except in Changzhi and Ya’an prefectures
APPENDIX 3
Table on time and location
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Wuxiang R→ Peak of TVEs Wuxiang
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Ya￿an R→ More emphasis
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Jiangyin I3→ Political ranks





















































































































Yucheng R↑ Some resources
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Note:   R ↑↓ → Revenue extraction, transfer, mobilization
D1↑↓ → centralizing dependency, decentralizing  and restructuring dependency
lines
D2↑↓ → centralizing, decentralizing and restructuring interlinking lines
P     privatization;
P+ increasing private sphere
Exp.     centralizing and decentralizing expenditures
I3 forming and ceasing feedbacks
1994: R↓; Exp R↑ R↑ R↑ D1→D1→D1→P
1995: I3 I3 D1→D1→P P+P+
1996: R↑ D2↓ D2→ D2→ D1→ P P P
1997: D2→D1→D2→R→
1998: D1↓D1↑D1↑R↑ R→ P P P P
1999: R↑ D2↓; P+D1→D2→D2→




Revenue, expenditure, and balance on province level in 1995 and 2000
(million RMB)
1995 2000 Difference Rate
Revenue 16707.3 23386.3 6679 140
Expenditure 27772.1 45200.4 17428.3 163
Shanxi
Balance -11064.8 -21814.1 -10749.3 197 def.
Revenue 17264.0 44831.0 27567 260
Expenditure 25348.8 59128.1 33779.3 233
Jiangsu
Balance -8084.8 -14297.1 -6212.3 177 def.
Revenue 16707.3 23386.3 6679 140
Expenditure 27772.1 45200.4 17428.3 163
Sichuan
Balance -11064.8 -21814.1 -10749.3 197 def.
Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/, Statistics, 1996. China Statistical Yearbook, 2001,
compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of China, Beijing: China Statistics Press,
2001, p. 262, 266.127
APPENDIX 5
Loss-making SOEs and volume of losses at prefecture level in 1994 (93)
and 2000 (01)






















Source: Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 1995, edited by Changzhi prefecture
statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 1995, p.121, 127;
Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 2002, edited by Changzhi prefecture statistic
bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 2002 p.138, 146; Wuxi Statistical
Yearbook: 1994, edited by Wuxi statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press
(Beijing), 1994, p.157, 159; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook 2002, electronic version, edited
by Wuxi Center for Economic Information, 2002; Ya￿an Statistical Data: 1995, edited
and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 1995, p.81, 88, 89; Ya￿an Statistical
Yearbook: 2001, edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 2001, p.
104,105.128
APPENDIX 6
Number of enterprises at prefecture level in 1994 (93) and 2000 (01)
1994 (93) 2000 (01) Difference Rate
SOEs 309 198
Collective 5472 ￿ - ￿
Changzhi
prefecture






SOEs 198 60 30.3
Collective 1838 895 40.7
Ya’an
prefecture
Pes 12803 19734 154.1
Source: Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 1995, edited by Changzhi prefecture
statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 1995, p.117, 148;
Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 2002, edited by Changzhi prefecture statistic
bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 2002; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook:
1994, edited by Wuxi statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing),
1994, p.128; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook 2002, electronic version, edited by Wuxi Center
for Economic Information, 2002; Ya￿an Statistical Data: 1995, edited and published by
Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 1995, p.56-57; Ya￿an Statistical Yearbook: 2001,
edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 2001, p.93-95;129
APPENDIX 7
Employment at prefectures in 1994 (93) and 2000 (01)
1994 (93) 2000 (01) Difference Rate
SOEs 317,174 209,207 -108507 66 Changzhi
prefecture Collective 72,437 30,693 -41744 42
SOEs 464,563 287,407 -177156 62 Wuxi
prefecture Collective 227,469 67,006 -160463 29
SOEs 115,600 92,800   /00 -22800 80 Ya’an
prefecture Collective 17,100 12,700   /00 -4400 74
Source: Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 1995, edited by Changzhi prefecture
statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 1995, p.332, 340;
Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 2002, edited by Changzhi prefecture statistic
bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 2002 p.380, 392; Wuxi Statistical
Yearbook: 1994, edited by Wuxi statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press
(Beijing), 1994, p.55; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook 2002, electronic version, edited by
Wuxi Center for Economic Information, 2002; Ya￿an Statistical Data: 1995, edited and
published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 1995, p.113-114; Ya￿an Statistical
Yearbook: 2001, edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 2001, p.149;130
APPENDIX 8
Total investment by ownership at prefectures in 1994 (93) and 2000
(01) (million RMB)
1994 (93) 2000 (01) Difference Rate
SOEs 1621 3016  /01 1395 186
Collective 119 1684  /01 1565 1415
Changzhi
prefecture
PEs 175 384   /01 209 219
SOEs 5258 19026 13768 362
Collective 12082 10724 -1358 89
Wuxi
prefecture
P E s ￿￿￿￿
SOEs 464 1971 1507 425
Collective 251 110 -141 44
Ya’an
prefecture
PEs 154 327 173 212
Source: Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 1995, edited by Changzhi prefecture
statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 1995, p.269; Changzhi
Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 2002, edited by Changzhi prefecture statistic bureau,
published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 2002 p.325; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook:
1994, edited by Wuxi statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing),
1994, p.244; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook 2002, electronic version, edited by Wuxi Center
for Economic Information, 2002; Ya￿an Statistical Data: 1995, edited and published by
Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 1995, p.95, 101,102; Ya￿an Statistical Yearbook:
2001, edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 2001, p.126-128.131
APPENDIX 9
Total investment by ownership at counties in 1994 (93) and 2000 (01)
(million RMB)
1994 (93) 2000 (01) Difference Rate %
SOEs 28 72 44 257
Collective 48 97 49 202
Changzhi
county
Pes 22 26 4 118
SOEs 13 34 21 262
Collective 2 59 57 2950
Wuxiang
county
Pes 7 24 17 343
SOEs 848 2244 1396 265
Collective 3197 4204 1007 132
Jiangyin
county
P e s ￿￿￿￿
SOEs 770 1521 751 198
Collective 2233 2011 -222 90
Yixing
county
P e s ￿￿￿￿
SOEs 240 193 -47 80
Collective 62 22 -40 35
Yucheng
county
P e s 4 56 52 0 1 4 4
SOEs 33 109 76 330
Collective 30 10 -20 33
Mingshan
county
P e s 2 94 92 0 1 3 1
Source: Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 1995, edited by Changzhi prefecture
statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 1995, p.269; Changzhi
Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 2002, edited by Changzhi prefecture statistic bureau,
published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 2002 p.325; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook:
1994, edited by Wuxi statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing),
1994, p.244; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook 2002, electronic version, edited by Wuxi Center
for Economic Information, 2002; Ya￿an Statistical Data: 1995, edited and published by
Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 1995, p.95, 101,102; Ya￿an Statistical Yearbook:
2001, edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 2001, p.126-128.132
APPENDIX 10
SOE losses at surveyed counties in 1994 (93) and 2000 (01)
1994 (93) 2000 (01) Difference Rate
Number of loss-
making SOEs




0.4 19.3 18.9 4825
Number of loss-
making SOEs




1.0 0 -1.0 0
Number of loss-
making SOEs




7.9 5.1 -2.8 65
Number of loss-
making SOEs




14.8 5.6 -9.2 38
Number of loss-
making SOEs




71.8 27.7 -44.1 39
Number of loss-
making SOEs




17.3 6.9 -10.4 40
Source: Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 1995, edited by Changzhi prefecture
statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 1995, p.142, 144;
Changzhi Prefecture Statistical Yearbook: 2002, edited by Changzhi prefecture statistic
bureau, published by China Statistic Press (Beijing), 2002 p.178, 180; Wuxi Statistical
Yearbook: 1994, edited by Wuxi statistic bureau, published by China Statistic Press
(Beijing), 1994, p.172; Wuxi Statistical Yearbook 2002, electronic version, edited by
Wuxi Center for Economic Information, 2002; Ya￿an Statistical Data: 1995, edited and
published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 1995, p.81, 89; Ya￿an Statistical
Yearbook: 2001, edited and published by Ya￿an prefecture statistic bureau, 2001, p.104,
114-115.133
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